# Round 2 v North Texas KP

## 1NC

### 1NC

#### 1. Interpretation: The role of the ballot is to determine if the enactment of a topical plan is better than the status quo or a competitive option. The 1ac must read and defend the implementation of such a topical plan.

#### 2. Violation:

#### A) “Resolved” implies a policy or legislative decision – means they must be resolved about a future federal government policy

Parcher 1

Jeff Parcher, former debate coach at Georgetown, Feb 2001 http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html

Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desirablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the preliminary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution.

#### B) USFG is the national government in DC

Encarta Online Encyclopedia, 2k

(http://encarta.msn.com)

“The federal government **of the U**nited **S**tates **is centered in** Washington **DC”**

#### C) Should means there is a practical reason for action

WordNet in ‘97

Princeton University, 1.6

**Should** v 1 : be expected to: “Parties should be fun” 2 : **expresses an** emotional**, practical,** or other **reason for doing something:** “You had better put on warm clothes”; “You should call your mother-in-law”; *“The State ought to repair bridges*”[syn**:** had better, ought]

#### 3. Vote Negative:

#### A) Decisionmaking - a limited topic of discussion that provides for equitable ground is key to decision-making and advocacy skills

Steinberg & Freeley 8

\*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45-

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Specifically, decisionmaking skills based on specific energy policy proposals are key to motivate legislative fence-sitters – the aff’s strategy is doomed to the status quo

Brown 11

[heath, PhD Political Science, Roanoke, Salem, VA, “narrative strategies used by interest groups during the 2008 presidental transition”, 2011 Pat-Net Conference]

Milbrath argues that interest groups must strategically present information so as to ¶ overcome the “perceptual screen” that shields policy makers from absorbing endless amounts ¶ of information. He suggests that groups use facts (scientific information about policy ¶ outcomes), arguments (normative explanations of justness or rightness of action), and power¶ (typically subtle offers of political support or threats of political retribution) to communicate ¶ their interests and make their case for policy action (or inaction). In a more recent approach, ¶ Esterling (2007, p. 79) makes the case that groups can use [using] “instrumental” – “research or ¶ evidence-based causal” arguments -- or “normative” – “intrinsic desirability” arguments. By ¶ emphasizing one of these approaches, a group is tacitly communicating the way it wants to ¶ persuade the target of the information. By emphasizing power or normative arguments, the ¶ group implies that the policy maker should make decisions based primarily on their political ¶ judgment and political future. Conversely, by emphasizing facts-based or instrumental ¶ arguments, the group implies that the policy maker should base decisions primarily on rational ¶ or scientific considerations. In practice, it is difficult to disentangle these two types of ¶ arguments and many groups will likely combine various ways to present information (Wright ¶ 1996; Rochefort and Cobb 1994). The dichotomy though does help clarify the persuasive or ¶ argumentative tone of the information and advice given by groups to policy makers. 6 ¶ While public perceptions of interest groups might suggest crass self-interest, ¶ manipulation, and deception, groups have an incentive to be forthright in the information they ¶ provide and arguments they make. A group that provides shoddy statistics or misleading ¶ arguments will be discounted in future interactions with the policy maker (Kersh 2009; ¶ Easterling 2007). John E. Chubb (1983, p. 145) writes in regard to energy interest groups: ¶ “information and advice that are solely self-serving threaten the bond of trust that facilitates ¶ the informal play of influence.” In fact, rather than targeting political opponents or fence ¶ sitters, much research suggests that groups prefer or are invited to lobby friends and allies over ¶ adversaries (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, 1999; Hall and Deardorff ¶ 2006; Bauer et al. 1963; Holyoke 2004; McCool 1990). If this is the case, the cost of ¶ misrepresenting or overstating information may be particularly high for those engaged in what ¶ Hall and Deardorff (2006) and others have called “legislative subsidy” (Hall and Deardorff 2006; ¶ Esterling 2007a). From this subsidy perspective, if a policy maker is sub-contracting information ¶ collection and analysis to an allied interest group, it behooves that group to be conscientious, ¶ thorough, and consistent in the information and advice it gives. And in many cases, as Wright ¶ (1996) contends, it is relatively easy for policy makers to check the authenticity of the ¶ information provided to them, sometimes simply through the contradictory information ¶ provided by other groups, thereby curtailing the inclination to blatantly misrepresent the truth. ¶ Furthermore, experimental research shows that factual or instrumental information is ¶ preferred by legislative staff (LaPira 2008) and neutral expert lobbyists have more legislative ¶ access than non-experts (Esterling 2007b). Facts may be useful on their own terms in ¶ formulating legislative decisions but scientific or statistically based arguments also serve as a 7 ¶ cue for policy makers to determine the credibility or reliability of the advice they are given ¶ (Sabatier 1978). ¶ Rather than convince those already in agreement, the approach taken by proactive ¶ theorists suggests that groups seek to convince legislative fence sitters or opponents to adopt ¶ the group’s position, advocate the group’s interests, or simply vote in the group’s way through ¶ the offer of, or refusal to give, political support (Smith 1984; Austen-Smith and Wright 1994; ¶ Wright 1996). Wright (1990) for one finds that groups which distribute campaign contributions ¶ to a wide group of legislators are then able to access a wider group, rather than just political ¶ allies (Wright 1990). Similarly, Heberling (2005) shows that one group, the AFL-CIO, seeks out ¶ legislators with unknown political preferences rather than targeting political allies (Heberling ¶ 2005). The field of interest group research has not yet resolved whether groups typically lobby ¶ friends, adversaries, or some combination of the two (Leech and Baumgartner 1998). This is ¶ likely due to the wide variation of group types and also policy domains in which groups operate. ¶ These inter-organizational and inter-policy differences affect the strategies employed and ¶ therefore the content of information presented during lobbying.

#### Switch-side is key to making those decisionmaking skills effective – EPA debates prove

Mitchell 10

(Gordon R., Associate Professor, Director of Graduate Studies, and Director of the William Pitt Debating Union at the University of Pittsburgh; Spring, “Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 1 – Kurr)

The preceding analysis of U.S. intelligence community debating initiatives highlighted how analysts are challenged to navigate discursively the heteroglossia of vast amounts of different kinds of data flowing through intelligence streams. Public policy planners are tested in like manner when they attempt to stitch together institutional arguments from various and sundry inputs ranging from expert testimony, to historical precedent, to public comment. Just as intelligence managers find that algorithmic, formal methods of analysis often don't work when it comes to the task of interpreting and synthesizing copious amounts of disparate data, public-policy planners encounter similar challenges. In fact, the argumentative turn in public-policy planning elaborates an approach to public-policy analysis that foregrounds deliberative interchange and critical thinking as alternatives to "decisionism," the formulaic application of "objective" decision algorithms to the public policy process. Stating the matter plainly, Majone suggests, "whether in written or oral form, argument is central in all stages of the policy process." Accordingly, he notes, "we miss a great deal if we try to understand policy-making solely in terms of power, influence, and bargaining, to the exclusion of debate and argument."51 One can see similar rationales driving Goodwin and Davis's EPA debating project, where debaters are invited to conduct on-site public debates covering resolutions crafted to reflect key points of stasis in the EPA decision-making process. For example, in the 2008 Water Wars debates held at EPA headquarters in Washington, D.C., resolutions were crafted to focus attention on the topic of water pollution, with one resolution focusing on downstream states' authority to control upstream states' discharges and sources of pollutants, and a second resolution exploring the policy merits of bottled water and toilet paper taxes as revenue sources to fund water infrastructure projects. In the first debate on interstate river pollution, the team of Seth Gannon and Seungwon Chung from Wake Forest University argued in favor of downstream state control, with the Michigan State University team of Carly Wunderlich and Garrett Abelkop providing opposition. In the second debate on taxation policy, Kevin Kallmyer and Matthew Struth from University of Mary Washington defended taxes on bottled water and toilet paper, while their opponents from Howard University, Dominique Scott and Jarred McKee, argued against this proposal. Reflecting on the project, Goodwin noted how the intercollegiate [End Page 106] debaters' ability to act as "honest brokers" in the policy arguments contributed positively to internal EPA deliberation on both issues.52 Davis observed that since the invited debaters "didn't have a dog in the fight," they were able to give voice to previously buried arguments that some EPA subject matter experts felt reticent to elucidate because of their institutional affiliations.53 Such findings are consistent with the views of policy analysts advocating the argumentative turn in policy planning. As Majone claims, "Dialectical confrontation between generalists and experts often succeeds in bringing out unstated assumptions, conflicting interpretations of the facts, and the risks posed by new projects."54 Frank Fischer goes even further in this context, explicitly appropriating rhetorical scholar Charles Willard's concept of argumentative "epistemics" to flesh out his vision for policy studies: Uncovering the epistemic dynamics of public controversies would allow for a more enlightened understanding of what is at stake in a particular dispute, making possible a sophisticated evaluation of the various viewpoints and merits of different policy options. In so doing, the differing, often tacitly held contextual perspectives and values could be juxtaposed; the viewpoints and demands of experts, special interest groups, and the wider public could be directly compared; and the dynamics among the participants could be scrutizined. This would by no means sideline or even exclude scientific assessment; it would only situate it within the framework of a more comprehensive evaluation.55 As Davis notes, institutional constraints present within the EPA communicative milieu can complicate efforts to provide a full airing of all relevant arguments pertaining to a given regulatory issue. Thus, intercollegiate debaters can play key roles in retrieving and amplifying positions that might otherwise remain sedimented in the policy process. The dynamics entailed in this symbiotic relationship are underscored by deliberative planner John Forester, who observes, "If planners and public administrators are to make democratic political debate and argument possible, they will need strategically located allies to avoid being fully thwarted by the characteristic self-protecting behaviors of the planning organizations and bureaucracies within which they work."56 Here, an institution's need for "strategically located allies" to support deliberative practice constitutes the demand for rhetorically informed expertise, setting up what can be considered a demand-driven rhetoric of science. As an instance of rhetoric of science scholarship, this type of "switch-side public [End Page 107] debate"57 differs both from insular contest tournament debating, where the main focus is on the pedagogical benefit for student participants, and first-generation rhetoric of science scholarship, where critics concentrated on unmasking the rhetoricity of scientific artifacts circulating in what many perceived to be purely technical spheres of knowledge production.58 As a form of demand-driven rhetoric of science, switch-side debating connects directly with the communication field's performative tradition of argumentative engagement in public controversy—a different route of theoretical grounding than rhetorical criticism's tendency to locate its foundations in the English field's tradition of literary criticism and textual analysis.59 Given this genealogy, it is not surprising to learn how Davis's response to the EPA's institutional need for rhetorical expertise took the form of a public debate proposal, shaped by Davis's dual background as a practitioner and historian of intercollegiate debate. Davis competed as an undergraduate policy debater for Howard University in the 1970s, and then went on to enjoy substantial success as coach of the Howard team in the new millennium. In an essay reviewing the broad sweep of debating history, Davis notes, "Academic debate began at least 2,400 years ago when the scholar Protagoras of Abdera (481–411 BC), known as the father of debate, conducted debates among his students in Athens."60 As John Poulakos points out, "older" Sophists such as Protagoras taught Greek students the value of dissoi logoi, or pulling apart complex questions by debating two sides of an issue.61 The few surviving fragments of Protagoras's work suggest that his notion of dissoi logoi stood for the principle that "two accounts [logoi] are present about every 'thing,' opposed to each other," and further, that humans could "measure" the relative soundness of knowledge claims by engaging in give-and-take where parties would make the "weaker argument stronger" to activate the generative aspect of rhetorical practice, a key element of the Sophistical tradition.62 Following in Protagoras's wake, Isocrates would complement this centrifugal push with the pull of synerchésthé, a centripetal exercise of "coming together" deliberatively to listen, respond, and form common social bonds.63 Isocrates incorporated Protagorean dissoi logoi into synerchésthé, a broader concept that he used flexibly to express interlocking senses of (1) inquiry, as in groups convening to search for answers to common questions through discussion;64 (2) deliberation, with interlocutors gathering in a political setting to deliberate about proposed courses of action;65 and (3) alliance formation, a form of collective action typical at festivals,66 or in the exchange of pledges that deepen social ties.67 [End Page 108] Returning once again to the Kettering-informed sharp distinction between debate and deliberation, one sees in Isocratic synerchésthé, as well as in the EPA debating initiative, a fusion of debate with deliberative functions. Echoing a theme raised in this essay's earlier discussion of intelligence tradecraft, such a fusion troubles categorical attempts to classify debate and deliberation as fundamentally opposed activities. The significance of such a finding is amplified by the frequency of attempts in the deliberative democracy literature to insist on the theoretical bifurcation of debate and deliberation as an article of theoretical faith. Tandem analysis of the EPA and intelligence community debating initiatives also brings to light dimensions of contrast at the third level of Isocratic synerchésthé, alliance formation. The intelligence community's Analytic Outreach initiative invites largely one-way communication flowing from outside experts into the black box of classified intelligence analysis. On the contrary, the EPA debating program gestures toward a more expansive project of deliberative alliance building. In this vein, Howard University's participation in the 2008 EPA Water Wars debates can be seen as the harbinger of a trend by historically black colleges and universities (HBCUS) to catalyze their debate programs in a strategy that evinces Davis's dual-focus vision. On the one hand, Davis aims to recuperate Wiley College's tradition of competitive excellence in intercollegiate debate, depicted so powerfully in the feature film The Great Debaters, by starting a wave of new debate programs housed in HBCUS across the nation.68 On the other hand, Davis sees potential for these new programs to complement their competitive debate programming with participation in the EPA's public debating initiative. This dual-focus vision recalls Douglas Ehninger's and Wayne Brockriede's vision of "total" debate programs that blend switch-side intercollegiate tournament debating with forms of public debate designed to contribute to wider communities beyond the tournament setting.69 Whereas the political telos animating Davis's dual-focus vision certainly embraces background assumptions that Greene and Hicks would find disconcerting—notions of liberal political agency, the idea of debate using "words as weapons"70—there is little doubt that the project of pursuing environmental protection by tapping the creative energy of HBCU-leveraged dissoi logoi differs significantly from the intelligence community's effort to improve its tradecraft through online digital debate programming. Such difference is especially evident in light of the EPA's commitment to extend debates to public realms, with the attendant possible benefits unpacked by Jane Munksgaard and Damien Pfister: [End Page 109] Having a public debater argue against their convictions, or confess their indecision on a subject and subsequent embrace of argument as a way to seek clarity, could shake up the prevailing view of debate as a war of words. Public uptake of the possibility of switch-sides debate may help lessen the polarization of issues inherent in prevailing debate formats because students are no longer seen as wedded to their arguments. This could transform public debate from a tussle between advocates, with each public debater trying to convince the audience in a Manichean struggle about the truth of their side, to a more inviting exchange focused on the content of the other's argumentation and the process of deliberative exchange.71 Reflection on the EPA debating initiative reveals a striking convergence among (1) the expressed need for dissoi logoi by government agency officials wrestling with the challenges of inverted rhetorical situations, (2) theoretical claims by scholars regarding the centrality of argumentation in the public policy process, and (3) the practical wherewithal of intercollegiate debaters to tailor public switch-side debating performances in specific ways requested by agency collaborators. These points of convergence both underscore previously articulated theoretical assertions regarding the relationship of debate to deliberation, as well as deepen understanding of the political role of deliberation in institutional decision making. But they also suggest how decisions by rhetorical scholars about whether to contribute switch-side debating acumen to meet demand-driven rhetoric of science initiatives ought to involve careful reflection. Such an approach mirrors the way policy planning in the "argumentative turn" is designed to respond to the weaknesses of formal, decisionistic paradigms of policy planning with situated, contingent judgments informed by reflective deliberation.

#### B) Dialogue - predictable points of stasis are key – effective deliberation is critical to preventing mass violence as it overcomes politically debilitating self-obsession

Roberts-Miller 03

(Patricia Roberts-Miller is Associate Professor of Rhetoric at the University of Texas "Fighting Without Hatred: Hannah Arendt’s Agonistic Rhetoric" JAC 22.2 2003)

Totalitarianism and the Competitive Space of Agonism Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism andEichmann in Jerusa¬lem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into **solipsistic and unreflective behavior**. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all **imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience**, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58) What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that **it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical**. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social." Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who **abdicate their human capacities** and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with **disastrous consequences**, **both for other people and eventually for themselves**" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, butnot act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a **people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews**. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their **constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible**. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibil¬ity for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a **totalitarian system**, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; **there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies**. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody. It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitar¬ian systems, Arendt's solution is the **playful and competitive space of agonism**; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the **assumption of competition,** and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are **not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments**, **of one's thought**. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives. Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to **articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response**. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that **one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it**. The situation is agonistic **not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict**, but because **conflict is a necessary consequence of difference**. This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity. Continued… Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banal¬ity of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to **engage in mass murder** **because he was able not to think about it,** especially **not from the perspective of the victims**, and he was able to **exempt himself from personal responsibility** by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87). Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes, Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the **central mystery of the holocaust**—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, **fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy**, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87) Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social. Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4). Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: **denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive**. To put it another way, **theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies**. Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38). By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others: Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am ponder¬ing a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241) There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "**critical thinking**, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, **necessarily public discourse**: critical thinking is possible "**only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection**" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; **participants are interlocutors** and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must **be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed.** Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259). Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. InEichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in bothrhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238). The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). **The paradoxical nature of agonism** (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking. Arendt's Polemical Agonism As I said, agonism does have its advocates within rhetoric—Burke, Ong, Sloane, Gage, and Jarratt, for instance—but while each of these theorists proposes a form of conflictual argument, not one of these is as adversarial as Arendt's. Agonism can emphasize persuasion, as does John Gage's textbook The Shape of Reason or William Brandt et al.'s The Craft of Writing. That is, the goal of the argument is to identify the disagreement and then construct a text that gains the assent of the audience. This is not the same as what Gage (citing Thomas Conley) calls "asymmetrical theories of rhetoric": theories that "presuppose an active speaker and a passive audience, a speaker whose rhetorical task is therefore to do something to that audience" ("Reasoned" 6). Asymmetric rhetoric is not and cannot be agonistic. Persuasive agonism still **values conflict, disagreement, and equality** among interlocutors, but it **has the goal of reaching agreement,** as when Gage says that the process of argument should enable one's reasons to be "understood and believed" by others (Shape 5; emphasis added). Arendt's version is what one might call polemical agonism: it puts less emphasis on gaining assent, and it is exemplified both in Arendt's own writing and in Donald Lazere's "Ground Rules for Polemicists" and "Teaching the Political Conflicts." Both forms of agonism (persuasive and polemical) require substantive debate at two points in a long and recursive process. First, one engages in debate in order to invent one's argument; even silent thinking is a "dialogue of myself with myself (Lectures 40). The difference between the two approaches to agonism is clearest when one presents an argument to an audience assumed to be an opposition. In persuasive agonism, one plays down conflict and moves through reasons to try to persuade one's audience. In polemical agonism, however, one's intention is not necessarily to prove one's case, but to make public one' s thought in order to test it. In this way, communicability serves the same function in philosophy that replicability serves in the sciences; it **is how one tests the validity of one's thought**. In persuasive agonism, success is achieved through persuasion; in polemical agonism, success may be marked through the quality of subsequent controversy. Arendt quotes from a letter Kant wrote on this point: You know that I do not approach reasonable objections with the intention merely of refuting them, but that in thinking them over I always weave them into my judgments, and afford them the opportunity of overturning all my most cherished beliefs. I entertain the hope that by thus viewing my judgments impartially from the standpoint of others some third view that will improve upon my previous insight may be obtainable. {Lectures 42) Kant's use of "impartial" here is interesting: he is not describing a stance that is free of all perspective; it is impartial only in the sense that it is not his own view. This is the same way that Arendt uses the term; she does not advocate any kind of positivistic rationality, but instead a "universal interdependence" ("Truth" 242). She does not place the origin of the "disinterested pursuit of truth" in science, but at "the moment when Homer chose to sing the deeds of the Trojans no less than those of the Achaeans, and to praise the glory of Hector, the foe and the defeated man, no less than the glory of Achilles, the hero of his kinfolk" ("Truth" 262¬63). It is useful to note that Arendt tends not to use the term "universal," opting more often for "common," by which she means both what is shared and what is ordinary, a usage that evades many of the problems associated with universalism while preserving its virtues (for a brief butprovocative application of Arendt's notion of common, see Hauser 100-03). In polemical agonism, there is a sense in which one' s main goal is not to persuade one's readers; persuading one's readers, if this means that they fail to see errors and flaws in one' s argument, might actually be a sort of failure. It means that one wishes to put forward an argument that makes clear what one's stance is and why one holds it, but with the intention of provoking critique and counterargument. Arendt describes Kant's "hope" for his writings not that the number of people who agree with him would increase but "that the circle of his examiners would gradually be en¬larged" {Lectures 39); he wanted interlocutors, not acolytes. This is not consensus-based argument, nor is it what is sometimes called "consociational argument," nor is this argument as mediation or conflict resolution. Arendt (and her commentators) use the term "fight," and they mean it. When Arendt describes the values that are necessary in our world, she says, "They are a sense of honor, desire for fame and glory, the spirit of fighting without hatred and 'without the spirit of revenge,' and indifference to material advantages" {Crises 167). Pitkin summarizes Arendt's argument: "Free citizenship presupposes the ability to fight— openly, seriously, with commitment, and about things that really mat¬ter—without fanaticism, without seeking to exterminate one's oppo¬nents" (266). My point here is two-fold: first, there is not a simple binary opposition between persuasive discourse and eristic discourse, the conflictual versus the collaborative, or argument as opposed to debate. Second, while polemical agonismrequires diversity among interlocutors, and thus seems an extraordinarily appropriate notion, and while it may be a useful corrective to too much emphasis on persuasion, it seems to me that polemical agonism could easily slide into the kind of wrangling that is simply frustrating. Arendt does not describe just how one is to keep the conflict useful. Although she rejects the notion that politics is "no more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing countfs] but pleasure and profit, partisanship, and the lust for dominion," she does not say exactly how we are to know when we are engaging in the existential leap of argument versus when we are lusting for dominion ("Truth" 263). Like other proponents of agonism, Arendt argues that rhetoric does **not lead individuals or communities to ultimate Truth**; **it leads to decisions that will necessarily have to be reconsidered.** Even Arendt, who tends to express a greater faith than many agonists (such as Burke, Sloane, or Kastely) in the ability of individuals to perceive truth, insists that self-deception is always a danger, so public discourse is necessary as a form of testing (see especially Lectures and "Truth"). She remarks that it is difficult to think beyond one's self-interest and that "nothing, indeed, is more common, even among highly sophisticated people, than the blind obstinacy that becomes manifest in lack of imagination and failure to judge" ("Truth" 242). Agonism demands that one **simultaneously trust and doubt one' s own perceptions**, **rely on one's own judgment and consider the judgments of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think.** The question remains whether this is a kind of thought in which everyone can engage. Is the agonistic public sphere (whether political, academic, or scientific) only available to the few? Benhabib puts this criticism in the form of a question: "That is, is the 'recovery of the public space' under conditions of modernity necessarily an elitist and antidemocratic project that can hardly be reconciled with the demand for universal political emancipa¬tion and the universal extension of citizenship rights that have accompa¬nied modernity since the American and French Revolutions?" (75). This is an especially troubling question not only because Arendt's examples of agonistic rhetoric are from elitist cultures, but also because of com¬ments she makes, such as this one from The Human Condition: "As a living experience, thought has always been assumed, perhaps wrongly, to be known only to the few. It may not be presumptuous to believe that these few have not become fewer in our time" {Human 324). Yet, there are **important positive political consequences of agonism.** Arendt' s own promotion of the agonistic sphere helps to explain how **the system could be actively moral**. It is not an overstatement to say that a central theme in Arendt's work is the **evil of conformity**—the fact that the modern bureaucratic state **makes possible extraordinary evil** carried out by people who do not even have any ill will toward their victims. It does so by "imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Human 40). It keeps people from thinking, and it keeps them behaving. The agonistic model's celebration of achievement and verbal skill **undermines the political force of conformity**, so it is **a force against the bureaucratizing of evil.** If people think for themselves, **they will resist dogma**; if people think of themselves as one of many, they will empathize; if people can do both, **they will resist totalitarianism**. And if they talk about what they see, tell their stories, argue about their perceptions, and listen to one another—that is, engage in rhetoric—then they are engaging in antitotalitarian action. In post-Ramistic rhetoric, it is a convention to have a thesis, and one might well wonder just what mine is—whether I am arguing for or against Arendt's agonism. Arendt does not lay out a pedagogy for us to follow (although one might argue that, if she had, it would lookmuch like the one Lazere describes in "Teaching"), so I am not claiming that greater attention to Arendt would untangle various pedagogical problems that teachers of writing face. Nor am I claiming that applying Arendt's views will resolve theoretical arguments that occupy scholarly journals. I am saying, on the one hand, that Arendt's connection of argument and thinking, as well as her perception that both serve to thwart totalitarian¬ism, suggest that agonal rhetoric (despite the current preference for collaborative rhetoric) is the **best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere**. On the other hand, Arendt's advocacy of agonal rhetoric is troubling (and, given her own admiration for Kant, this may be intentional), especially in regard to its potential elitism, masculinism, failure to describe just how to keep argument from collapsing into wrangling, and apparently cheerful acceptance of hierarchy. Even with these flaws, Arendt describes something we would do well to consider thoughtfully: a fact-based but not positivist, communally grounded but not relativist, adversarial but not violent, independent but not expressivist rhetoric.

### 1NC

#### THE 1AC’S DELORIAN EPISTEMOLOGY LEAVES THEM UNABLE TO EVALUATE AND DISMISS CREATIONIST MYTHS AND NEOCONSERVATIVE PSEUDOSCIENTIFIC CLIMATE DENIAL. THIS IS IN EFFECT A CEDING OF THE POLITICAL BY MEANS OF MULTICULTURALISM.

Brumble 98

[H. David, Vine Deloria Jr., Creationism, and Ethnic Psuedoscience, *American Literary History*, Vol. 10, No. 2, Summer, 335-346, prof. English @ University of Pittsburgh]

These people have helped him to prove that dinosaurs did not go¶ extinct millions of years ago: a hundred years ago the Sioux saw¶ the stegosaurus walking in the Badlands.¶ He "gave their knowledge credence." Imagine how these¶ "traditional people," these Standing Rock Sioux, must have felt¶ to have Vine Deloria, a university professor and one of their own,¶ talking with them seriously about paleontology-and giving credence¶ to what they were able to tell him about the stegosaurus,¶ what they were able to tell him out of the storehouse of their¶ traditional knowledge. Anyone who knows anything at all about¶ American Indian history must understand what a moment this¶ must have been. Red Earth, White Lies was written in the spirit of¶ that evening-the book promotes not just the value of American¶ Indian oral traditions, but the scientific value of American Indian¶ oral traditions. And the book is also a heady indictment of the¶ white man's science.¶ The only problem, of course, is that Deloria is wrong. He¶ was wrong on that memorable evening: whatever the beast in the¶ tale might be, the Sioux could not have seen a stegosaurus a hundred¶ years ago. And he is just as obviously wrong on almost every¶ page of Red Earth, White Lies. Here is a sampling:¶ On the Earth as a Youthful Planet: Deloria doubts that the¶ earth is many millions of years old; indeed, he writes, "Most¶ American Indians, I believe, were here 'at the beginning' and¶ have preserved the memory of traumatic continental and planetary¶ catastrophes" (251). The geologists are simply wrong in¶ their reading of the geological record. For example, "vulcanism¶ was a onetime event" (235).¶ Dinosaurs and Human Beings. Indians tell stories about a¶ time when there were monsters on the earth. Some of these monsters¶ Deloria recognizes as dinosaurs: "That is to say, humans¶ and some creatures we have classified as dinosaurs were contemporaries"¶ (241). Deloria is inclined to credit one western tribe's¶ belief that they have in their possession "an unfossilized dinosaur¶ bone" (241). And as we have seen, he believes that the Sioux saw¶ the stegosaurus walking in the Badlands a hundred years ago.¶ On Noah's Flood. Deloria believes in the historical reality of¶ the Biblical flood, because "Indian traditions also spoke of a¶ great flood ... and they had their own culture heroes who followed¶ the same procedure as Noah" (61-62).2 In fact, the Old¶ Testament account of Noah's flood "may very well provide evidence¶ of the basic accuracy of the Indian story" (207). (Just as¶ his forefathers built their encampments in a circle, so Deloria¶ builds his arguments.)¶ American Literary History 337¶ On Pilgrims and Mammoths. Deloria argues that "there¶ were mammoths or mastodons still living in the eastern United¶ States at the time the Pilgrims landed" (143).¶ On the Mormon View of the Origin of the American Indians:¶ Deloria gives credence to the Mormon belief that the American¶ Indians came from the Middle East (62).¶ On the Effects of Increased Levels of Carbon Dioxide. Deloria¶ is convinced that increased levels of carbon dioxide lead to¶ gigantism; this explains the size of the mammoths and the giant¶ sloths-just as it explains the increasing size of human beings¶ since the beginnings of the industrial revolution. Indeed, the increase¶ of carbon dioxide (which most of us worry about in connection¶ with global warming) Deloria sees as one reason for the¶ increased size of football and basketball players since he was in¶ high school (172-77).¶ On the Change in the Coefficient of Gravity. Deloria is inclined¶ to think that the coefficient of gravity has fluctuated so¶ widely as to account (with the increased levels of carbon dioxide)¶ for the gigantism we find in the age of the dinosaurs and again¶ in the age of the mammoths and giant sloths (174).¶ On Ecology. By way of dismissing the idea that such animals¶ as the mammoth might have gone extinct because of climate¶ change, Deloria writes that "[i]t hardly seems possible that any¶ animal, living in a more benign region for a change, would¶ promptly expire" (164)-as though penguins, for example,¶ would really be better off in San Diego.¶ On Evolution: Evolution is a failed theory: "[E]ven the most¶ sophisticated of modern scientists, in explaining the fossil remains,¶ finds that species in the rocks are distant relatives to each¶ other, not direct lineages" (40). At one point Deloria refers dismissively¶ to "the outmoded sequence of alleged human evolution"¶ (217). Once Deloria has considered the evidence, he asks,¶ "Where is evolution?" (238).¶ On the Character of Science. Scientists are virtually incapable¶ of independent thinking; they are hobbled by their reverence¶ for orthodoxy (42-44, 50-51, 154-55, 180, 202, 231-32);¶ scientists characteristically persecute those who dare to advance¶ unorthodox views; science is thus essentially a religion (17-18,¶ 41, 87, 178, 251)-and scientists are in the thrall of their scientific¶ myths. In many areas science is nothing more than "a hilarious¶ farce" (202).3¶ Most readers of American Literary History will recognize¶ in much of this the lineaments of "Creation Science." But for¶ those who have (quite reasonably) paid little attention to Creation Science, here is a good, brief characterization of the¶ movement:¶ [T]he creationists have learned a lot in their long struggle¶ to unseat evolution. Trial and error has shown them what¶ doesn't work: Anti-science doesn't, efforts to ban [the teaching¶ of] evolution don't, and purely religious invective is also¶ a losing proposition. The idea of being open-minded, religiously¶ neutral, and scientific has gained such wide credence¶ (or at least lip service) that creationists can't successfully¶ oppose it, no matter how much they might like to.¶ So, their new tactic is to declare creationism scientific,¶ then join in with the majority and espouse the virtues of the¶ times in their own name. In this way they can pose as latterday¶ Galileos being persecuted by "orthodox" science. (Edwords¶ 4-5)4¶ Sympathizing as they do¶ with the yearnings of the¶ dispossessed, educated¶ people of good will often¶ pretend to see real¶ contributions to learning¶ in ethnic pseudoscience¶ and pseudoscholarship.¶ Add to this a large measure of standard-issue American Ethnic¶ Invective, and you have Deloria's method exactly.

#### And refuting pseudoscience is key to human survival; failure to polemically negate it when it presents itself condemns populations to irrational genocidal violence along racial, sexual, and economic lines

Sagan 96

[carl sagan, physicist, science advocate, does truth matter?: science, pseudoscience, and civilization, skeptical inquirer, vol 20.2, march.april]

It's disheartening to discover government corruption and incompetence, for example; but is it better not to know about it? Whose interest does ignorance serve? If we humans bear, say, hereditary propensities toward the hatred of strangers, isn't self-knowledge the only antidote? If we long to believe that the stars rise and set for us, that we are the reason there is a Universe, does science do us a disservice in deflating our conceits?¶ In The Genealogy of Morals, Friedrich Nietzsche, as so many before and after, decries the “unbroken progress in the self-belittling of man” brought about by the scientific revolution. Nietzsche mourns the loss of “man's belief in his dignity, his uniqueness, his irreplaceability in the scheme of existence.” For me, it is far better to grasp the Universe as it really is than to persist in delusion, however satisfying and reassuring. Which attitude is better geared for our long-term survival? Which gives us more leverage on our future? And if our naive self-confidence is a little undermined in the process, is that altogether such a loss? Is there not cause to welcome it as a maturing and character-building experience?¶ To discover that the universe is some 8 to 15 billion and not 6 to 12 thousand years old1 improves our appreciation of its sweep and grandeur; to entertain the notion that we are a particularly complex arrangement of atoms, and not some breath of divinity, at the very least enhances our respect for atoms; to discover, as now seems probable, that our planet is one of billions of other worlds in the Milky Way Galaxy and that our galaxy is one of billions more, majestically expands the arena of what is possible; to find that our ancestors were also the ancestors of apes ties us to the rest of life and makes possible important—if occasionally rueful—reflections on human nature.¶ Plainly there is no way back. Like it or not, we are stuck with science. We had better make the best of it. When we finally come to terms with it and fully recognize its beauty and its power, we will find, in spiritual as well as in practical matters, that we have made a bargain strongly in our favor. But superstition and pseudoscience keep getting in the way, distracting us, providing easy answers, dodging skeptical scrutiny, casually pressing our awe buttons and cheapening the experience, making us routine and comfortable practitioners as well as victims of credulity. Yes, the world would be a more interesting place if there were UFOs lurking in the deep waters off Bermuda and eating ships and planes, or if dead people could take control of our hands and write us messages. It would be fascinating if adolescents were able to make telephone handsets rocket off their cradles just by thinking at them, or if our dreams could, more often than can be explained by chance and our knowledge of the world, accurately foretell the future.¶ These are all instances of pseudoscience. They purport to use the methods and findings of science, while in fact they are faithless to its nature—often because they are based on insufficient evidence or because they ignore clues that point the other way. They ripple with gullibility. With the uninformed cooperation (and often the cynical connivance) of newspapers, magazines, book publishers, radio, television, movie producers, and the like, such ideas are easily and widely available. Far more difficult to come upon are the alternative, more challenging, and even more dazzling findings of science.¶ Pseudoscience is easier to contrive than science because distracting confrontations with reality—where we cannot control the outcome of the comparison—are more readily avoided. The standards of argument, what passes for evidence, are much more relaxed. In part for these same reasons, it is much easier to present pseudoscience to the general public than science. But this isn't enough to explain its popularity.¶ Naturally people try various belief systems on for size, to see if they help. And if we're desperate enough, we become all too willing to abandon what may be perceived as the heavy burden of skepticism. Pseudoscience speaks to powerful emotional needs that science often leaves unfulfilled. It caters to fantasies about personal powers we lack and long for (like those attributed to comic book superheroes today, and earlier, to the gods). In some of its manifestations, it offers satisfaction of spiritual hungers, cures for disease, promises that death is not the end. It reassures us of our cosmic centrality and importance. It vouchsafes that we are hooked up with, tied to, the universe.2 Sometimes it's a kind of halfway house between old religion and new science, mistrusted by both.¶ At the heart of some pseudoscience (and some religion also, New Age and Old) is the idea that wishing makes it so. How satisfying it would be, as in folklore and children's stories, to fulfill our heart's desire just by wishing. How seductive this notion is, especially when compared with the hard work and good luck usually required to achieve our hopes. The enchanted fish or the genie from the lamp will grant us three wishes—anything we want except more wishes. Who has not pondered—just to be on the safe side, just in case we ever come upon and accidentally rub an old, squat brass oil lamp—what to ask for?¶ I remember, from childhood comic strips and books, a top-hatted, mustachioed magician who brandished an ebony walking stick. His name was Zatara. He could make anything happen, anything at all. How did he do it? Easy. He uttered his commands backwards. So if he wanted a million dollars, he would say “srallod noillim a em evig.” That's all there was to it. It was something like prayer, but much surer of results.¶ I spent a lot of time at age eight experimenting in this vein, commanding stones to levitate: “esir, enots.” It never worked. I blamed my pronunciation.¶ The Metaphysicist Has No Laboratory¶ The truth may be puzzling or counterintuitive. It may contradict deeply held beliefs. Experiment is how we get a handle on it. At a dinner many decades ago, the physicist Robert W. Wood was asked to respond to the toast, “To physics and metaphysics.” By “metaphysics,” people then meant something like philosophy, or truths you could recognize just by thinking about them. They could also have included pseudoscience. Wood answered along these lines:¶ The physicist has an idea. The more he thinks it through, the more sense it seems to make. He consults the scientific literature. The more he reads, the more promising the idea becomes. Thus prepared, he goes to the laboratory and devises an experiment to test it. The experiment is painstaking. Many possibilities are checked. The accuracy of measurement is refined, the error bars reduced. He lets the chips fall where they may. He is devoted only to what the experiment teaches. At the end of all this work, through careful experimentation, the idea is found to be worthless. So the physicist discards it, frees his mind from the clutter of error, and moves on to something else.3¶ The difference between physics and metaphysics, Wood concluded as he raised his glass high, is not that the practitioners of one are smarter than the practitioners of the other. The difference is that the metaphysicist has no laboratory.¶ Pseudoscience is embraced, it might be argued, in exact proportion as real science is misunderstood—except that the language breaks down here. If you've never heard of science (to say nothing of how it works), you can hardly be aware you're embracing pseudoscience. You're simply thinking in one of the ways that humans always have. Religions are often the state-protected nurseries of pseudoscience, although there's no reason why religions have to play that role. In a way, it's an artifact from times long gone. In some countries nearly everyone believes in astrology and precognition, including government leaders. But this is not simply drummed into them by religion; it is drawn out of the enveloping culture in which everyone is comfortable with these practices, and affirming testimonials are everywhere.¶ Most of the case histories I will relate are American—because these are the cases I know best, not because pseudoscience and mysticism are more prominent in the United States than elsewhere. But the psychic spoonbender and extraterrestrial channeler Uri Geller hails from Israel. As tensions rise between Algerian secularists and Moslem fundamentalists, more and more people are discreetly consulting the country's 10,000 soothsayers and clairvoyants (about half of whom operate with a license from the government). High French officials, including a former president of France, arranged for millions of dollars to be invested in a scam (the Elf-Aquitaine scandal) to find new petroleum reserves from the air. In Germany, there is concern about carcinogenic “Earth rays” undetectable by science; they can be sensed only by experienced dowsers brandishing forked sticks. “Psychic surgery” flourishes in the Philippines. Ghosts are something of a national obsession in Britain. Since World War II, Japan has spawned enormous numbers of new religions featuring the supernatural. An estimated 100,000 fortunetellers flourish in Japan; the clientele are mainly young women. Aum Shinrikyo, a sect thought to be involved in the release of the nerve gas sarin in the Tokyo subway system in March 1995, features levitation, faith healing, and ESP among its main tenets. Followers, at a high price, drank the “miracle pond” water—from the bath of Asaraha, their leader. In Thailand, diseases are treated with pills manufactured from pulverized sacred Scripture. “Witches” are today being burned in South Africa. Australian peace-keeping forces in Haiti rescue a woman tied to a tree; she is accused of flying from rooftop to rooftop, and sucking the blood of children. Astrology is rife in India, geomancy widespread in China.

### Case

Birds DA

## 2NC

### 2NC Decisionmaking Good

#### Decisionmaking skills and engagement with the state energy apparatus prevents energy technocracy and actualizes radical politics

Hager 92

Hager, professor of political science – Bryn Mawr College, ‘92

(Carol J., “Democratizing Technology: Citizen & State in West German Energy Politics, 1974-1990” Polity, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 45-70)

During this phase, the citizen initiative attempted to overcome its defensive posture and implement an alternative politics. The strategy of legal and technical challenge might delay or even prevent plant construction, but it would not by itself accomplish the broader goal on the legitimation dimension, i.e., democratization. Indeed, it worked against broad participation. The activists had to find a viable means of achieving change. Citizens had proved they could contribute to a substantive policy discussion. Now, some activists turned to the parliamentary arena as a possible forum for an energy dialogue. Until now, parliament had been conspicuously absent as a relevant policy maker, but if parliament could be reshaped and activated, citizens would have a forum in which to address the broad questions of policy-making goals and forms. They would also have an institutional lever with which to pry apart the bureaucracy and utility. None of the established political parties could offer an alternative program. Thus, local activists met to discuss forming their own voting list.¶ These discussions provoked internal dissent. Many citizen initiative members objected to the idea of forming a political party. If the problem lay in the role of parliament itself, another political party would not solve it. On the contrary, parliamentary participation was likely to destroy what political innovations the extraparliamentary movement had made. Others argued that a political party would give the movement an institutional platform from which to introduce some of the grassroots democratic political forms the groups had developed. Founding a party as the parliamentary arm of the citizen movement would allow these groups to play an active, critical role in institutionalized politics, participating in the policy debates while retaining their outside perspective. Despite the disagreements, the Alternative List for Democracy and Environmental Protection Berlin (AL) was formed in 1978 and first won seats in the Land parliament with 7.2 percent of the vote in 1981.43 The founders of the AL were encouraged by the success of newly formed local green parties in Lower Saxony and Hamburg,44 whose evolution had been very similar to that of the West Berlin citizen move-ment. Throughout the FRG, unpopular administrative decisions affect-ing local environments, generally in the form of state-sponsored indus-trial projects, prompted the development of the citizen initiative and ecology movements. The groups in turn focused constant attention on state planning "errors," calling into question not only the decisions themselves, but also the conventional forms of political decision making that produced them.45 Disgruntled citizens increasingly aimed their critique at the established political parties, in particular the federal SPD/ FDP coalition, which seemed unable to cope with the economic, social, and political problems of the 1970s. Fanned by publications such as the Club of Rome's report, "The Limits to Growth," the view spread among activists that the crisis phenomena were not merely a passing phase, but indicated instead "a long-term structural crisis, whose cause lies in the industrial-technocratic growth society itself."46 As they broadened their critique to include the political system as a whole, many grassroots groups found the extraparliamentary arena too restrictive. Like many in the West Berlin group, they reasoned that the necessary change would require a degree of political restructuring that could only be accomplished through their direct participation in parliamentary politics. Green/alternative parties and voting lists sprang up nationwide and began to win seats in local assemblies. The West Berlin Alternative List saw itself not as a party, but as the parliamentary arm of the citizen initiative movement. One member explains: "the starting point for alternative electoral participation was simply the notion of achieving a greater audience for [our] own ideas and thus to work in support of the extraparliamentary movements and initia-tives,"47 including non-environmentally oriented groups. The AL wanted to avoid developing structures and functions autonomous from the citizen initiative movement. Members adhered to a list of principles, such as rotation and the imperative mandate, designed to keep parliamentarians attached to the grassroots. Although their insistence on grassroots democracy often resulted in interminable heated discussions, the participants recognized the importance of experimenting with new forms of decision making, of not succumbing to the same hierarchical forms they were challenging. Some argued that the proper role of citizen initiative groups was not to represent the public in government, but to mobilize other citizens to participate directly in politics themselves; self-determination was the aim of their activity.48¶ Once in parliament, the AL proposed establishment of a temporary parliamentary commission to study energy policy, which for the first time would draw all concerned participants together in a discussion of both short-term choices and long-term goals of energy policy. With help from the SPD faction, which had been forced into the opposition by its defeat in the 1981 elections, two such commissions were created, one in 1982-83 and the other in 1984-85.49 These commissions gave the citizen activists the forum they sought to push for modernization and technical innovation in energy policy.¶ Although it had scaled down the proposed new plant, the utility had produced no plan to upgrade its older, more polluting facilities or to install desulfurization devices. With prodding from the energy commission, Land and utility experts began to formulate such a plan, as did the citizen initiative. By exposing administrative failings in a public setting, and by producing a modernization plan itself, the combined citizen initiative and AL forced bureaucratic authorities to push the utility for improvements. They also forced the authorities to consider different technological solutions to West Berlin's energy and environmental problems. In this way, the activists served as technological innovators. In 1983, the first energy commission submitted a list of recommendations to the Land parliament which reflected the influence of the citizen protest movement. It emphasized goals of demand reduction and efficiency, noted the value of expanded citizen participation and urged authorities to "investigate more closely the positive role citizen participation can play in achieving policy goals."50 The second energy commission was created in 1984 to discuss the possibilities for modernization and shutdown of old plants and use of new, environmentally friendlier and cheaper technologies for electricity and heat generation. Its recommendations strengthened those of the first commission.51 Despite the non-binding nature of the commissions' recommendations, the public discussion of energy policy motivated policy makers to take stronger positions in favor of environmental protection.¶ III. Conclusion ¶ The West Berlin energy project eventually cleared all planning hurdles, and construction began in the early 1980s. The new plant now conforms to the increasingly stringent environmental protection requirements of the law. The project was delayed, scaled down from 1200 to 600 MW, moved to a neutral location and, unlike other BEWAG plants, equipped with modern desulfurization devices. That the new plant, which opened in winter 1988-89, is the technologically most advanced and environmen-tally sound of BEWAG's plants is due entirely to the long legal battle with the citizen initiative group, during which nearly every aspect of the original plans was changed. In addition, through the efforts of the Alter-native List (AL) in parliament, the Land government and BEWAG formulated a long sought modernization and environmental protection plan for all of the city's plants. The AL prompted the other parliamentary parties to take pollution control seriously. Throughout the FRG, energy politics evolved in a similar fashion. As Habermas claimed, underlying the objections against particular projects was a reaction against the administrative-economic system in general.¶ One author, for example, describes the emergence of two-dimensional protest against nuclear energy: The resistance against a concrete project became understood simul-taneously as resistance against the entire atomic program. Questions of energy planning, of economic growth, of understanding of democracy entered the picture. . . . Besides concern for human health, for security of conditions for human existence and protec-tion of nature arose critique of what was perceived as undemocratic planning, the "shock" of the delayed public announcement of pro-ject plans and the fear of political decision errors that would aggra-vate the problem.52 This passage supports a West Berliner's statement that the citizen initiative began with a project critique and arrived at *Systemkritik*.53 I have labeled these two aspects of the problem the public policy and legitima-tion dimensions. In the course of these conflicts, the legitimation dimen-sion emergd as the more important and in many ways the more prob-lematic.¶ Parliamentary Politics ¶ In the 1970s, energy politics began to develop in the direction Offe de-scribed, with bureaucrats and protesters avoiding the parliamentary channels through which they should interact. The citizen groups them-selves, however, have to a degree reversed the slide into irrelevance of parliamentary politics. Grassroots groups overcame their defensive posture enough to begin to formulate an alternative politics, based upon concepts such as decision making through mutual understanding rather than technical criteria or bargaining. This new politics required new modes of interaction which the old corporatist or pluralist forms could not provide. Through the formation of green/alternative parties and voting lists and through new parliamentary commissions such as the two described in the case study, some members of grassroots groups attempted to both operate within the political system and fundamentally change it, to restore the link between bureaucracy and citizenry.¶ Parliamentary politics was partially revived in the eyes of West German grassroots groups as a legitimate realm of citizen participation, an outcome the theory would not predict. It is not clear, however, that strengthening the parliamentary system would be a desirable outcome for everyone. Many remain skeptical that institutions that operate as part of the "system" can offer the kind of substantive participation that grass-roots groups want. The constant tension between institutionalized politics and grassroots action emerged clearly in the recent internal debate between "fundamentalist" and "realist" wings of the Greens. Fundis wanted to keep a firm footing outside the realm of institutionalized politics. They refused to bargain with the more established parties or to join coalition governments. Realos favored participating in institutionalized politics while pressing their grassroots agenda. Only this way, they claimed, would they have a chance to implement at least some parts of their program. ¶ This internal debate, which has never been resolved, can be interpreted in different ways. On one hand, the tension limits the appeal of green and alternative parties to the broader public, as the Greens' poor showing in the December 1990 all-German elections attests. The failure to come to agreement on basic issues can be viewed as a hazard of grass-roots democracy. The Greens, like the West Berlin citizen initiative, are opposed in principle to forcing one faction to give way to another. Disunity thus persists within the group. On the other hand, the tension can be understood not as a failure, but as a kind of success: grassroots politics has not been absorbed into the bureaucratized system; it retains its critical dimension, both in relation to the political system and within the groups themselves. The lively debate stimulated by grassroots groups and parties keeps questions of democracy on the public agenda.¶ Technical Debate ¶ In West Berlin, the two-dimensionality of the energy issue forced citizen activists to become both participants in and critics of the policy process. In order to defeat the plant, activists engaged in technical debate. They won several decisions in favor of environmental protection, often proving to be more informed than bureaucratic experts themselves. The case study demonstrates that grassroots groups, far from impeding techno-logical advancement, can actually serve as technological innovators. ¶ The activists' role as technical experts, while it helped them achieve some success on the policy dimension, had mixed results on the legitimation dimension. On one hand, it helped them to challenge the legitimacy of technocratic policy making. They turned back the Land government's attempts to displace political problems by formulating them in technical terms.54 By demonstrating the fallibility of the technical arguments, activists forced authorities to acknowledge that energy demand was a political variable, whose value at any one point was as much influenced by the choices of policy makers as by independent technical criteria. ¶ Submission to the form and language of technical debate, however, weakened activists' attempts to introduce an alternative, goal-oriented form of decision making into the political system. Those wishing to par-ticipate in energy politics on a long-term basis have had to accede to the language of bureaucratic discussion, if not the legitimacy of bureaucratic authorities. They have helped break down bureaucratic authority but have not yet offered a viable long-term alternative to bureaucracy. In the tension between form and language, goals and procedure, the legitima-tion issue persists. At the very least, however, grassroots action challenges critical theory's notion that technical discussion is inimical to democratic politics.55 Citizen groups have raised the possibility of a dialogue that is both technically sophisticated and democratic.¶ In sum, although the legitimation problems which gave rise to grass-roots protest have not been resolved, citizen action has worked to counter the marginalization of parliamentary politics and the technocratic character of policy debate that Offe and Habermas identify. The West Berlin case suggests that the solutions to current legitimation problems may not require total repudiation of those things previously associated with technocracy.56¶ In Berlin, the citizen initiative and AL continue to search for new, more legitimate forms of organization consistent with their principles. No permanent Land parliamentary body exists to coordinate and con-solidate energy policy making.57 In the 1989 Land elections, the CDU/ FDP coalition was defeated, and the AL formed a governing coalition with the SPD. In late 1990, however, the AL withdrew from the coali-tion. It remains to be seen whether the AL will remain an effective vehi-cle for grassroots concerns, and whether the citizenry itself, now includ-ing the former East Berliners, will remain active enough to give the AL direction as united Berlin faces the formidable challenges of the 1990s. On the policy dimension, grassroots groups achieved some success. On the legitimation dimension, it is difficult to judge the results of grass-roots activism by normal standards of efficacy or success. Activists have certainly not radically restructured politics. They agree that democracy is desirable, but troublesome questions persist about the degree to which those processes that are now bureaucratically organized can and should be restructured, where grassroots democracy is possible and where bureaucracy is necessary in order to get things done. In other words, grassroots groups have tried to remedy the Weberian problem of the marginalization of politics, but it is not yet clear what the boundaries of the political realm should be. It is, however, the act of calling existing boundaries into question that keeps democracy vital. In raising alternative possibilities and encouraging citizens to take an active, critical role in their own governance, the contribution of grassroots environmental groups has been significant. As Melucci states for new social movements in general, these groups mount a "symbolic" challenge by proposing "a different way of perceiving and naming the world."58 Rochon concurs for the case of the West German peace movement, noting that its effect on the public discussion of secur-ity issues has been tremendous.59 The effects of the legitimation issue in the FRG are evident in increased citizen interest in areas formerly left to technical experts. Citizens have formed nationwide associations of environmental and other grassroots groups as well as alternative and green parties at all levels of government. The level of information within the groups is generally quite high, and their participation, especially in local politics, has raised the awareness and engagement of the general populace noticeably.60 Policy concessions and new legal provisions for citizen participation have not quelled grassroots action. The attempts of the established political parties to coopt "green" issues have also met with limited success. Even green parties themselves have not tapped the full potential of public support for these issues. The persistence of legitima-tion concerns, along with the growth of a culture of informed political activism, will ensure that the search continues for a space for a delibera-tive politics in modern technological society.61

### 2NC Dialogue/Limits

#### C) Echo Chamber DA - This rejection of structured clash makes debate into an echo chamber. This impoverishes their project even if it is right

Talisse 5

Professor of Philosophy @Vandy¶ Robert, Philosophy & Social Criticism, Deliberativist responses to activist challenges, 31(4) p. 429-431

The argument thus far might appear to turn exclusively upon different conceptions of what reasonableness entails. **The deliberativist view** I have sketched hold that reasonableness **involved some degree of** what we may call **epistemic modesty. On this** view, **the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reflect the best available reasons,** and so she enters into public discourse **as a way of testing her views against the objections** and questions of those who disagree; hence she implicitly hold that **her present view is open to reasonable critique** and that others who hold opposing views may be able to offer justifications for their views that are at least as strong as her reasons for her own. Thus any mode of **politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justification is unreasonable**. The activist sees no reason to accept this. Reasonableness **for the activist** consists in the ability to act on reasons that upon due reflection seem adequate to underwrite action; **discussion with those who disagree need not be involved**. **According to the activist,** there are certain cases in which he does in fact know the truth about what justice requires and in which **there is no room for reasoned objection.** Under such conditions, **the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice; it is therefore irrational**. It may seem that we have reached an impasse. However, there is a further line of criticism that the activist must face. To the activist’s view that at least in certain situations he may reasonably decline to engage with persons he disagrees with (107), the deliberative democrat can raise the phenomenon that Cass Sunstein has called ‘group polarization’ (Sunstein, 2003; 2001A; ch. 3; 2001b: ch. 1). To explain: consider that political **activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether; they often engage in rallies,** demonstrations, teach-ins, workshops, and other activities in which they are called to make public the case for their views. Activists also must engage in deliberation among themselves when deciding strategy. Political movement must be organized, hence those involved must decide upon targets, methods, and tact’s; they must also decide upon the content of their pamphlets and the precise messages they most wish to convey to the press. **Often the audience in both of these deliberative contexts will be a self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists**. **Group polarization** is a well-documented phenomenon that **has ‘been found all over the world** and is many diverse tasks’; it means that ‘members of a deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in the direction indicated by’ predeliberation tendencies’ (Sunstein, 2003: 81-2). Importantly, **in group that ‘engage in repeated discussions’** over time, **the polarization is even more pronounced** (2003: 86). Hence discussion in a small but devoted activist enclave that meets regularly to strategize and protest ‘should produce a situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than those of an individual member before the series of deliberations began’ (ibid.).17 The fact of group polarization is relevant to our discussion because the activist has proposed that **he may reasonably decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees** in cases in which the requirement of justice are so clear that he can be confidents that has the truth .Group polarization suggest that even deliberatively confronting those with whom we disagree is essential even we have the truth. **For even if we have the truth, if we do not engage opposing views,** but instead deliberate only with those with whom we agree, our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth ,In order to avoid polarization, deliberation must take place within heterogeneous ‘argument pools’ (Sunstein, 2003: 93). This of course does not mean that there should be no groups devoted to the achievement of some common political goal; it rather suggest that a engagement with those with whom one disagrees is essential to the proper pursuitof justice. Insofar as the activist denies this, he is unreasonable.

### SSD

#### C) Predictable ground – it’s necessary for meaningful switch-side debate – key to progressive politics

English et al 7

(Eric English, Stephen Lano, Gordon Mitchell, University of Pittsburgh communications professor, Catherine Morrison, John Reif, and Carly Woods, Schenley Park Debate Authors Working Group, “Debate as a Weapon of Mass Destruction,” June 2007, Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, [www.pitt.edu/~gordonm/JPubs/EnglishDAWG.pdf](http://www.pitt.edu/~gordonm/JPubs/EnglishDAWG.pdf%5D), - Kurr)

The problem for Greene and Hicks is that this notion of citizenship becomes tied to a normative conception of American democracy that justifies imperialism. They write, ‘‘The production and management of this field of governance allows liberalism to trade in cultural technologies in the global cosmopolitan marketplace at the same time as it creates a field of intervention to transform and change the world one subject (regime) at a time.’’11 Here, Greene and Hicks argue that this new conception of liberal governance, which epitomizes the ethical citizen as an individual trained in the switch-side technique, serves as a normative tool for judging other polities and justifying forcible regime change. One need look only to the Bush administration’s framing of war as an instrument of democracy promotion to grasp how the switch-side technique can be appropriated as a justification for violence. It is our position, however, that rather than acting as a cultural technology expanding American exceptionalism, switch-side debating originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes. Several prominent voices reshaping the national dialogue on homeland security have come from the academic debate community and draw on its animating spirit of critical inquiry. For example, Georgetown University law professor Neal Katyal served as lead plaintiff’s counsel in Hamdan, which challenged post-9/11 enemy combat definitions.12 The foundation for Katyal’s winning argument in Hamdan was laid some four years before, when he collaborated with former intercollegiate debate champion Laurence Tribe on an influential Yale Law Journal addressing a similar topic.13 Tribe won the National Debate Tournament in 1961 while competing as an undergraduate debater for Harvard University. Thirty years later, Katyal represented Dartmouth College at the same tournament and finished third. The imprint of this debate training is evident in Tribe and Katyal’s contemporary public interventions, which are characterized by meticulous research, sound argumentation, and a staunch commitment to democratic principles. Katyal’s reflection on his early days of debating at Loyola High School in Chicago’s North Shore provides a vivid illustration. ‘‘I came in as a shy freshman with dreams of going to medical school. Then Loyola’s debate team opened my eyes to a different world: one of argumentation and policy.’’ As Katyal recounts, ‘‘the most important preparation for my career came from my experiences as a member of Loyola’s debate team.’’14 The success of former debaters like Katyal, Tribe, and others in challenging the dominant dialogue on homeland security points to the efficacy of academic debate as a training ground for future advocates of progressive change. Moreover, a robust understanding of the switch-side technique and the classical liberalism which underpins it would help prevent misappropriation of the technique to bolster suspect homeland security policies. For buried within an inner-city debater’s files is a secret threat to absolutism: the refusal to be classified as ‘‘with us or against us,’’ the embracing of intellectual experimentation in an age of orthodoxy, and reflexivity in the face of fundamentalism. But by now, the irony of our story should be apparent\*the more effectively academic debating practice can be focused toward these ends, the greater the proclivity of McCarthy’s ideological heirs to brand the activity as a ‘‘weapon of mass destruction.’’

### Hanghoj

#### Unbridled affirmation makes research impossible and destroys dialogue in debate, making deliberation impossible

Hanghoj 8

http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf¶ Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008 ¶ Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish¶ Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of¶ Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have¶ taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the¶ Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab¶ Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant¶ professor.

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

## 1NR

### Link

#### Their liberatory INTELLECTUAL effort OF CRITIQUE will be universalized and used as an excuse to ignore ecologically centered Western cultural practices. THEIR METHOD PRECLUDES A CULTURAL APPRECIATION THAT CAN SAVE THE EARTH FROM INEVITABLE DESTRUCTION. THIS ANSWERS RODRIGUES

Bowers 2K8

[Professor of Environmental Studies @ University of Oregon, C. A., Ph. D. from the University of California in educational studies with an emphasis on education and social thought, Transitions: Educational Reforms that Promote Ecological Intelligence or the Assumptions Underlying Modernity?, pg. 144]

To reiterate the key reason that a critical pedagogy of place is an oxymoron is that the linguistic tradition of relying upon abstractions, including abstract theories that encode many of the same taken- for-granted assumptions that underlie both the idea of universal decolonization and the market liberals’ efforts to universalize the West’s consumer dependent lifestyle, fail to take account of the intergenerational traditions of habitation that still exist in communities. Places have a long and culturally varied history, while the language of a critical pedagogy of place has a specific history that carries forward the tradition of ignoring the diverse ways in which more ecologically centered cultures and community practices have contributed to long-term habitation of place. One has only to recall the generalizations of Dewey, Freire, and Gadotti that reveal their respective one-true approaches to reconstructing experience, emancipation, and achieving a planetary consciousness to recognize that their prescriptions for change are based on a culturally uninformed theory that is intended to be universalized. Unless science/environmental educators are knowledgeable about how universal prescriptions too often become a cultural colonizing agenda they should be wary of ignoring the inherent contradiction in a theory that leads to understanding “decolonization” only in terms of Western cultural assumptions, and that represents “reinhabitation” as an excuse for educators to ignore the different expressions of the local cultural commons that students need to help revitalize. Even though Gruenewald makes an effort to balance the transformative agenda of critical pedagogy with an awareness of what needs to be conserved, he still falls short of clarifying the nature and importance of the local cultural commons—and the pedagogy that is required for helping students recognize the differences between commons and market based experiences. Unfortunately, the assumptions underlying critical pedagogy are now so widely taken-for-granted among educators in nearly all subject areas that the silence about the need to acquire a deep knowledge of culture, that of the teacher as well as the culture of others that are to be decolonized, is likely to be ignored by science/environmental educators who identify with a critical pedagogy of place.

#### AND DELORIA’S WORK IS DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTIVE OF SUPPORT TO NEOCONSERVATIVE PSEUDOSCIENCE.

Brumble 98

[H. David, Vine Deloria Jr., Creationism, and Ethnic Psuedoscience, *American Literary History*, Vol. 10, No. 2, Summer, 335-346, prof. English @ University of Pittsburgh]

¶ My guess is that Deloria will not change his mind about¶ "transitional forms" (and so about evolution and creationism)¶ just because of the walking whales. But in the hope of influencing¶ those who read ethnic pseudoscience with affirmative action in¶ their hearts, I offer in closing this parable:¶ A man in tweed stands before an academic audience.¶ He is, let us say, a professor of English (as I am); he has¶ (like me) no scientific training, aside from some amateur¶ reading. He delivers a series of lectures on Creation Science.¶ He acknowledges that his religious affiliation is Southern¶ Baptist-no, let us say Pentecostal, to suggest more¶ strongly that he is guided by the spirit. In his lectures he¶ argues that the scientists have it all wrong, that the earth¶ was created, and not created some unimaginable millions of¶ years ago. He asserts that, while he is not certain of the age¶ of the earth, he is fairly sure that human beings were on¶ earth with the dinosaurs, that human beings were on earth¶ to see the formation of the mountains. And all of the earth's¶ igneous rock poured forth in one great volcanic cataclysm¶ triggered by the impact of a great meteor. He argues that¶ the universal flood of the book of Genesis is probably historical¶ fact.¶ His scientific breakthrough, he explains, is that he is¶ bringing to bear the testimonies of the people who actually¶ witnessed these events. He presents the testimonies of preliterate¶ peoples as preserved in their oral traditions-oral traditions¶ of which he is a skilled interpreter; he shows how¶ these oral traditions are very often exactly in keeping with¶ Old Testament accounts.¶ He argues that many scientists actually know the truth¶ of the biblical account of creation (as corroborated by preliterate¶ peoples)-but they are cowed into dishonest silence¶ by the fear of ostracism from the cozy scientific community.¶ His lectures are applauded by this academic audience-¶ and endorsements are written by some rather eminent¶ figures in attendance.¶ This would, of course, be highly unlikely. Most of the welleducated¶ people who praise Red Earth, White Lies would be embarrassed¶ even to be found in the audience on such an occasion.¶ Most academics would work hard to prevent such "fundamentalist"¶ notions from intrusion into the science curriculum of their¶ children's school. But change lectures to book published by Scribners,¶ change Pentecostal Christian to charismatic Sioux religion-¶ and this unlikely¶ fantasy is exactly what Vine Deloria has accomplished.

### K Turns Aff

#### Scientific conceptual rigidity and separation from pseudoscience is key to undermine racism’s attempts at scientific legitimacy

Brumble 98

[H. David, Vine Deloria Jr., Creationism, and Ethnic Psuedoscience, *American Literary History*, Vol. 10, No. 2, Summer, 335-346, prof. English @ University of Pittsburgh]

 But even had he read the article, Deloria's thinking would¶ probably have been undisturbed-for the same reason that the¶ melanin scholars are undisturbed by easily available scientific accounts¶ of melanin. They are not doing science really-they are¶ promoting a cause. But one of the many sad things about Affirmative Action Ethnic Pseudoscience is that their cause doesn't¶ really need pseudoscience or pseudoscholarshipI.t has been the¶ anthropologists, after all, who have been largely responsible for¶ providing the scholarly foundation for cultural relativism-and¶ so the academic community now seldom refers to nineteenthcentury¶ American Indians and New Guinea tribes as "primitives.""¶ And the weight of scientific research now oppose s the¶ idea that intelligence is tied to race. Deloria seems to forget this¶ when, in the course of recounting the sins of the scientists, he¶ mentions the notorious case of Cyril Burt:¶ Perhaps the epitome of scientific fraud was the work of Sir¶ Cyril Burt on twins. Fearful of criticism of his work, Burt¶ simply performed the peer-review process by himself, writing¶ glowing reviews of his work using pseudonyms. This deceit,¶ and the manipulation of statistical data in his studies,¶ was eventually exposed. (41-42)¶ Deloria misses much here. Burt's work claimed to find a very¶ high correlation between IQ scores of twins raised apart-and¶ this was regarded as important evidence for hereditarian views,¶ evidence which was useful to those who claimed that race could¶ determine intelligence. But ethnic pseudoscience was not necessary¶ to reveal Burt's fraud. Here is the story as Gould tells it:¶ I think that the splendid "official" biography of Burt recently¶ published by L. S. Hearnshaw (1979) has resolved the¶ issue so far as the data permit (Hearnshaw was commissioned¶ to write his book by Burt's sister before any charges¶ had been leveled). Hearnshaw, who began as an unqualified¶ admirer of Burt and who tends to share his intellectual attitudes,¶ eventually concluded that all allegations are true, and¶ worse. (Mismeasure 236)¶ Hearnshaw, then, actually began as an apologist for Burt-but¶ when he found real evidence of fraud, he was forced to change¶ his mind. This is real scholarship.

#### Inequity in scientific education exacerbates material inequity.

Brumble 98

[H. David, Vine Deloria Jr., Creationism, and Ethnic Psuedoscience, *American Literary History*, Vol. 10, No. 2, Summer, 335-346, prof. English @ University of Pittsburgh]

All of this is diverting, but we should remember that when¶ theology or affirmative action drives science, there can be realworld¶ consequences. Most immediately, we should worry that¶ Deloria's affirmative action science might work its way into public¶ school science curricula. Deloria puts it this way: "All we ask¶ is respect for the other traditions and some of their versions of¶ origins" (187). This is, of course, exactly the argument of the¶ creationists, as they strive to get creationism into the schools and¶ textbooks: "We are only asking that both theories be taught."7¶ But well-meaning academics who scorn this argument when it¶ comes from Baptist creationists often encourage ethnic pseudoscience¶ curricula out of a sense of cultural noblesse oblige. And¶ so we end up with real science for the nice, white suburbs, and¶ self-affirming pseudoscience for the reservations [sic] and inner¶ cities.

and, THEIR CRITICAL PEDEGOGY CREATES A DISAVOWAL OF AMERICAN NEOLIBERAL VIOLENCE THAT RENDERS COLONIZATION INEVITABLE AND ETHICALLY TOLERABLE.

Bowers 2k5

[Professor of Environmental Studies @ University of Oregon[C. A., Ph. D. from the University of California in educational studies with an emphasis on education and social thought “Is transformative learning the trojan horse of western globalization?,” Journal of Transformative Education, 3 (2), pg. 116-125 [www.cabowers.net/pdf/ Transformative%20theorist- Commons.pdf](http://www.cabowers.net/pdf/Transformative%20theorist-Commons.pdf), 9-15]

They also ignore that critical reflection is not the only legitimate approach to intergenerational renewal, and that many aspects of the cultural construction of everyday reality are sources empowerment and the basis of moral reciprocity. The implications of their collective silences and reductionist thinking is that they have nothing to say about the need to re-direct curriculum reform in ways that help students recognize the different aspects of the commons that they take-for-granted. In not being given the language for naming the commons they take-for-granted, they are unable to recognize and thus challenge politically when the commons are being further enclosed. That is, in addition to not understanding their rights within the commons, as well as their responsibility to future generations for ensuring that a commons are not further diminished by corporate capitalism, their present form of education (which will become even more limited as transformative learning becomes more widespread) now leaves them largely ignorant of the non-monetized face-to-face alternatives to consumerism within their communities. The other irony is that the use of the restrictive liberal political vocabulary that the transformative learning theorists reinforce in teacher education classes, which in turn is reinforced in public schools, is that a significant number of Americans call themselves conservatives while supporting the imperialistic assumptions and practices of market liberals. This has the effect of social and eco-justice advocates not wanting to identify themselves with the word conservatism. The result is that both the faux conservatives such as President George W. Bush and the transformative learning theorists support each other in avoiding the question that now needs to be ask in this era of economic and cultural colonization: namely, what do we need to conserve in order to resist the forces that are increasing poverty around the world and putting future generations at greater risk of an environment that is too contaminated to support a healthy and fulfilling life. The challenge will be for the current generation of transformative learning theorists to recognize how they have been indoctrinated by liberal ideologues who failed to renew what was viable in the earlier formulations of liberal ideas in ways that address issues related to the diversity of the world’s cultural commons and the environmental changes that these earlier liberal theorists were unaware of.

**THEIR Transformative OPENNESS annihilates** **whole ways of living and fosters individualism that makes challenging the root causes of ecological degredation impossible. their epistemology gaurentees planetary destruction.**

Bowers 2k5

[Professor of Environmental Studies @ University of Oregon[C. A., Ph. D. from the University of California in educational studies with an emphasis on education and social thought “Is transformative learning the trojan horse of western globalization?,” Journal of Transformative Education, 3 (2), pg. 116-125 [www.cabowers.net/pdf/ Transformative%20theorist- Commons.pdf](http://www.cabowers.net/pdf/Transformative%20theorist-Commons.pdf), 9-15]

It is important to acknowledge that the rise of liberal/Enlightenment ideas in the late 18th and 19th century led to basic improvements in the lives of the people of Western Europe who had been oppressed by feudal ideas and institutions—and by the authoritarian political systems that were equally resistant to change. The emphasis on the authority and power of critical reflection to overturn unjust traditions, the idea that change can lead to social progress, the view of the individual as having the power of self-determination, and the idea that new forms of knowledge will mitigate the ravages of the illness and the stultifying nature of work, led to important advances. But it also needs to be kept in mind that the widespread acceptance in the West of these ideas also coincided with the rise of the Industrial Revolution. And more importantly, these liberal ideas had no self-limiting principle. That is, the dominant motivation has been to achieve more and faster progress, more reliance on critical reflection (increasingly by experts promoting the development of new technologies and markets), more labor saving technologies (and now the elimination of the need for workers), newer drugs (and the control of the American Congress to ensure the growing dominance of the drug industry), and more self-determination—including self-determination in the construction of knowledge and values. The lack of any self-limiting principles, which made these liberal ideas even more problematic when they were merged with the market liberalism of John Locke, Adam Smith, and, later, Herbert Spencer, becomes especially evident when we consider the current drive to turn every aspect of the environmental and cultural commons into market opportunities—and to convert the entire world to a survival of the fittest business mentality. To reiterate a point that I have been making in the earlier part of my critique, in basing their interpretations of transformative learning on these liberal assumptions Freire, Dewey, Gadotti, and the current group of critical pedagogy fundamentalists not only reproduce the contradictions that arise when relying on abstract ideas for reforming a culturally diverse world, but they also reproduce in their interpretations of transformative learning the silences that characterized the earlier phase of liberal/Enlightenment thinking. These silences in the writings of the earlier liberal/Enlightenment thinkers led to ignoring the differences in cultural ways of knowing. In reality, it was not really a case of ignoring these differences. Rather, in the early phase of liberal thinking it was a matter of viewing other cultures as primitive, uncivilized, and as heathens that needed to be turned into Christians. The deficit model of culture has in more recent times been revised so that they are now viewed a pre-literate, pre-scientific, economically and technologically undeveloped, limited by a spectator approach to knowledge, and locked into a semi-intransitive state of consciousness. What earlier and present liberal theorists have overlooked is that many of these non-Western culture have developed in ways that have a smaller ecological footprint, and many of them place more emphasis on the forms of knowledge and relationships that sustain the commons in ways that reduce the dependence upon consumerism.The reductionism ways in which various traditions of liberal thinking have categorized non-Western cultures, as well as marginalized cultures in the West, have led to ignoring the need for an in-depth understanding of their approaches to knowledge and intergenerational renewal. This reductionist way of thinking, as I have been arguing, is part of the reason for the imperialist orientation of transformative learning theorists such as Freire and Dewey, and the professors of education who are now promoting transformative learning in 29 non-Western countries. More importantly, this bias which shows up in the messianic nature of transformative learning theorists should also be understand as one of the reasons that, when theorists such as Gadotti, O’Sullivan, and McLaren do address environmental issues, their panacea is to promote the global acceptance of an even more culturally uninformed interpretations of liberal ideals. That is, their response to the industrial culture that is accelerating the rate of change in the Earth’s natural system, and in making the people of the world more dependent upon consumerism, is to promote more change through an approach to education that fosters a rootless form of individualism.

But they add to the crisis of the commons that is spreading around the world in other ways. Their uncritical embrace of various explanations --current versions of Social Darwinism, the oppressive (banking) nature of all cultural models of learning other than their own, the messianic drive to share (impose) our highest ideals on other cultures, the effort to enable other cultures to achieve a Western interpretation of what constitutes the fullest expression of their humanity, and so forth—all add up to a thinking of other cultures as fundamentally deficient—and thus, as Derek Rasmussen points out, as in need of being rescued (Bowers, Apffel-Marglin, pp. 115-131). This way of thinking does not take account of the fact that there are still nearly 6000 languages still spoken in the world today—with a third of them in danger of becoming extinct in the near future. Conserving this diversity in language/knowledge systems is directly related to conserving biological diversity, as these languages encode knowledge accumulated over many generations of living in one place and from observing the interdependent relationships that make up the natural and cultural ecology. Unfortunately, transformative learning theorists have not become a voice for educational reforms that support linguistic and, by extension, biological diversity. As long as they maintain their core ideas about learning being only a transformative, emancipatory experience, any references to the importance of cultural diversity is simply empty rhetoric that has as its real purpose the need to represent themselves as being on the politically correct side of the social justice and environmental debate. In effect, Freire and the other transformative learning theorists should be understood as having accepted themselves as being subjects of the banking process of education that they reject for others. That is, their professors imposed upon them a restricted political language that neither they nor their professors have thought critically about. And one of the primary characteristic of this political language, which I have earlier identified with classical liberalism (sans Adams Smith’s emphasis on the progressive nature of a market economy) is that it lacks a vocabulary for naming those aspects of culture that are now the only real source of resistance to the imperialism of market liberalism. It is especially noteworthy that the word “commons” is not part of the emancipatory liberal discourse. The problem with the language of liberalism can be seen in Gadotti’s way of addressing the ecological crisis. Globalizing the romantic idea of a planetary consciousness emerging from the grand journey into the individual’s subjective universe simply does not address the genuine sources of resistance to economic globalization and its impact on natural systems. What from the beginning of human history has been understood as the commons, and which exists today in various state of viability in the diverse cultures of the world, is the only alternative to the way in which the West’s industrial culture is creating greater dependence upon Western style consumerism and technologies. The nature of the commons varies from culture to culture, and from bioregion to bioregion. What they have in common is that much of the culture’s symbolic patterns as well as the natural systems of the bioregion are available to the members of the community on a non-monetary basis. That is, they have not been enclosed—that is, privatized, commodified, monetized, incorporated into an industrial process, and so forth. This general account of the commons does not mean that all of the culturally diverse commons where entirely free of political systems that gave certain groups special advantages—including the right to restrict the commons to the bare essentials for sustaining life, such as access to water, soil for growing small crops, animals, traditions of ceremonies, patterns of reciprocity, intergenerational knowledge of how to use medical plants, preparing food, and so forth. To make the point more directly, the commons should not be understood as always free of status systems and the unequal use of power. On the other hand, many of the cultural commons have been and still are characterized by local decision-making—an important phenomena that is now being undermined by the World Trade Organization and capitalistic forms of enclosure where decision about the use of the commons is now made by corporations and private owners who are unaffected by their decisions. The enclosure (privatization) of municipal water systems, as well as the corporate ownership and sale of supposedly “pure” bottled water, are examples of how the process of enclosing the commons also undermines local democracy.

### Perm

#### Privileging ecojustice prevents our ecological concerns from just becoming an “add-on” way of thinking that fails to challenge the cultural assumptions leading to this crisis. DON’T BUY ANY PERMUTATION.

Bowers 2K6

[Professor of Environmental Studies @ University of Oregon, C. A. Bower, Ph. D. from the University of California in educational studies with an emphasis on education and social thought, Renewing the Commons: University Reform in an Era of Weakened Democracy and Environmental Crises, p. 146-8]

While a healthy cultural commons has a proven record of success in enabling cultures in different parts of the world, and at different times in history, to live less consumer dependent lives, current strategies for affecting the fundamental curricular reforms within universities do not yet have a record of success. The networking of environmentally oriented faculty has been useful in helping to establish degree programs in environmental studies and sub-specializations within other disciplines. Networking has also led to faculty in many disciplines to adding environmental issues to their established courses. But these successes are partly undermined by the way the students’ education is segmented into a number of distinct areas of inquiry that are governed more by the shifting priorities within the disciplines than by an effort to help students develop a broad understanding of how and why it is important to live less consumer dependent lives.

What conceptual coherence there is between courses is largely a matter of the deep cultural assumptions that most of them share in common. Unfortunately, as pointed out before, these assumptions about the individual as an autonomous thinker (who must cite the source of borrowed ideas), change as the linear expression of progress, an anthropocentric world, a hubris driven ethnocentrism, and a conduit view of language, make it unnecessary to recognize the cultural nature of intelligence. While the explicit course content may differ, the underlying deep cultural assumptions that the professors take-for-granted continue to reinforce among students a taken-for-granted way of thinking of the industrial culture that has now reached a critical tipping point. What can be said for certain is that the networking of environmentally oriented faculty has not succeeded in developing an undergraduate or graduate program of study that provides an interdisciplinary understanding of the complex forces that historically and are currently undermining both the cultural and environmental commons, as well as an understanding of how the cultural commons represents a sustainable alternative to the unsustainable industrial culture that market-iberals are promoting in the name of progress.

In the Culture of Denial, I suggest that because of the hierarchical organization of universities that determines the allocation of resources, university presidents need to provide leadership by allocating extra resources in ways that will encourage the development of programs of study that address the cultural roots of the ecological crisis. At that time the evidence of global warming was less visible than it is now, and corporations were actively funding scientists who were willing to dispute the evidence that the early scientific warnings were based upon. Many corporations are now taking global warming seriously by promoting research in alternative sources of energy. Unfortunately, there is little evidence that university presidents are willing to go much beyond signing their names to documents that commit universities to address environmental issues—which is little more than a ritualized gesture in the direction of political correctness. Urging faculty to declare a moratorium on teaching courses that reinforce the same deep cultural assumptions that underlie the industrial culture that is a major contributor to global warming, and to use the moratorium to rethink the university’s responsibility for promoting a more ecologically responsible citizen, appears to be beyond the current ability of university presidents and deans of departments to recognize that we have reached a tipping point that other cultures have ignored—with the results that Diamond documents in his recent book, Collapse. The difference between cultures such as the Anasazi, Mayan, and the Norse outposts in Greenland that could not develop the form of intelligence that would enable them to live within the limits and possibilities of their habit, and our current situation, is that the further degradation of the world’s cultural and environmental commons will be an all-encompassing form of collapse.

It seems, however, that fund-raising and ensuring that the alumni can take pride in a winning team as they arrive at the university’s sports venues in oversize SUVs and cars that communicate that their university education paid off big-time, now consume most of the time and energy of university presidents. They seem indifferent to making the hard decisions by asking which programs and departments should be eliminated, thus freeing up funds for a degree program that addresses the cultural changes that contribute to our prospects of reversing the trend line that indicate that modern cultures are exceeding the sustaining capacity of natural systems. Their lack of leadership can also be seen in their failure to educate the alumni that spending millions of dollars on the salaries of winning coaches and the building of new stadiums represent a gross misplacement of what should be the highest university priority in this era of global warming.

# Round 3 v Michigan State BC

## 1NC

### 1NC- T

#### 1 Interp – nuclear power generates energy through fission

Zebrowski 09

(Summer, 2009 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 20 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 391 LENGTH: 22147 words Note & Comment: Nuclear Power as Carbon-Free Energy? The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership NAME: Mariah Zebrowski\* BIO: \* University of Colorado Dual Degree Candidate; J.D. and Masters in Environmental Studies, 2011. B.A. with honors, Princeton University, 2005. The Author wishes to thank Dr. Lakshman Guruswamy, Professor Len Ackland, and Kevin Doran for their comments on an earlier draft of this Note.)

A major barrier to the widespread use of nuclear power is the issue of how to dispose of nuclear waste. In nuclear power generation, nuclear fission of the material in fuel rods generates heat that is used to generate steam and run turbines to create electricity. n156 After a period of time ranging from one to five years, fuel rods no longer generate enough heat for economical steam generation and are then considered to be nuclear waste. n157 Depleted fuel rods contain unfissionable uranium-238, unused fissionable uranium-235, plutonium-239, and other waste products. n158 These wastes contain radioactive elements that remain active for hundreds of thousands of years, making the permanent isolation of nuclear waste critical for safeguarding public health and preventing proliferation of nuclear materials. n159

#### 2 Violation – the plan is fusion

#### 3 Vote Neg

#### A – Predictable Limits – their interp justifies giving incentives to any energy type and massively unlimits the topic

#### B – Ground – their interp kill process and regulation based disads and solvency arguments because nuclear power is defined in terms of fission reactions

### 1NC- T

#### Financial incentives must be direct

Dyson et al 3 - International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (Megan, Flow: The Essentials of Environmental Flows, p. 67-68)

Understanding of the term ‘incentives’ varies and economists have produced numerous typologies. A brief characterization of incentives is therefore warranted. First, the term is understood by economists as incorporating both positive and negative aspects, for example a tax that leads a consumer to give up an activity that is an incentive, not a disincentive or negative incentive. Second, although incentives are also construed purely in economic terms, incentives refer to more than just financial rewards and penalties. They are the “positive and negative changes in outcomes that individuals perceive as likely to result from particular actions taken within a set of rules in a particular physical and social context.”80 Third, **it is possible to distinguish between direct and indirect incentives, with direct incentives referring to financial or other inducements and indirect incentives referring to both variable and enabling incentives**.81 Finally, incentives of any kind may be called ‘perverse’ where they work against their purported aims or have significant adverse side effects. **Direct incentives lead people**, groups and organisations **to take particular action** or inaction. In the case of environmental flows these are the same as the net gains and losses that different stakeholders experience. The key challenge is to ensure that the incentives are consistent with the achievement of environmental flows. This implies the need to compensate those that incur additional costs by providing them with the appropriate payment or other compensation. Thus, farmers asked to give up irrigation water to which they have an established property or use right are likely to require a payment for ceding this right. The question, of course, is how to obtain the financing necessary to cover the costs of developing such transactions and the transaction itself. Variable incentives are policy instruments that affect the relative costs and benefits of different economic activities. As such, they can be manipulated to affect the behaviour of the producer or consumer. For example, a government subsidy on farm inputs will increase the relative profitability of agricultural products, hence probably increasing the demand for irrigation water. Variable incentives therefore have the ability to greatly increase or reduce the demand for out-of-stream, as well as in-stream, uses of water. **The number of these incentives within the realm of economic and fiscal policy is practically limitless**.

#### For is a term of exclusion requiring direct action

US CUSTOMS COURT 39

AMERICAN COLORTYPE CO. v. UNITED STATES C. D. 107, Protest 912094-G against the decision of the collector of customs at the port of New York UNITED STATES CUSTOMS COURT, THIRD DIVISION 2 Cust. Ct. 132; 1939 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 35

The same reasons used by the appellate court may be adopted in construing the language of the statute herein involved. If the words "for industrial use" mean no more than the words "articles of utility," there could be no reason for inserting the additional words "for industrial use" in the paragraph. Therefore, it must be held that the [\*135] new language "for industrial use" was intended to have a different meaning from the words "articles of utility," as construed in the case of Progressive Fine Arts Co. v. United States, [\*\*8] supra. Webster's New International Dictionary defines the word "industrial" as follows: Industrial. 1. Relating to industry or labor as an economic factor, or to a branch or the branches of industry; of the nature of, or constituting, an industry or industries \* \* \* . The transferring of the scenes on an oil painting to a printed copy is a branch of industry under the definition above quoted. **Some of the meanings of the preposition "for" signify intent,** as shown by the following definition in the same dictionary: For. 2. **Indicating the end with** reference **to which anything is**, acts, serves, or is **done**; as: a. As a preparation for; with the object of; in order to be, become, or act as; conducive to. \* \* \*. d. Intending, or in order, to go to or in the direction of. Therefore**, the words "articles for industrial use"** in paragraph 1807 **imply that Congress intended to exclude from that provision articles either purchased or imported with the intention to use the same in industry** for manufacturing purposes.

#### Violation – funding energy R&D is an indirect incentive

EIA 7 (Energy Information Administration, "Federal Energy Research and Development," http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/subsidy2/pdf/chap3.pdf)

It is easier to measure energy R&D spending than to characterize it as a subsidy. R&D spending is intended to create useful knowledge and develop technologies that have **potential** commercial benefits to society. Thus, all Federal R&D spending could, in a general way, be considered a subsidy to knowledge and technology. However, the extent to which specific R&D programs actually affect energy markets is more **difficult to ascertain**. The results of R&D are **inherently uncertain**. Many programs are intended to advance knowledge across a range of energy and non-energy applications, rather than in the context of a particular fuel or form of consumption. Furthermore, the knowledge obtained may not be of value, in the sense that the research may **only reveal technical or economic dead ends** to be avoided in the future.65 Thus, only a portion of Federal energy R&D is likely to achieve results in the form of changes in energy production costs or consumption that can be attributed to a specific R&D program. Moreover, to the extent that R&D yields commercial technologies, they are likely to be measurable **only years after the funded research effort is initiated**.

#### Vote neg

#### 1. Limits – indirect incentives could include 40 different mechanisms

Moran 86 **-** non-resident fellow at the Center for Global Development and holds the Marcus Wallenberg Chair at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University(Theodore, Investing in Development: New Roles for Private Capital?, p. 29 - googlebooks) Guisinger finds that **if “incentives” are broadly defined to include** tariffs and **trade controls** along with **tax holidays, subsidized loans, cash grants, and other fiscal measures, they comprise more than forty separate kinds of measures**. Moreover, the author emphasizes, the value of an incentive package is just one of several means that governments use to lure foreign investors. Other methods—for example, promotional activities (advertising, representative offices) and subsidized government services—also influence investors’ location decisions. The author points out that empirical research so far has been unable to distinguish the relative importance of fundamental economic factors and of government policies in decisions concerning the location of foreign investment—let alone to determine the effectiveness of individual government instruments.

#### 2. Topic education – allowing indirect incentives means affs don’t even have to target the energy sector

Enters 4 - Food and Agricultural Organization (Thomas, “What does it take? The role of incentives in forest plantation development in Asia and the Pacific”, http://www.fao.org/docrep/007/ad524e/ad524e05.htm) While there is no dearth of definitions for incentives, a single agreed definition does not exist (Meijerink 1997). Defined in very broad terms, an incentive is anything that motivates or stimulates people to act (Giger 1996; cited in FAO 1999). Sargent (1994; cited in Tomforde 1995) defines incentives as signals that motivate action. Other definitions refer to the “incitement and inducement of action” (Enters 2001). Within the context of development projects, incentives have also been described as “bribes” and “sweeteners” (Smith 1998). To be of interest and to have an impact, incentives need to affect the cost-benefit structure of economic activities such as plantation management. Hence, in the context of the regional study, incentives can be defined as policy instruments that increase the comparative advantage of forest plantations and thus stimulate investments in plantation establishment and management. This definition is broader than the more narrow definition for subsidies. The latter are of a purely pecuniary nature and usually viewed as payments provided to reduce the costs of or raise the returns on an activity. The broader definition includes research and extension, which are important elements in supporting plantation development. The definition also includes sectoral and macro-economic policies which, as will be argued in the concluding chapter, establish much of the general investment climate and heavily influence the economic behaviour of individuals and corporations. Consequently, the spectrum of incentives is considerably broadened and a distinction is made between direct and indirect incentives (Figure 5). Direct incentives are designed to influence returns to investment directly The distinction between direct and indirect incentives is somewhat blurred. **Direct incentives are designed to have an immediate impact on resource users** and influence returns to investment directly. Indirect incentives on the other hand have an indirect effect through setting or changing the overall framework conditions within and outside **the forestry** sector. There are some overlaps. For example, **tax concessions for plantation investors are a direct incentive, whereas general tax reductions for fuel are considered indirect incentives**, because they lower production and transport costs within - as well as outside - the plantation sector.

### 1NC-CP

#### CP text: the 50 States and all relevant Territories should enter into a compact to substantially increase grants for magnetic fusion energy production in the United States. The Compact should collect revenue via a Clean Energy Community Finance Initiative.

#### Compacts solve faster than the federal government

Mountjoy ‘01

John is a policy analyst with the council of State Governments, “Interstate Compacts Make a Comeback,” Spring <http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/ncic/Comeback.pdf>

Some may question the need for interstate compacts to address multi-state policy issues. Why ¶ not leave such regulation to the feds? ¶ “Interstate compacts help us maintain state control,” said Gary McConnell, director of the ¶ Georgia Emergency Management Agency. ¶ During his 10 years as GEMA director, McConnell has played an instrumental role in developing ¶ and promoting a successful interstate compact —the Emergency Management Assistance ¶ Compact, or EMAC. EMAC allows state emergency management agencies to cooperate and ¶ share resources in the event of natural and man-made disasters. ¶ “We can go to the federal government for all kinds of help when natural disasters strike, but the ¶ states [cooperating under an interstate compact] can provide specific resources quicker, which ¶ are likely to be problem specific,” McConnell said. “It’s less bureaucratic, and it’s far cheaper. ¶ It’s easier for us under EMAC to obtain resources from surrounding states than it is to use ¶ federal assistance, which we’d end up having to pay more for anyway. I suspect this is the case ¶ with many other interstate compacts as well.” ¶ “States are rediscovering that they have the power to address their own problems better than the ¶ federal government,” said Rick Masters, The Council of State Governments’ legal counsel and ¶ special counsel for interstate compacts. ¶ CSG, which has tracked interstate compacts for more than 40 years, maintains a clearinghouse of ¶ compact information. More recently, CSG helps administer EMAC and is facilitating the update ¶ of the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision and the Interstate Compact on ¶ Juveniles. Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution laid the legal foundation for interstate ¶ compacts: “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep ¶ Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another ¶ State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent ¶ Danger as will not admit of delay.” Compacts actually preceded the Constitution, having been ¶ used in colonial times to resolve boundary disputes between colonies. ¶ Prior to the 1920s, interstate compacts were typically bi-state agreements, addressing boundary ¶ disputes and territorial claims. In fact, only 36 interstate compacts were formed between 1783 ¶ and 1920. It is only in this century that states have turned to interstate compacts to facilitate ¶ cooperative solutions to multi-state problems. ¶ After a lull in the late 1970s and early 1980s, interstate compacts are beginning to enjoy a ¶ resurgence. Since the early 1990s, states have initiated or updated several high-profile compacts. ¶ Examples include EMAC, the Interstate Compact on Industrialized/Modular Buildings and the ¶ Interstate Insurance Receivership Compact. Interstate compacts can set the framework for cooperative solutions to today’s cross-state ¶ challenges, from policing drugs to supplying energy or controlling sprawl. ¶ “Issues within the states are becoming more complex and aren’t confined by state boundaries. As ¶ a result, solutions are becoming multi-state as well. Compacts are the only tool that is truly ¶ adequate for addressing these multi-state issues,” said Bill Voit, senior project director at The ¶ Council of State Governments. ¶ An example is an interstate compact being considered to facilitate taxation of e-commerce. ¶ Opponents of Internet taxation claim that it would be virtually impossible for online vendors to ¶ comply with the complex, often confusing system of state and local sales and use taxes. Since ¶ Internet sales are expected to reach $184 billion annually by 2004, states have a vested interest in ¶ breaking down this and other barriers to taxing online transactions. ¶ Congress currently is considering the Internet Tax Moratorium Equity Act (S. 512) to help states ¶ simplify their sales and use taxes, in part by authorizing states to enter into an Interstate Sales ¶ and Use Tax Compact. The compact would create a “uniform, streamlined sales and use tax ¶ system,” convenient to remote sales. ¶ At least 18 states are considering the model streamlined sales tax legislation in 2001. Kentucky, ¶ South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming already have signed bills into law. ¶ Existing interstate compacts, many drafted in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, are ripe for ¶ amendment and revision. Technology and the Internet now make the sharing of information ¶ seamless and immediate, yet several interstate compacts are plagued by inadequate ¶ administration. ¶ “Not only do we see the development of new compacts, but we are seeing the re-examination of ¶ existing compacts…revising them to keep pace with our changing world,” Masters said. ¶ Developed in 1937, the Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers is ¶ one example of a compact in need of update. Adopted by all 50 states, the compact regulates the ¶ movement of parolees and probationers across state lines. The burgeoning offender population ¶ and the ease with which offenders now can travel have created several problems for the compact, ¶ including: frequent violations of compact rules, inability to enforce compliance, difficulty in ¶ creating new rules and slow, unreliable exchange of case information. ¶ The antiquated compact needed a replacement that would provide states the authority, ¶ enforcement tools and resources to adequately track and ensure supervision of parolees and ¶ probationers. ¶ The new interstate compact, the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision, provides ¶ these solutions. The new compact includes mechanisms for enforcement, accountability, resource provision, information sharing and state-to-state cooperation. Currently, the compact ¶ has been introduced in 39 states and enacted in 18. ¶ Just as technology can smooth the operation of interstate compacts, alternative dispute resolution ¶ techniques can increase their self-sufficiency. Enforcement tools within interstate compacts need ¶ to utilize more of the mediation and arbitration services that have proven successful throughout ¶ state government. By developing additional self-contained enforcement mechanisms, compact ¶ members would not need to rely solely on the crowded docket of the U.S. Supreme Court. ¶ States should further utilize interstate compacts to address new problems and create new ¶ methods of interstate cooperation. If not, federal preemption in certain policy areas is a distinct ¶ possibility.

### 1NC- Politics

#### Obama will use public popularity to get immigration, energy tanks him

Harder 2-6

Amy is the Energy and Environment Editor for National Journal, “In Washington, Energy and Climate Issues Get Shoved in the Closet,” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/power-play/in-washington-energy-and-climate-issues-get-shoved-in-the-closet-20130206>

At a news conference where TV cameras in the back were nearly stacked on top of each other, an influential bipartisan group of five senators introduced legislation late last month to overhaul the nation’s immigration system. The room was so crowded that no open seats or standing room could be found.¶ A week later, one senator, Republican Lisa Murkowski of Alaska, was standing at the podium in the same room to unveil her energy-policy blueprint. There were several open seats and just a few cameras. At least one reporter was there to ask the senator about her position on President Obama’s choice for Defense secretary, former Republican Sen. Chuck Hagel.¶ “I’m doing energy right now,” Murkowski responded. “I’m focused on that.”¶ Almost everyone else on Capitol Hill is focused on something else. Aside from the broad fiscal issues, Congress and the president are galvanizing around immigration reform.¶ Four years ago, the White House prioritized health care reform above comprehensive climate-change legislation. The former will go down in history as one of Obama’s most significant accomplishments. The latter is in the perpetual position of second fiddle. “To everything,” Murkowski interjected fervently when asked by National Journal Daily whether energy and climate policy was second to other policies in Washington’s pecking order.¶ Murkowski, ranking member of the Senate's Energy and Natural Resources Committee, said she hoped the Super Bowl blackout would help the public understand the importance of energy policy.¶ “This issue of immigration: Why are we all focused on that? Well, it’s because the Republicans lost the election because in part we did not have the Hispanic community behind us,” Murkowski said this week. “What is it that brings about that motivation? Maybe it could be something like a gap in the Super Bowl causes the focus on energy that we need to have. I can only hope.”¶ It will take more than hope. Elections have consequences, but so far the only kind of electoral consequence climate and energy policy has instigated is one that helped some lawmakers who supported cap-and-trade legislation to lose their seats in the 2010 midterm elections. For the pendulum to swing the other way—for lawmakers to lose their seats over not acting on climate and energy policy—seems almost unfathomable right now.¶ Billions of dollars are invested in the fossil-fuel power plants, refineries, and pipelines that the country depends on today. The companies that own this infrastructure have a business interest in keeping things the way they are. Immigration reform doesn’t face such formidable interests invested in the status quo.¶ “They [businesses] have employees—real, visible people—who they value and who they want to make legal as soon as possible,” said Chris Miller, who until earlier this year was the top energy and environment adviser to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev.¶ On energy and climate-change policy, Miller added, “You’re probably never going to have anything like the fence in the Southwest or the border-control issue that pushes action and debate on immigration, because climate-change impacts will likely continue to be more abstract in the public's mind until those impacts are so crystal-clear it’s too late for us to do anything.”¶ Another, tactical reason helps build momentum on immigration and not on other issues. Obama can capitalize on immigration as it becomes more of a wedge issue within the GOP. On energy and climate policy, Obama faces a unified Republican Party.¶ “The president has cracked the code on how to push his agenda items through. He learned from his victories on the payroll tax and the fiscal cliff that the key is to stake out the political high ground on issues that poll in his favor while exploiting the divisions within the GOP,” said a former Republican leadership aide who would speak only on the condition of anonymity. “With this in mind, the next logical place for him to go is immigration. Unlike issues like energy or tax reform where the GOP is united, he can claim a big win on immigration reform while striking a political blow to Republicans.”¶ While Obama maneuvers for a big legislative win on immigration, he’s moving on a parallel track toward another win on climate change through Environmental Protection Agency rules controlling greenhouse-gas emissions, which don’t require congressional approval. Fresh off a strong reelection victory, Obama has more freedom to move unilaterally with EPA.¶ “He doesn't have to expend political capital or ask Democrats to extend their necks on this issue,” said Kevin Book, an energy analyst at the Washington-based consulting firm ClearView Energy Partners. “He already won. He can control the issue and move as fast or slow as he wants.”¶ The EPA action will only further polarize efforts, such as those by Murkowski on the Senate Energy panel, to move through Congress smaller bits of energy and environmental policy.¶ At that point, this second fiddle might not even be in the band.

#### Citizenship solves the deficit

Tucker 10

Cynthia is a columnist for The Atlanta Journal-Constitution. “We need immigrants to help pay the deficit,” Nov 19, http://blogs.ajc.com/cynthia-tucker/2010/11/19/we-need-immigrants-to-help-pay-the-deficit/

Recommendations for taming the deficit include raising the retirement age, raising the federal gas tax and ending the mortgage interest deduction for homeowners. Ouch!¶ But there is a palliative that would ease the pain: Put 11 million illegal immigrants on a path to legalization. And don’t touch birthright citizenship!¶ Yes, you heard that right: Granting legal residency to illegal immigrants will eventually help sop up some of the federal budget’s red ink. I know that’s counterintuitive since so many citizens have come to believe that Mexican landscapers and Guatemalan maids are a drain on the treasury. But the fact is that their relative youth is just what the U.S. economy needs.¶ The explosion of the long-term deficit is largely the consequence of an aging population, with more retirees depending on taxes from fewer workers. While the recession, two unfunded wars and Bush-era tax cuts fueled the immediate deficit, a tsunami of long-term red ink will swamp the budget in about ten years, as a massive wave of baby boomers leaves the workplace.¶ So we need as many younger workers as we can find to help support the coming crush of senior citizens. The U.S. is lucky enough to have a higher birthrate than many other Westernized democracies, even among native-born women. Immigrants are an added demographic bonus.¶ “When some people think of immigrants, they think of people coming in and immediately absorbing our resources,” said Emory economist Jeffrey Rosensweig. “Most immigrants come here to work. They’re young workers, and they’re paying taxes.” Why not add all of them to the federal tax rolls?

#### Long Term Deficit kills hegemony causes nuclear war

Khalilzad 11

Zalmay Khalilzad, the United States ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United Nations during the presidency of George W. Bush and the director of policy planning at the Defense Department from 1990 to 1992, February 8, 2011, “The Economy and National Security; If we don’t get our economic house in order, we risk a new era of multi-polarity,” online: <http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad>

Without faster economic growth and actions to reduce deficits, publicly held national debt is projected to reach dangerous proportions. If interest rates were to rise significantly, annual interest payments — which already are larger than the defense budget — would crowd out other spending or require substantial tax increases that would undercut economic growth. Even worse, if unanticipated events trigger what economists call a “sudden stop” in credit markets for U.S. debt, the United States would be unable to roll over its outstanding obligations, precipitating a sovereign-debt crisis that would almost certainly compel a radical retrenchment of the United States internationally.¶ Such scenarios would reshape the international order. It was the economic devastation of Britain and France during World War II, as well as the rise of other powers, that led both countries to relinquish their empires. In the late 1960s, British leaders concluded that they lacked the economic capacity to maintain a presence “east of Suez.” Soviet economic weakness, which crystallized under Gorbachev, contributed to their decisions to withdraw from Afghanistan, abandon Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and allow the Soviet Union to fragment. If the U.S. debt problem goes critical, the United States would be compelled to retrench, reducing its military spending and shedding international commitments.¶ We face this domestic challenge while other major powers are experiencing rapid economic growth. Even though countries such as China, India, and Brazil have profound political, social, demographic, and economic problems, their economies are growing faster than ours, and this could alter the global distribution of power. These trends could in the long term produce a multi-polar world. If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new international order will emerge. The closing of the gap between the United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical competition among major powers, increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another, and undercut our will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher risk of escalation.¶ The stakes are high. In modern history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership. By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world wars.¶ American retrenchment could have devastating consequences. Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats. Under this scenario, there would be a heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation, or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict. Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions.¶ As rival powers rise, Asia in particular is likely to emerge as a zone of great-power competition. Beijing’s economic rise has enabled a dramatic military buildup focused on acquisitions of naval, cruise, and ballistic missiles, long-range stealth aircraft, and anti-satellite capabilities. China’s strategic modernization is aimed, ultimately, at denying the United States access to the seas around China. Even as cooperative economic ties in the region have grown, China’s expansive territorial claims — and provocative statements and actions following crises in Korea and incidents at sea — have roiled its relations with South Korea, Japan, India, and Southeast Asian states. Still, the United States is the most significant barrier facing Chinese hegemony and aggression.

### 1NC- K

#### The affirmative’s call to SECURITY only FEEDS THE APORIAS by which security apparatuses CONTINUOUSLY ORDER AND PROBLEMATIZE LIFE

Dillon and Reid 2K0

Professor of Politics at the University of Lancaster and lecturer in international relations at Kings College in London, 2000 [Michael and Julian, Alternatives vol. 25, issue 1, spring, EbscoHost]

As a precursor to global governance, governmentality, according to Foucault's initial account, poses the question of order not in terms of the origin of the law and the location of sovereignty, as do traditional accounts of power, but in terms instead of the management of population. The management of population is further refined in terms of specific problematics to which population management may be reduced. These typically include but are not necessarily exhausted by the following topoi of governmental power: economy, health, welfare, poverty, security, sexuality, demographics, resources, skills, culture, and so on. Now, where there is an operation of power there is knowledge, and where there is knowledge there is an operation of power. Here discursive formations emerge and, as Foucault noted, ¶ in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality.[ 34] ¶ More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations.¶ Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. ¶ Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet serial policy failure—the fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[ 35] ¶ Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it.

#### The discourse of the 1AC contributes to the emergence of destructive security-state that becomes indistinguishable from the forms of violence it seeks to prevent.

Agamben 2K2,

[ Professor of Philosophy at the Collège International de Philosophie in Paris, [Giorgio, Theory & Event 5:4, ProjectMuse]

Security as the basic principle of state politics dates back to the birth of the modern state. Hobbes already mentions it as the opposite of the fear which compels human beings to unite and form a society together. But not until the 18th century does the paradigm of security reach its fullest development. In an unpublished lecture at the Collège de France in 1978, Michel Foucault showed how in the political and economic practice of the Physiocrats security opposes discipline and the law as instruments of governance.¶ Neither Turgot and Quesnay nor the Physiocratic officials were primarily concerned with the prevention of famine or the regulation of production, but rather wanted to allow for their development in order to guide and "secure" their consequences. While disciplinary power isolates and closes off territories, measures of security lead to an opening and globalisation; while the law wants to prevent and prescribe, security wants to intervene in ongoing processes to direct them. In a word, discipline wants to produce order, while security wants to guide disorder. Since measures of security can only function within a context of freedom of traffic, trade, and individual initiative, Foucault can show that the development of security coincides with the development of liberal ideology.¶ Today we are facing extreme and most dangerous developments of this paradigm of security. In the course of a gradual neutralisation of politics and the progressive surrender of traditional tasks of the state, security imposes itself as the basic principle of state activity. What used to be one among several decisive measures of public administration until the first half of the twentieth century, now becomes the sole criterion of political legitimation. Security reasoning entails an essential risk. A state which has security as its only task and source of legitimacy is a fragile organism; it can always be provoked by terrorism to turn itself terroristic.¶ We should not forget that the first major organisation of terror after the war, the Organisation de l'Armée Secrète (OAS) was established by a French General who thought of himself as patriotic and who was convinced that terrorism was the only answer to the guerilla phenomenon in Algeria and Indochina. When politics, the way it was understood by theorists of the "Polizeiwissenschaft" in the eighteenth century, reduces itself to police, the difference between state and terrorism threatens to disappear. In the end it may lead to security and terrorism forming a single deadly system in which they mutually justify and legitimate each others' actions.¶ The risk is not merely the development of a clandestine complicity of opponents but that the hunt for security leads to a worldwide civil war which destroys all civil coexistence. In the new situation -- created by the end of the classical form of war between sovereign states -- security finds its end in globalisation: it implies the idea of a new planetary order which is, in fact, the worst of all disorders. But there is yet another danger. Because they require constant reference to a state of exception, measures of security work towards a growing depoliticization of society. In the long run, they are irreconcilable with democracy.¶ Nothing is therefore more important than a revision of the concept of security as the basic principle of state politics. European and American politicians finally have to consider the catastrophic consequences of uncritical use of this figure of thought. It is not that democracies should cease to defend themselves, but the defense of democracy demands today a change of political paradigms and not a world civil war which is just the institutionalization of terror. Maybe the time has come to work towards the prevention of disorder and catastrophe, and not merely towards their control. Today, there are plans for all kinds of emergencies (ecological, medical, military), but there is no politics to prevent them. On the contrary, we can say that politics secretly works towards the production of emergencies. It is the task of democratic politics to prevent the development of conditions which lead to hatred, terror, and destruction -- and not to reduce itself to attempts to control them once they occur.

#### ALTERNATIVE: VOTE NEGATIVE. ONLY TOTALLY ESCHEWING THE LOGIC OF SECURITY SOLVES.

NEOCLEOUS 2K8.

[Mark, Professor of Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University (UK), “Critique of Security.” Pg. 185-186]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether – to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favor of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that cannot be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain ‘this is an insecure world’ and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalizes all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritizing of a mythical security as a political end – as the political end – constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible – that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics, dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more ‘sectors’ to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimizes state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text *Critical Security Studies*, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that’s left behind? But I’m inclined to agree with Dalby: there is no hole. The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilized or gendered or humanized or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up re-affirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That’s the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding ‘more security’ (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn’t damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitizing of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that ‘security’ helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centered on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipator in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognizing that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognizing that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and ‘insecurities’ that come with being human; it requires accepting that ‘securitizing’ an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift.

### Leadership

#### Bureaucratic and institutional constraints thump preclude energy leadership

NEI ’12

["Improved Policies for Commercial Nuclear Trade Will Create American Jobs," June, <http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/newplants/policybrief/improved-policies-for-commercial-nuclear-trade-will-create-american-jobs?page=1~~>]

**While U.S. firms offer some of the most innovative and safest nuclear energy technologies, they are hampered by cumbersome trade regulations, lack of coordination among the federal agencies involved, an inefficient export licensing process, limited options for financing nuclear exports and the absence of an international liability regime**. These companies face intense competition from suppliers in nations with less restrictive policies and substantial government subsidies for their nuclear industries. **To facilitate a greater U.S. role in the global commercial nuclear market, government support must be integrated into a seamless mechanism that includes coordination of nuclear trade policy, creation of bilateral agreements, export control reform and enhanced export financing. It also is vital that the United States pursue the international adoption of effective civil nuclear liability regimes**.

#### Squo solves

Steyer and Podesta 12

TOM STEYER And JOHN PODESTA, writers for the Wall Street Journal, “We Don't Need More Foreign Oil and Gas “, January 24, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203718504577178872638705902.html

Under President Obama's leadership, we appear to be at the beginning of a domestic gas and oil boom. After a four-decade decline in oil production, the U.S. is now producing more than half of our oil domestically. This can free us from our addiction to foreign-sourced barrels, particularly if we utilize our dramatically larger and cheaper natural gas reserves. Natural gas now costs the equivalent of less than $15 per barrel, versus the $100-plus barrels we import from the Middle East.¶ There are critical environmental questions associated with developing these resources, particularly concerning methane leakage and water pollution. Yet as long as we ensure high regulatory standards and stay away from the riskiest and most polluting of these activities, we can safely assemble a collection of lower-carbon, affordable and abundant domestic-energy assets that will dramatically improve our economy and our environment. Under President Obama's watch, increased domestic production from developing these reserves has already created 75,000 new gas and oil-production jobs since 2009. And we have much further to go.¶ At the same time, the U.S. is well on its way to becoming a global clean-energy leader. America is the largest clean-energy investor, after reclaiming this title from China last year. Our companies make over 75% of all venture investments in clean technologies world-wide. Overall, because of U.S. public and private investments in clean energy—including renewables, efficiency, transportation and infrastructure—the clean economy grew by 8.3% from 2008 to 2009, even during the depths of the recession.

### C-Mod

#### The US won’t fund quantum computing research – their author

**Aaronson 8**

(Scott, Associate Professor of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at MIT, "Quantum Computing and the Ultimate Limits of Computation: The Case for a National Investment," 12-12-08, [http://www.cra.org/ccc/docs/init/Quantum\_Computing.pdf-http://www.cra.org/ccc/docs/init/Quantum\_Computing.pdf](http://www.cra.org/ccc/docs/init/Quantum_Computing.pdf-http%3A//www.cra.org/ccc/docs/init/Quantum_Computing.pdf))

The US has long dominated computing technology. The transistor and integrated circuit

were invented in the US, and Silicon Valley has been the preeminent creator of computing technologies over the last few decades. It is critical that the US continue to lead with the ¶ computing technologies of the 21st century. Recently Singapore invested over $100 million ¶ in quantum computing research. The Canadian government has contributed over $50 ¶ million to the University of Waterloo's Institute for Quantum Computing and the Perimeter ¶ Institute for Theoretical Physics, both of which have become world leaders in quantum ¶ computing and information. European spending on quantum computing is comparable to that of the US. In short, while the US has funded quantum computing research, it has done so only at a level sufficient enough to barely keep up with the rest of the world. In some areas of quantum computing, for instance in the theory of these computers, the US is being

eclipsed by the rest of the world.

#### Their China fusion leadership argument says its inevitable and happening now – it’s not reverse causal, the aff has ZERO evidence that says it will stop this

#### Chinese fusion research inevitable – and has ramped up despite prior US support

Shieber, 11 (Jonathan, “China Cranks Up Heat on Nuclear Fusion” WSJ, 5/26, <http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/05/26/china-cranks-up-heat-on-nuclear-fusion/>)

According to a report in the state-run China Daily, the central government is planning to train 2,000 experts to pursue research and development into magnetic confinement fusion, which seeks to use magnetic fields to create the high-pressure conditions necessary for fusion.¶ A number of research institutes and private companies around the world are racing to perfect magnetic confinement.¶ China is already a signatory and participant in the France-based International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project, that is perhaps the largest project pursuing magnetic approach. Arguably one of the most world’s ambitious multinational scientific undertakings, the project has a price tag of at least $21 billion and involves hundreds of scientists from China, the European Union, Japan, India Korea, Russia and the United States.¶ One concern among Chinese scientists is that the nation is not getting enough value out of its investment the ITER project. “China is trying to dispatch more qualified scientists to work on” the project, Cao Jianlin, vice-minister of science and technology, told China Daily.¶ Right now China provides 10% of the funding for the project, but supplies only 5% of the scientists, which means the country is missing out on valuable training for its would-be fusion experts.¶ Chinese engineers and scientists are currently responsible for building components such as heating, diagnostic and remote maintenance equipment for the project, as well as transporting it to Cadarache in the south of France, where the ITER reactor will be built.¶ Another researcher quoted by the China Daily thinks it’s not nearly enough and complained about the lack of exposure Chinese scientists are getting to the new technologies that could reshape the energy market.¶ “The ITER is related to 34 core scientific engineering technologies and management subjects,” Wan Yuanxi, dean of the school of nuclear science and technology under the University of Science and Technology of China, said. “Chinese researchers only work on 11 of them, which means we have no involvement in more than 60 percent of its core scientific engineering technologies and management subjects.”¶ In addition to its international efforts, China is also pursuing its own research into fusion technologies in research around the country, including at a laboratory in Chengdu.¶ An April guideline issued jointly by China’s Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Education, the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the China National Nuclear Corp. recommends the government subsidize at least 200 researchers who intend to pursue doctorates in magnetic controlled fusion.¶ Currently there are 1,254 researchers have been involved with magnetic controlled fusion-related projects in China, according to the China Daily report.¶ Not to be outdone, the U.S. has spent billions of dollars on fusion research, in addition to the work it is doing to promote ITER projects domestically and on the main project in France, although funding for the European project has been a political football in the past. Like China, the US is responsible for around 9% of the ITER project’s total costs, with the EU has taking on the bulk of financing.

#### No impact to cyber

Rid 12

(Thomas Rid, reader in war studies at King's College London, is author of "Cyber War Will Not Take Place" and co-author of "Cyber-Weapons.", March/April 2012, “Think Again: Cyberwar”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/27/cyberwar?page=full)

"Cyberwar Is Already Upon Us." No way. "Cyberwar is coming!" John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt predicted in a celebrated Rand paper back in 1993. Since then, it seems to have arrived -- at least by the account of the U.S. military establishment, which is busy competing over who should get what share of the fight. Cyberspace is "a domain in which the Air Force flies and fights," Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne claimed in 2006. By 2012, William J. Lynn III, the deputy defense secretary at the time, was writing that cyberwar is "just as critical to military operations as land, sea, air, and space." In January, the Defense Department vowed to equip the U.S. armed forces for "conducting a combined arms campaign across all domains -- land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace." Meanwhile, growing piles of books and articles explore the threats of cyberwarfare, cyberterrorism, and how to survive them. Time for a reality check: Cyberwar is still more hype than hazard. Consider the definition of an act of war: It has to be potentially violent, it has to be purposeful, and it has to be political. The cyberattacks we've seen so far, from Estonia to the Stuxnet virus, simply don't meet these criteria. Take the dubious story of a Soviet pipeline explosion back in 1982, much cited by cyberwar's true believers as the most destructive cyberattack ever. The account goes like this: In June 1982, a Siberian pipeline that the CIA had virtually booby-trapped with a so-called "logic bomb" exploded in a monumental fireball that could be seen from space. The U.S. Air Force estimated the explosion at 3 kilotons, equivalent to a small nuclear device. Targeting a Soviet pipeline linking gas fields in Siberia to European markets, the operation sabotaged the pipeline's control systems with software from a Canadian firm that the CIA had doctored with malicious code. No one died, according to Thomas Reed, a U.S. National Security Council aide at the time who revealed the incident in his 2004 book, At the Abyss; the only harm came to the Soviet economy. But did it really happen? After Reed's account came out, Vasily Pchelintsev, a former KGB head of the Tyumen region, where the alleged explosion supposedly took place, denied the story. There are also no media reports from 1982 that confirm such an explosion, though accidents and pipeline explosions in the Soviet Union were regularly reported in the early 1980s. Something likely did happen, but Reed's book is the only public mention of the incident and his account relied on a single document. Even after the CIA declassified a redacted version of Reed's source, a note on the so-called Farewell Dossier that describes the effort to provide the Soviet Union with defective technology, the agency did not confirm that such an explosion occurred. The available evidence on the Siberian pipeline blast is so thin that it shouldn't be counted as a proven case of a successful cyberattack. Most other commonly cited cases of cyberwar are even less remarkable. Take the attacks on Estonia in April 2007, which came in response to the controversial relocation of a Soviet war memorial, the Bronze Soldier. The well-wired country found itself at the receiving end of a massive distributed denial-of-service attack that emanated from up to 85,000 hijacked computers and lasted three weeks. The attacks reached a peak on May 9, when 58 Estonian websites were attacked at once and the online services of Estonia's largest bank were taken down. "What's the difference between a blockade of harbors or airports of sovereign states and the blockade of government institutions and newspaper websites?" asked Estonian Prime Minister Andrus Ansip. Despite his analogies, the attack was no act of war. It was certainly a nuisance and an emotional strike on the country, but the bank's actual network was not even penetrated; it went down for 90 minutes one day and two hours the next. The attack was not violent, it wasn't purposefully aimed at changing Estonia's behavior, and no political entity took credit for it. The same is true for the vast majority of cyberattacks on record. Indeed, there is no known cyberattack that has caused the loss of human life. No cyberoffense has ever injured a person or damaged a building. And if an act is not at least potentially violent, it's not an act of war. Separating war from physical violence makes it a metaphorical notion; it would mean that there is no way to distinguish between World War II, say, and the "wars" on obesity and cancer. Yet those ailments, unlike past examples of cyber "war," actually do kill people. "A Digital Pearl Harbor Is Only a Matter of Time." Keep waiting. U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta delivered a stark warning last summer: "We could face a cyberattack that could be the equivalent of Pearl Harbor." Such alarmist predictions have been ricocheting inside the Beltway for the past two decades, and some scaremongers have even upped the ante by raising the alarm about a cyber 9/11. In his 2010 book, Cyber War, former White House counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke invokes the specter of nationwide power blackouts, planes falling out of the sky, trains derailing, refineries burning, pipelines exploding, poisonous gas clouds wafting, and satellites spinning out of orbit -- events that would make the 2001 attacks pale in comparison. But the empirical record is less hair-raising, even by the standards of the most drastic example available. Gen. Keith Alexander, head of U.S. Cyber Command (established in 2010 and now boasting a budget of more than $3 billion), shared his worst fears in an April 2011 speech at the University of Rhode Island: "What I'm concerned about are destructive attacks," Alexander said, "those that are coming." He then invoked a remarkable accident at Russia's Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric plant to highlight the kind of damage a cyberattack might be able to cause. Shortly after midnight on Aug. 17, 2009, a 900-ton turbine was ripped out of its seat by a so-called "water hammer," a sudden surge in water pressure that then caused a transformer explosion. The turbine's unusually high vibrations had worn down the bolts that kept its cover in place, and an offline sensor failed to detect the malfunction. Seventy-five people died in the accident, energy prices in Russia rose, and rebuilding the plant is slated to cost $1.3 billion. Tough luck for the Russians, but here's what the head of Cyber Command didn't say: The ill-fated turbine had been malfunctioning for some time, and the plant's management was notoriously poor. On top of that, the key event that ultimately triggered the catastrophe seems to have been a fire at Bratsk power station, about 500 miles away. Because the energy supply from Bratsk dropped, authorities remotely increased the burden on the Sayano-Shushenskaya plant. The sudden spike overwhelmed the turbine, which was two months shy of reaching the end of its 30-year life cycle, sparking the catastrophe. If anything, the Sayano-Shushenskaya incident highlights how difficult a devastating attack would be to mount. The plant's washout was an accident at the end of a complicated and unique chain of events. Anticipating such vulnerabilities in advance is extraordinarily difficult even for insiders; creating comparable coincidences from cyberspace would be a daunting challenge at best for outsiders. If this is the most drastic incident Cyber Command can conjure up, perhaps it's time for everyone to take a deep breath. "Cyberattacks Are Becoming Easier." Just the opposite. U.S. Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper warned last year that the volume of malicious software on American networks had more than tripled since 2009 and that more than 60,000 pieces of malware are now discovered every day. The United States, he said, is undergoing "a phenomenon known as 'convergence,' which amplifies the opportunity for disruptive cyberattacks, including against physical infrastructures." ("Digital convergence" is a snazzy term for a simple thing: more and more devices able to talk to each other, and formerly separate industries and activities able to work together.) Just because there's more malware, however, doesn't mean that attacks are becoming easier. In fact, potentially damaging or life-threatening cyberattacks should be more difficult to pull off. Why? Sensitive systems generally have built-in redundancy and safety systems, meaning an attacker's likely objective will not be to shut down a system, since merely forcing the shutdown of one control system, say a power plant, could trigger a backup and cause operators to start looking for the bug. To work as an effective weapon, malware would have to influence an active process -- but not bring it to a screeching halt. If the malicious activity extends over a lengthy period, it has to remain stealthy. That's a more difficult trick than hitting the virtual off-button. Take Stuxnet, the worm that sabotaged Iran's nuclear program in 2010. It didn't just crudely shut down the centrifuges at the Natanz nuclear facility; rather, the worm subtly manipulated the system. Stuxnet stealthily infiltrated the plant's networks, then hopped onto the protected control systems, intercepted input values from sensors, recorded these data, and then provided the legitimate controller code with pre-recorded fake input signals, according to researchers who have studied the worm. Its objective was not just to fool operators in a control room, but also to circumvent digital safety and monitoring systems so it could secretly manipulate the actual processes. Building and deploying Stuxnet required extremely detailed intelligence about the systems it was supposed to compromise, and the same will be true for other dangerous cyberweapons. Yes, "convergence," standardization, and sloppy defense of control-systems software could increase the risk of generic attacks, but the same trend has also caused defenses against the most coveted targets to improve steadily and has made reprogramming highly specific installations on legacy systems more complex, not less.

**No launch on warning—de-targeting and long process checks**

**Boese ‘7**, (Wade, editor at Arms Control Association, December “Nuclear Weapons Alert Status Debated” Arms Control Association 2007 <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_12/NuclearAlert>)

In a Nov. 13 interview with Arms Control Today, retired General Eugene Habiger, a former head of Strategic Command, said that **an accurate characterization of the current U.S. nuclear posture is that it is** “a continuation of the Cold War alert status, which was **not hair-trigger**.” He contended **“hair-trigger” conjures** up the notion of **a system set to go off with just a little pressure**, while **U.S. forces are subject to a “very deliberate process” before use.** Almost all nuclear arms possessors strictly cloak their postures in secrecy. The **U**nited **K**ingdom has been most open, declaring that, under normal circumstances, its **nuclear weapons require “several days’** ‘notice to fire.’**” Russia is perceived to keep** its weapons **on an alert status similar to** that of **the U**nited **S**tates, while French, Indian, and Israeli policy is uncertain. **China and Pakistan are generally thought to store nuclear warheads separately from delivery vehicles**. At a once-every-five-years review conference of the 1968 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 2000, the treaty’s five recognized nuclear-weapon states **(China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States**) **announced that their nuclear weapons were not targeted at any state**. They also **agreed** in that conference’s final document **to pursue “concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.”**

**Accidents won’t escalate—no causal connection**

**Muller ‘9** (John, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State, *Atomic Obsession,* pIOO-OI)

It is a plausible argument that, all other things equal, if the number of nuclear weapons in existence increases, the likelihood one will go off by accident will also increase. But, in fact, all things haven't been equal. **As nuclear weapons have increased in numbers** and sophistication, **so have safety devices and procedures.** Precisely **because** **the weapons are so dangerous. extraordinary** **efforts to keep them from going off by accident** or by an unauthorized deliberate act **have been** instituted, and these measures have. so far, been **effective:** no one has been killed in a nuclear explosion since Nagasaki. Extrapolating further from disasters that have not occurred, **many have been** led to a **concern that. triggered by** a **nuclear weapons accident. a war could** somehow **be started through an act of desperate irrationality** or of consummate sloppiness. Before the invention of nuclear weapons such possibilities were not perhaps of great concern, because no weapon or small set of weapons could do enough damage to be truly significant. Each nuclear weapon, however, is capable of destroying in an instant more people than have been killed in an average war, and the weapons continue to exist in the tens of thousands. However, **even if a bomb, or a few bombs. were to go off. it does not** necessarily **follow that war would result**. For that to happen, it is usually asserted, the accident would have to take place at a time of high war readiness, as during a crisis, when both sides are poised for action and when one side could perhaps be triggered-or panicked-into major action by an explosion mistakenly taken to be part of, or the prelude to, a full attack. 30 This means that the **unlikely happening-a nuclear accident-would have to coincide precisely with an event. a militarized** international **crisis something that is rare to begin with**, became more so as the cold war progressed, and has become even less likely since its demise. Furthermore, **even if the accident takes place during a crisis, it does not follow that escalation** or hasty response **is inevitable. or even** very **likely**. As Bernard Brodie points out, escalation scenarios essentially impute to both sides "a well-nigh limitless concern with saving face" and/or "a great deal of ground in automaticity of response and counter response:' None of this was in evidence during the Cuban missile crisis when there were accidents galore. An American spy plane was shot down over Cuba, probably without authorization, and another accidentally went off course and flew threateningly over the Soviet Union. As if that weren’t enough, a Soviet military officer spying for the West sent a message, apparently on a whim, warning that the Soviets were about to attack.3 None of these remarkable events triggered anything in the way of precipitous response. They were duly evaluated and then ignored.

**Cyber offense outpaces defense**

**Zach 3/28**

(“U.S. Outgunned in Hacker War: WSJ” <http://blog.cybersecuritylaw.us/?p=85>, SEH)

On March 27th, 2012, Devlin Barret reported for the Wall Street Journal on comments made by Shawn Henry, the FBI's departing cyber head. Notably, Mr. Henry said that **in the context of cyber-espionage,** the currentpublic and private approach **to trying to stop hackers is "unsustainable**." **It's unsustainable in the sense that the U.S. can "never get ahead, never become secure, [and] never have a reasonable expectation of privacy or security."¶** The WSJ article noted that Mr. Henry criticized the lax cybersecurity efforts of company executives. Over the course of FBI investigations, some companies have discovered that they've been breached for not only months, but years. This, according to Mr. Henry, gave the hackers "full visibility into everything occurring on that network, potentially." However, some company executives still don't recognize that there is a problem. **Even if a company decides to build cyber-defenses, Mr. Henry explained that "[y]ou can only build a fence so high . . . the offense outpaces the defense, and the offense is better than the defense."**

**Cyber threats exaggerated**

**Lin and Woodcock ‘12**

[Herbert Lin, chief scientist with the National Academies’s Computer Science and Telecommunications Board. Bill Woodcock, research director at Packet Clearing House.Interviewed by Ali Wyne, research at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.<http://bigthink.com/power-games/an-all-star-panel-on-cybersecurity?page=all> ETB]

**LIN:** I’d argue that both kinds of analysts are right.  That is, **cyberthreats** *are* serious and poised to increase, but…they **are** (sometimes) **exaggerated and** well **within our ability to manage.** Whether they are within our WILL to manage is a different point.  For all of the expressed concern about cybersecurity, few people seem to be willing to pay very much (in dollars or effort or convenience) to fix those problems.  If we as a nation would actually implement what we have the knowledge and the technology to do, our cybersecurity posture would be much stronger than it is now.

WOODCOCK: The future is unknowable, and people are very bad at quantifying risk.  Some people consider what’s possible, while others consider what’s likely.  Some people think that what’s possible will happen eventually, while the temporally egocentric assume that anything that’s possible will occur while they’re alive.  Personally, I’m an optimist, and believe that people are, by and large, good, and it doesn’t occur to them to actually do the terrible things that other people know are possible.  Perfect security is impossible, yet planes and buildings are not blowing up, because most people are rational and well-intentioned most of the time, and it’s neither nice nor useful to blow up planes.  I think there are many more inventive, pessimistic, paranoid people than there are inventive, sociopathic, motivated people.  Thus**, people invent and worry about scenarios that are far worse than any that will actually be carried out** in our lifetimes.

### Fusion

#### Huge timeframe before spinoffs will be beneficial -- takes longer than fusion to get right.

Rothwell, ‘97

[Jed, cold fusion researcher, “Cold Fusion and the Future: Part 2 - A Look at Economics and Society,” March-June, Infinite Energy Magazine, Issue #13-#14, http://www.infinite-energy.com/iemagazine/issue1314/future.html]

Cold fusion spin-off like indoor farming, desalination, and aerospace engines will take decades to develop. They will require massive investment, new factories, and years of research. Cold fusion itself will take time to perfect, but the spin-offs will take longer because they are more complex, and because large scale research on them will not begin until cold fusion is commercialized. Indoor farming with robots might take 30 to 60 years to develop. It is cost effective for some crops already: flowers in the Netherlands, tomatoes in Tokyo, aquaculture in Boston. But it will be a long time, if ever, before we grow wheat more cheaply indoors than on the Great Plains. The change to automated indoor farming will occur gradually, giving displaced farm workers time to find new jobs. The energy production industries ­ oil, gas, coal, and the electric power companies ­ are another matter. The potential for chaotic disruption here is very great, because the transition will be swift and it will be in one direction only. All jobs will be lost, none will be created.

#### Your predictions are bad – other areas disprove

**HGFRC, ‘1** (Institutes of the HGF Research Collaboration on Nuclear Fusion, Hearing on Nuclear Fusion before the Bundestag Committee for Education, Research, and Technology Assessment, 28 March 2001, http://fire.pppl.gov/eu\_bundestag\_english.pdf)//CC

Moreover, it is to be doubted that the presentation of long spin-off lists can be regarded as a justification for high future expenditures. Such lists have been drawn up in many areas of research, among others, in elementary particle physics (CERN), in space research (ESA, NASA) and also in the field of fusion research (JET, DOE Office for Fusion Research). A justification on the basis of expected spin-offs, however, is not possible since it is difficult to quantify the coming economic benefit. It would also have to be analysed what benefit would have been achieved if this money had been spent otherwise. On the other hand, it may be assumed, however, that the expenditure of similar sums in different high-technology areas produces similar levels of spin-offs. The fact that fusion research requires very complex, specifically developed instruments in various technological areas makes it so to speak destined for the generation of spin-off products.

#### Status quo solves – ITER not key

**Morrison, ’10** (Chris Morrison, CBS Money Watch, 1 February 2010, “Ten Serious Nuclear Fusion Projects Making Progress Around the World,” [http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505123\_162-34242897/ten-serious-nuclear-fusion-projects-making-progress-around-the-world/)//CC](http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505123_162-34242897/ten-serious-nuclear-fusion-projects-making-progress-around-the-world/%29//CC)

Besides the NIF, there are fusion projects going on around the world. All have two things in common: they're still at an experimental stage, and they've all been derided by critics at one point or another. But by looking at the pedigree, breakthroughs and financial support of projects, I've come up with a set of TKTK projects that, like the NIF, could someday give the world a cheap new energy source. I've tried to roughly rank them by their apparent prospects. By necessity the descriptions are pretty short, but you can Google any for more; also, look up the Lawson criterion, which sets the requirements for the sort of self-powered fusion reactions that would be required for any of the below projects to be successful. Here they are: The National Ignition Facility (USA) -- With its initial proof of the viability of using lasers to create fusion, the NIF has become the world's most watched fusion project. The ful name of the technology is laser-based inertial confinement fusion; the basic concept is firing 192 separate lasers to rapidly compress a tiny fuel pellet, which will (hopefully)undergo fusion at its core. Experiments around the idea began in the late 1970s, and following a series of cost overruns, the $3.5 billion NIF opened last year. ITER and DEMO (France) -- The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor is planned for France, but ultimately funded by seven countries, if you count the European Union as a single member. Building on the work of numerous other projects, like the Joint European Torus, China's EAST and South Korea's KSTAR, it would be proper to call ITER the grandfather of fusion research -- though the facility won't actually be complete until 2018. ITER is based on a tokamak, a circular (toroidal) magnetic chamber that compresses atoms to achieve fusion. If ITER works out perfectly, construction could begin on DEMO, a Demonstration Power Plant intended to produce usable amounts of electricity. LDX (USA) -- The Levitating Dipole Experiment, also mentioned above, is MIT's attempt to create a new design for fusion reactors. While shaped like a tokamak, which uses external magnets, the LDX brings the magnetic field inside its chamber, allowing different interactions with the plasma inside, including an unexpected density from turbulence. And, as the name suggests, the chamber levitates. HiPER (Europe) -- The High Power Laser Energy Research facility is supposed to be something of an improvement on the NIF's design, using a "fast ignition" approach that shrinks the size and output of the lasers to save on energy costs. Needless to say, HiPER got a boost from the NIF's early success, but the initial design and construction work isn't planned to begin for another year or two. Z-IFE (USA) -- A device at Sandia National Laboratory called the Z machine has proven capable of reaching extremely high temperatures (in the billions of Kelvins) and causing fusion with X-rays. Sandia has already upgraded the Z machine once, and through a series of further upgrades plans to reach the Z-inertial fusion energy (ZIFE) power plant and work up to creating a fairly continuous stream of fusion energy. The trick, as with all of these projects, will be achieving a positive energy output. General Fusion (Canada) -- This is a Canadian startup working on something they call "acoustically driven magnetized target fusion". Much like the NIF's laser fusion, General Fusion plans to use many pressure points to cause fusion in a central pellet; but unlike NIF, the company's design uses phsyical rams that transmit shock waves to compress the material. It's funded with a few million dollars, versus the billions governments have put into projects like NIF and ITER, but General Fusion can at least claim a unique design, which it says is superior because of modern computer controls. Lawrenceville Plasma Physics (USA) -- Another private company, LPP is working with even less funding than General Fusion, for the moment. LPP, run by a researcher who started off with NASA grants, plans to use a "dense plasma focus" device that creates magnetic fields with electricity and uses them to focus matter into a plasmoid. While similar to ITER, one of its advantages would be a lack of external magnets (like the LDX); another, its much lower cost to prototype and smaller scale overall. FRX-L (USA) -- Under study at the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Air Force Research Laboratory, the FRX-L uses magnetized target fusion, which is much like General Fusion's approach, above. Unlike General Fusion, the researchers using FRX-L aren't driven by the imperative of finding success within a few short years or being shut down. Wendelstein 7-X (Germany) -- Another pilot project intended only to evaluate the potential of fusion energy, the Wendelstein 7-X is, like ITER, based on a toroidal design. The 7-X will be a replacement for the previous 7-AS unit at Germany's Max Planck Institute when it's completed in 2015; the aim is for the unit to be able to operate for 30 minutes continuously, proving that fusion could be used in power plants. Sonofusion (USA) -- Also called bubble fusion, this technique can supposedly use sound waves to compress matter for fusion. It's also in the scientific doghouse, following a scandal in which the students of a researcher who initially claimed to have achieved sonofusion wrote a paper supporting his results. You can find a long technical paper on it here, and there's also a startup called Impulse Devices working on sonofusion.

#### No impact to disease

Posner 05

(Richard A, judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, and senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School, Winter. “Catastrophe: the dozen most significant catastrophic risks and what we can do about them.” http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_kmske/is\_3\_11/ai\_n29167514/pg\_2?tag=content;col1)

Yet the fact that Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease to assail it in the 200,000 years or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but none has come close to destroying the entire human race. There is a biological reason. Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet there is no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would cause the extinction of the human race is probably even less today than in the past (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease. The reason is improvements in medical science. But the comfort is a small one. Pandemics can still impose enormous losses and resist prevention and cure: the lesson of the AIDS pandemic. And there is always a lust time.

#### Bioterror is impossible

Ruppe ’05

[Brian, The National Journal, Apr 23, Lexis]

On the other hand, critics argue that some experts have oversimplified the significant technical challenges to building catastrophic biological weapons and have overestimated the abilities of terrorist groups to overcome them. "How do you kill a lot of people? There, you've got to get involved with airborne, deadly pathogens such as Bacillus anthracis spores, and that's fairly technically demanding to do," Zilinskas said. Potential difficulties, experts say, include obtaining proper equipment and an appropriate strain of pathogen; storing and handling the pathogen properly; growing it to produce a greater quantity; processing it to develop the desirable characteristics; testing it; and dispersing it. A terrorist group would need to have suitably educated and knowledgeable people, and sufficient time and freedom from government scrutiny, to do the work, they say. Potentially the toughest challenge, experts say, is "weaponization" -- processing an agent to the point that it can resist environmental stresses, survive dissemination, and increase its ability to infect (pathogenicity) and to harm (toxicity). This is particularly true if the terrorists want to spray the agent, which is a more effective approach for a mass attack than spreading an agent through human-to-human contact. "While collection and purification knowledge is widespread among ordinary scientists, weaponization is obviously a military subject, and much of the knowledge that surrounds it is classified," wrote Danzig, who believes that terrorists nevertheless might be able to develop catastrophic biological weapons. The key difficulty for producing an aerosolized weapon, Danzig said, "would be to produce a pathogen formulation in sizes that would be within the human respiratory range and that could be reliably stored, handled, and spread as a stable aerosol rather than clump and fall to the ground. Mastering these somewhat contradictory requirements is tricky... The challenge becomes greater as attackers seek higher concentrations of agent and higher efficiency in dissemination." Stanford's Chyba agrees on the difficulties of weaponization. "Aerosolization is clearly [a] serious hurdle. I just find it hard, currently, to imagine a Qaeda offshoot -- or, for that matter, any of the current non-state groups that I have read about -- being technically proficient in that."

### Solvency

#### This is nonsense – 60 years till it hits

Rhodes 12

Chris Rhodes, Sussex University, Physical Chemistry Professor, 6/10/12, The Progress made in the Different Fields of Nuclear Fusion, oilprice.com/Alternative-Energy/Nuclear-Power/The-Progress-made-in-the-Different-Fields-of-Nuclear-Fusion.html

When I was about 10, I recall hearing that nuclear fusion power would become a reality "in about thirty years". The estimate has increased steadily since then, and now, forty odd years on, we hear that fusion power will come on-stream "in about fifty years". So, what is the real likelihood of fusion-based power stations coming to our aid in averting the imminent energy crisis? Getting two nuclei to fuse is not easy, since both carry a positive charge and hence their natural propensity is to repel one another. Therefore, a lot of energy is required to force them together so that they can fuse. To achieve this, suitable conditions of extremely high temperature, comparable to those found in stars, must be met. A specific temperature must be reached in order for particular nuclei to fuse with one another. This is termed the "critical ignition temperature", and is around 400 million degrees centigrade for two deuterium nuclei to fuse, while a more modest 100 million degrees is sufficient for a deuterium nucleus to fuse with a tritium nucleus. For this reason, it is deuterium-tritium fusion that is most sought after, since it should be most easily achieved and sustained.¶ One disadvantage of tritium is that it is radioactive and decays with a half-life of about 12 years, and consequently, it exists naturally in only negligible amounts. However, tritium may be "bred" from lithium using neutrons produced in an initial deuterium-tritium fusion. Ideally, the process would become self-sustaining, with lithium fuel being burned via conversion to tritium, which then fuses with deuterium, releasing more neutrons. While not unlimited, there are sufficient known resources of lithium to fire a global fusion programme for about a thousand years, mindful that there are many other uses for lithium, ranging for various types of battery to medication for schizophrenics. The supply would be effectively limitless if lithium could be extracted from the oceans.¶ In a working scenario, some of the energy produced by fusion would be required to maintain the high temperature of the fuel such that the fusion process becomes continuous. At the temperature of around 100 - 300 million degrees, the deuterium/lithium/tritium mixture will exist in the form of a plasma, in which the nuclei are naked (having lost their initial atomic electron clouds) and are hence exposed to fuse with one another.¶ The main difficulty which bedevils maintaining a working fusion reactor which might be used to fire a power station is containing the plasma, a process usually referred to as "confinement" and the process overall as “magnetic confinement fusion” (MCF). Essentially, the plasma is confined in a magnetic bottle, since its component charged nuclei and electrons tend to follow the field of magnetic force, which can be so arranged that the lines of force occupy a prescribed region and are thus centralised to a particular volume. However, the plasma is a "complex" system that readily becomes unstable and leaks away. Unlike a star, the plasma is highly rarefied (a low pressure gas), so that the proton-proton cycle that powers the sun could not be thus achieved on earth, as it is only the intensely high density of nuclei in the sun's core that allows the process to occur sustainably, and that the plasma is contained within its own gravitational mass, and isolated within the cold vacuum of space.¶ In June 2005, the EU, France, Japan, South Korea, China and the U.S. agreed to spend $12 billion to build an experimental fusion apparatus (called ITER) by 2014. It is planned that ITER will function as a research instrument for the following 20 years, and the knowledge gained will provide the basis for building a more advanced research machine. After another 30 years, if all goes well, the first commercial fusion powered electricity might come on-stream.¶ The Joint European Torus (JET)¶ I attended a fascinating event recently - a Cafe' Scientifique meeting held in the town of Reading in South East England. I have also performed in this arena, talking about "What Happens When the Oil Runs Out?", which remains a pertinent question. This time it was the turn of Dr Chris Warrick from the Culham Centre for Fusion Energy based near Abingdon in Oxfordshire, which hosts both the MAST (Mega Amp Spherical Tokamak) and the better known JET (Joint European Torus) experiments. In the audience was a veteran engineer/physicist who had worked on the pioneering ZETA4 experiment in the late 1950s, from which neutrons were detected leading to what proved later to be false claims that fusion had occurred, their true source being different versions of the same instability processes that had beset earlier machines.¶ Nonetheless, his comment was salient: "In the late 50s, we were told that fusion power was 20 years away and now, 50-odd years later it is maybe 60 years away." Indeed, JET has yet to produce a positive ratio of output power/input energy, and instability of the plasma is still a problem. Dr Warrick explained that while much of the plasma physics is now sorted-out, minor aberrations in the magnetic field allow some of the plasma to leak out, and if it touches the far colder walls of the confinement chamber, it simply "dies". In JET it is fusion of nuclei of the two hydrogen isotopes, deuterium and tritium that is being undertaken, a process that as noted earlier, requires a "temperature" of 100 million degrees.¶ I say "temperature" because the plasma is a rarefied (very low pressure) gas, and hence the collisions between particles are not sufficiently rapid that the term means the same distribution of energy as occurs under conditions of thermal equilibrium. It is much the same as the temperatures that may be quoted for molecules in the atmospheric region known as the thermosphere which lies some 80 kilometres above the surface of the Earth. Here too, the atmosphere is highly rarefied and thus derived temperatures refer to translational motion of molecules and are more usefully expressed as velocities. However expressed, at 100 million degrees centigrade, the nuclei of tritium and deuterium have sufficient translational velocity (have enough energy) that they can overcome the mutual repulsion arising from their positive charges and come close enough that they are drawn together by attractive nuclear forces and fuse, releasing vast amounts of energy in the process.¶ JET is not a small device, at 18 metres high, but bigger machines will be necessary before the technology is likely to give out more energy than it consumes. Despite the considerable volume of the chamber, it contains perhaps only one hundredth of a gram of gas, hence its very low pressure. There is another matter and that is how long the plasma and hence energy emission can be sustained. Presently it is fractions of a second but a serious "power station" would need to run for some hours. There is also the problem of getting useful energy from the plasma to convert into electricity even if the aforementioned and considerable problems can be overcome and a sustainable, large-scale plasma maintained.¶ The plan is to surround the chamber with a "blanket" of lithium with pipes running through it and some heat-exchanger fluid passing through them. The heated fluid would then pass on its heat to water and drive a steam-turbine, in the time-honoured fashion used for fossil fuel fired and nuclear power plants. Now my understanding is that this would not be lithium metal but some oxide material. The heat would be delivered in the form of very high energy neutrons that would be slowed-down as they encounter lithium nuclei on passing through the blanket. In principle this is a very neat trick, since absorption of a neutron by a lithium nucleus converts it to tritium, which could be fed back into the plasma as a fuel. Unlike deuterium, tritium does not exist is nature, being radioactive with a half-life of about 12 years. However produced, either separately or in the blanket, lithium is the ultimate fuel source, not tritium per se. Deuterium does exist in nature but only to the extent of one part in about two thousand of ordinary hydrogen (protium) and hence the energy costs of its separation are not inconsiderable.¶ The neutron flux produced by the plasma is very high, and to enhance the overall breeding efficiency of lithium to tritium the reactor would be surrounded with a “lithium” blanket about three feet thick. The intense neutron flux will render the material used to construct the reactor highly radioactive, to the extent that it would not be feasible for operators to enter its vicinity for routine maintenance. The radioactive material will need to be disposed of similarly to the requirements for nuclear waste generated by nuclear fission, and hence fusion is not as "clean" as is often claimed. Exposure to radiation of many potential materials necessary to make the reactor, blanket, and other components such as the heat-exchanger pipes would render them brittle, and so compromise their structural integrity. There is also the possibility that the lithium blanket around the reactor might be replaced by uranium, so enabling the option of breeding plutonium for use in nuclear weapons.¶ Providing a fairly intense magnetic field to confine the plasma (maybe Tesla - similar to that in a hospital MRI scanner) needs power (dc not ac as switching the polarity of the field would cause the plasma to collapse) and large power-supply units containing a lot of metals including rare earths which are mined and processed using fossil fuels. The issue of rare earths is troublesome already, and whether enough of them can be recovered to meet existing planned wind and electric car projects is debatable, let alone that additional pressure should be placed upon an already fragile resource to build a first generation of fusion power stations.¶ World supplies of lithium are also already stressed, and hence getting enough of it not only to make blankets for fusion reactors and tritium production but also for the millions-scale fleet of electric vehicles needed to divert our transportation energy demand away from oil is probably a bridge too far, unless we try getting it from seawater, which takes far more energy than mining lithium minerals. The engineering requirements too will be formidable, however, most likely forcing the need to confront problems as yet unknown, and even according to the most favourable predictions of the experts, fusion power is still 60 years away, if it will arrive at all. Given that the energy crisis will hit hard long before then, I suggest we look to more immediate solutions, mainly in terms of energy efficiency, for which there is ample scope.¶ To quote again the ZETA veteran, "I wonder if maybe man is not intended to have nuclear fusion," and all in all, other than from solar energy I wonder if he is right. At any rate, garnering real electrical power from fusion is so far distant as to have no impact on the more immediately pressing fossil fuels crisis, particularly for oil and natural gas. Fusion Power is a long-range "holy grail" and part of the illusion that humankind can continue in perpetuity to use energy on the scale that it presently does. Efficiency and conservation are the only real means to attenuate the impending crisis in energy and resources.

#### Incentives fail

Economist 02

The Economist 364. 8282 (Jul 20, 2002): 69-70. Science and Technology: It's impossible. And what's more, it's improbable; Nuclear fusion, PROQUEST,

SOME say that **a dollar spent on nuclear fusion is a dollar wasted**. **And many, many dollars have been spent on it, as physicists try to duplicate, in a controlled setting, the process by which the sun shines**. **Since 1951, America alone has devoted more than $17 billion** (see chart on next page) **to working out how to fuse atomic nuclei so as to generate an inexhaustible supply of clean, safe power. The claim that this money is wholly wasted may not be entirely fair, though. Fusion science has made a big return on this investment in the form of a new universal constant. This constant is the number 30, a figure that has for the past half-century or so been cited almost religiously by researchers as the number of years that it will take before fusion power becomes a commercial reality.**

## 2NC

### Overview

**Skilled worker access will determine the future of the biotech industry**

**Dahms 3**, executive director of the California State University System Biotechnology Program (CSUPERB); chair of the Workforce Committee, Biotechnology Industry Organization; and a member of the ASBMB Education and Professional Development Committee, (A. Stephen, “ Foreign Scientists Seen Essential to U.S. Biotechnology,” in Pan-Organizational Summit on the U.S. Science and Engineering Workforce: Meeting Summary, National Academy of Sciences, <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/bookshelf/picrender.fcgi?book=nap10727&blobtype=pdf>)

The scarcity of skilled technicians is seen by the biotechnology industry in the U.S. and Canada as one of its most serious challenges. The success of this industry is dependent on the quality of its workforce, and the skills and talents of highly trained people are recognized as one of the most vital and dynamic sources of competitive advantage. The U.S. biotechnology industry workforce has been growing 14 to 17 percent annually over the last six years and is now over 190,000 and conservatively estimated to reach 500,000 by 2012. Despite efforts by the industry to encourage U.S. institutions to increase the production of needed specialists, a continual shortfall in the needed expertise requires access to foreign workers. Foreign workers with unique skills that are scarce in the U.S. can get permission to stay in the U.S. for up to six years under the H1B classification, after which they can apply for permanent resident status. There are currently over 600,000 foreign workers in this category across all industries, and they are critical to the success and global competitiveness of this nation. Of these H-1B visa holders, 46 percent are from India and 10 percent are from China, followed in descending order by Canada, Philippines, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, U.K., Pakistan, and the Russian Federation. Our annual national surveys have demonstrated that between 6 and 10 percent of the biotechnology workforce have H-1B visas. The constant shortfall in specialized technical workers that has been experienced by the biotechnology industry over the past six years has been partially alleviated by access to talented individuals from other nations. However, the industry’s need is sufficient to justify a 25 percent increase in H-1Bs in 2004. Biotechnology industry H-1B visa holders are mainly in highly sought after areas such as analytical chemistry, instrumentation specialization, organic synthesis, product safety and surveillance, clinical research/biostatistics, bio/pharm quality, medicinal chemistry, product scale-up, bioinformatics and applied genomics, computer science, cheminformatics, pharmacokinetics, and pharmacodynamics. Forty percent of H-1B foreign workers are at the Ph.D. level, 35 percent M.S., 20 percent B.S., and 5 percent M.D. In comparison, the U.S. biotechnology industry technical workforce is estimated to be 19 percent Ph.D., 17 percent M.S., 50 percent B.S., and 14 percent combined voc-ed/ community college trained. These and other survey data by industry human resource groups clearly show that the H-1B worker skills match the most pressing employment needs of the biotechnology industry. The data demonstrate that maintaining a reasonably-sized H-1B cap is critical to the industry. Although the national annual H-1B visa cap was raised from 115,000 to 195,000 in the 106th Congress via S. 2045, the cap has already been exceeded. The increased cap remains in effect until 2003 and efforts are under way to ensure that it remains high. The Third Annual National Survey of H-1Bs in the biotechnology industry found that 80 percent are from U.S. universities, and 85 percent of those eventually get green cards. Companies now spend, on average, $10,200 in processing fees and legal expenses to obtain each green card, an estimated cost to the industry of more than $150 million over the past 5 years. In the wake of the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks, debate has been focused on more restrictions on foreign students, a development that would have a severe impact upon the competitiveness of the U.S. biotechnology industry. Clearly, the H-1B route provides a temporary solution to shortages in the national and domestic biotechnology labor pools, shortages mirroring the inadequate production of appropriately trained U.S. nationals by U.S. institutions of higher learning. The reality is that universities have inadequate resources for expanding the training pipeline, particularly in the specialized areas of the research phase of company product development. Efforts should be directed toward influencing greater congressional and federal agency attention to these important topics.

**Solves bioterror**

**Bailey, 1** [Ronald, award-winning science correspondent for Reason magazine and Reason.com, where he writes a weekly science and technology column. Bailey is the author of the book Liberation Biology: The Moral and Scientific Case for the Biotech Revolution (Prometheus, 2005), and his work was featured in The Best American Science and Nature Writing 2004. In 2006, Bailey was shortlisted by the editors of Nature Biotechnology as one of the personalities who have made the "most significant contributions" to biotechnology in the last 10 years. 11/7/1, “The Best Biodefense,” Reason, <http://reason.com/archives/2001/11/07/the-best-biodefense>]

But Cipro and other antibiotics are just a small part of the arsenal that could one day soon be deployed in defending America against biowarfare. Just consider what’s in the pipeline now that could be used to protect Americans against infectious diseases, including bioterrorism. A Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Research Association survey found 137 new medicines for infectious diseases in drug company research and development pipelines, including 19 antibiotics and 42 vaccines. With regard to anthrax, instead of having to rush a sample to a lab where it takes hours or even days to culture, biotech companies have created test strips using antibody technologies that can confirm the presence of anthrax in 15 minutes or less, allowing decontamination and treatment to begin immediately. Similar test strips are being developed for the detection of smallpox as well. The biotech company EluSys Therapeutics is working on an exciting technique which would "implement instant immunity." EluSys joins two monoclonal antibodies chemically together so that they act like biological double-sided tape. One antibody sticks to toxins, viruses, or bacteria while the other binds to human red blood cells. The red blood cells carry the pathogen or toxin to the liver for destruction and return unharmed to the normal blood circulation. In one test, the EluSys treatment reduced the viral load in monkeys one million-fold in less than an hour. The technology could be applied to a number of bioterrorist threats, such as dengue fever, Ebola and Marburg viruses, and plague. Of course, the EluSys treatment would not just be useful for responding to bioterrorist attacks, but also could treat almost any infection or poisoning. Further down the development road are technologies that could rapidly analyze a pathogen’s DNA, and then guide the rapid synthesis of drugs like the ones being developed by EluSys that can bind, or disable, segments of DNA crucial to an infectious organism's survival. Again, this technology would be a great boon for treating infectious diseases and might be a permanent deterrent to future bioterrorist attacks. Seizing Bayer’s patent now wouldn’t just cost that company and its stockholders a little bit of money (Bayer sold $1 billion in Cipro last year), but would reverberate throughout the pharmaceutical research and development industry. If governments begin to seize patents on the pretext of addressing alleged public health emergencies, the investment in research that would bring about new and effective treatments could dry up. Investors and pharmaceutical executives couldn’t justify putting $30 billion annually into already risky and uncertain research if they couldn’t be sure of earning enough profits to pay back their costs. Consider what happened during the Clinton health care fiasco, which threatened to impose price controls on prescription drugs in the early 1990s: Growth in research spending dropped off dramatically from 10 percent annually to about 2 percent per year. A far more sensible and farsighted way to protect the American public from health threats, including bioterrorism, is to encourage further pharmaceutical research by respecting drug patents. In the final analysis, America’s best biodefense is a vital and profitable pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry.

#### Increasing green cards generates effective IT experts to combat cyber war

McLarty 9 (Thomas F. III, President – McLarty Associates and Former White House Chief of Staff and Task Force Co-Chair, “U.S. Immigration Policy: Report of a CFR-Sponsored Independent Task Force”, 7-8, http://www.cfr.org/ publication/19759/us\_immigration\_policy.html)

We have seen, when you look at the table of the top 20 firms that are H1-B visa requestors, at least 15 of those are IT firms. And as we're seeing across industry, much of the hardware and software that's used in this country is not only manufactured now overseas, but it's developed overseas by scientists and engineers who were educated here in the United States.¶ We're seeing a lot more activity around cyber-security, certainly noteworthy attacks here very recently. It's becoming an increasingly dominant set of requirements across not only to the Department of Defense, but the Department of Homeland Security and the critical infrastructure that's held in private hands. Was there any discussion or any interest from DOD or DHS as you undertook this review on the security things about what can be done to try to generate a more effective group of IT experts here in the United States, many of which are coming to the U.S. institutions, academic institutions from overseas and often returning back? This potentially puts us at a competitive disadvantage going forward.¶ MCLARTY: Yes. And I think your question largely is the answer as well. I mean, clearly we have less talented students here studying -- or put another way, more talented students studying in other countries that are gifted, talented, really have a tremendous ability to develop these kind of technology and scientific advances, we're going to be put at an increasingly disadvantage. Where if they come here -- and I kind of like Dr. Land's approach of the green card being handed to them or carefully put in their billfold or purse as they graduate -- then, obviously, that's going to strengthen, I think, our system, our security needs.

#### That *deters* and *solves the impact* to cyberattacks

Saydjari 8 (O. Sami, Cyber Defense Agency, LLC, “Structuring for Strategic Cyber Defense: A Cyber Manhattan Project Blueprint”, 2008 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, http://www.acsac.org/2008/program /keynotes/saydjari.pdf)

As a step toward a security research plan that includes such capabilities, we should identify endstates— goals in terms of how we want our systems to ideally operate. This fresh perspective includes the overall strategic picture and connects clearly with strategic actions that significantly mitigate strategic vulnerabilities. If, for example, the nation has a capability to quickly recover its critical information infrastructure, then the end-state is that strategic attack damages are mitigated and critical services are restored quickly, possibly deterring adversaries from attempting a future attack. Desired End-States. The National Cyber Defense Initiative (NCDI) Opening Moves Workshop [4] identified important end-states, the outcome of a 10- year research effort to create critical capabilities. The following end-states appear in the workshop proceedings: --Continuity of Critical Information Infrastructure Operations. Create technology that would be the basis for a resilient US cyber infrastructure that would sustain critical functions in the face of attacks, including those that could be affected by determined adversaries. --Well-Defended Critical Assets. Make it economically prohibitive for an adversary to cause strategic damage to critical US infrastructures. Currently, adversaries can attack critical systems without investing substantial resources.

#### Highly skilled immigration key solve nuclear workforce shortages – plan can’t solve without CIR and CIR solves the case.

COC 9 [COMPETE – Council on Competitiveness, “Mobilizing a World-Class Energy Workforce,” Dec., http://www.compete.org/images/uploads/File/PDF%20Files/CoC\_-\_Pillar\_6\_Handout\_-\_Mobilizing\_a\_World-Class\_Energy\_Workforce,\_Dec09.pdf]

America currently lacks an energy workforce of sufficient size and capabilities to meet the needs of a sustainable, secure energy system. 1 With increasing demand come abundant job opportunities in both traditional and emerging energy industries. Unfortunately, U.S. workers are neither aware nor sufficiently prepared to take them. Moreover, with an aging population and the retirement of the baby boomers well under way, there is an inadequate pipeline of replacement workers, technicians and managers to succeed them. Bridge the Skills Gap and Build the Talent The Council Recommends that: • The U.S. Government offer full scholarships to U.S. graduates who commit to a minimum period of service in an energy-related career in the governmental, academic or non-profit sectors. • Congress establish a CompetePass program that will allow eligible participants to redeem the passes at U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) one-stop training centers. • The U.S. Government grant green cards to foreign students receiving undergraduate and advanced degrees in scientific and engineering disciplines from U.S. institutions.The United States stands to lose half of its electric power industry workforce within the next five to ten years due to retirement. America’s oil and gas workforce averages 50 years in age; half are likely to retire soon. Workers in these conventional energy sector jobs, from power plant operators to transmission line and pipeline workers, are retiring at a much faster rate than they are being replaced. The introduction of any new energy technologies will not compensate for this workforce shortage. For example, in the nuclear industry, the fact that there has been no new construction of a nuclear facility in the United States in over 30 years has led to the atrophy of skills, the loss of technicians, the dearth of American students in nuclear engineering and a national security risk for the primarily nuclear-powered U.S. Navy. 2 The development, installation and maintenance of new technologies require skills at all levels of educational training. Many of these jobs, such as building new power plants, cannot be exported and will remain in the United States. So-called “green collar” jobs could fill this gap over time and provide for significant domestic employment growth, but capitalizing on this opportunity will require government being proactive in developing programs to provide the necessary skills. Government should provide a 21st century education to match the 21st century job opportunities, requirements and needs. There is growing global competition for scientific and engineering talent today, and the U.S. pipeline of students is slowing. 3 The private sector, where the overwhelming majority of careers will be, knows best the current opportunities that are not being met. Executives cite the lack of scientific, engineering and skilled talent as among the most serious challenges facing their businesses today. 4 They know what skills will be required and can assist in developing the workforce of the future by working closely with educational institutions as well as within their own organizations.

### Thumper 2NC

#### Thumpers aren’t Responsive for 2 Reasons:

#### A Nothing Thumps Now- Obama has proposed popular legislation, losing the public costs him immigration

Ball 1-29

Molly covers Politics for the Atlantic, “Obama’s Permanent Campaign: Can he Use His Reelection to Change Washington?” <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/01/obamas-permanent-campaign-can-he-use-his-reelection-playbook-to-change-washington/272587/>

A week ago, President Obama launched his second term with a set of lofty goals -- climate change legislation, immigration reform, and gun control among them.¶ Around the same time, Obama's former campaign apparatus announced it would morph into a new group called Organizing for Action, a nonprofit group to promote Obama's policy goals.¶ The inaugural address's ambitious promises have been pronounced far-fetched; the new nonprofit has been viewed as an intriguing sidelight. But taken together, Organizing for Action could be the key to enacting the president's agenda. Obama's best hope for his aggressive program may lie in the same innovative campaign techniques of grassroots mobilization and data-based field organizing that got him reelected in November. And if he pulls it off, he could revolutionize lawmaking the way he's already revolutionized campaigns.¶ Politicians talk about an outside game, but no president has ever commanded a standing army of organized supporters who could be summoned at a moment's notice to put pressure on Washington at his command. That is what Obama is proposing to do, said Addisu Demissie, who served as political director of Organizing for America, the heir to Obama's 2008 campaign organization.¶ "A lot of the things the president has proposed are popular -- pieces of gun safety, immigration, and so on," Demissie said. "The people are with him. But those people have to be heard, to step up and be counted, particularly in Republican congressional districts."¶ To be sure, there's a network of progressive advocacy organizations who are active on a wide range of issues. "But none of them have the sole job of mobilizing on behalf of the president's agenda," Demissie said. Obama's grassroots supporters "have been trained now, through two presidential election cycles, to work and organize and do the hard work of politics. Now, Obama can really use that power and those skills."¶ Particularly with the House in Republican hands, Demissie said, "I don't see how he can get that ambitious agenda through Congress without playing an outside game. Having a grassroots army could be the whole ballgame."¶ The president has, in recent months, signaled repeatedly that he plans to count on mobilizing his supporters to get things done, and that he regrets not having done so more aggressively during his first term. In his victory speech on Election Night, Obama told the audience his reelection was not the end of the road, telling his supporters that getting him reelected "doesn't mean your work is done." Even before the election, he was ridiculed for asserting, "You can't change Washington from the inside," calling it "the most important lesson I've learned." Interviewed by The New Republic last week, Obama said he planned on "spending a lot more time in terms of being in a conversation with the American people as opposed to just playing an insider game here in Washington."¶ Jen Psaki, who served as deputy White House communications director and worked for both Obama presidential campaigns, says it's wisdom the president learned the hard way, by getting bogged down and burned in Washington battles. "One of the greatest lessons of the first [Obama] term is you can't govern in a bubble," Psaki said. "Sitting across the table from other elected officials in a fancy room in Washington doesn't move an agenda, because there's no impetus for them to move."¶ The millions of rank-and-file Obama supporters who not only voted for him but devoted hours of their time and portions of their hard-earned paychecks to his campaign didn't just do it to get him elected -- they did it because they believed in the things he promised to do, and many of them are now itching to continue the fight. "The simple fact is there were millions of people actively engaged in the campaign," Psaki said. "They might not be engaged on every single issue moving forward, but they may care deeply about gun control, immigration, climate change or something else."¶ Insiders are calling Organizing for Action "OFA 4.0" -- the fourth iteration of the acronym. OFA 1.0 was the first presidential campaign; 2.0 was its successor, Organizing for America, which became an arm of the Democratic National Committee in 2009; 3.0 was the reelection campaign.¶ OFA 2.0 is the most direct precedent for the current effort -- and a cautionary tale. Organizing for America was largely blamed for having squandered the momentum of Obama's first victory, allowing the president to get mired in D.C. deal-making and leaving his rank-and-file supporters out in the cold.¶ Veterans of the group bristle a bit at this characterization, but most acknowledge that Organizing for America took too long to get started, lacked a focused mission, didn't play well with other actors (such as local Democratic parties) and, because of its affiliation with the DNC, suffered from conflicting imperatives. Was its job to push Obama's plans, or was it to get more Democrats elected?¶ "The biggest problem with being inside the DNC was that we couldn't put pressure on Democrats," one Organizing for America veteran told me. Though Democrats commanded a 54-seat House majority and 60-vote Senate supermajority, it became clear early in Obama's first term that they would need some cajoling to go along with plans like the stimulus bill and especially the health-care legislation.¶ "On health care, we really needed to hold Democrats accountable for standing up on the issue, but they could just call up the DNC if we caused any headache for them," the former OFA 2.0 staffer said. "When your paycheck is coming from the organization whose job it is to reelect these people, they can reasonably expect that you're not going to give them a hard time."¶ Nonetheless, Organizing for America had some success. In particular, staffers credit it with salvaging the health-care push during its darkest hour, when it was in danger of failing altogether.¶ It was the summer of 2009, and health-care legislation had gotten badly sidetracked in a maze of congressional horse-trading. The newly energized Tea Party was showing up at congressional town halls across the country to voice its vehement objections to the legislation. Faced with the images on the news of representatives getting shouted down and accused of wanting to kill Grandma, many Democrats withdrew, canceling events and reevaluating their support for the legislation, which suddenly looked politically toxic.¶ "We called on dedicated Obama supporters to come out, and we were able to mobilize within a few days to a week," said Evan Sutton, who served as Organizing for America's field director in Nevada. "Democrats were able to come out of hiding, and by the end of August, we were showing up at events and outnumbering the Tea Party folks 3 to 1 or 5 to 1 or 10 to 1 depending on the area." That substantially altered the dynamic -- and the story -- about the town halls from being about voter anger over health care to being about a more balanced debate between two sides.¶ "In 2005, President Bush tried to privatize Social Security, and Democrats basically did what the Tea Party did in 2009 -- organized people and flooded town halls," said Sutton, who now works for the New Organizing Institute, a progressive training group. "Bush didn't have anything to apply pressure back the other way, and as a result, the party backed off the issue and it died."¶ If Organizing for Action works, then, it could be the difference between the downward slide, in effectiveness and popularity, of Bush's second term and a more successful forecast for Obama's.¶ OFA 4.0 is being run by Jon Carson, the field director of Obama's 2008 campaign and director of the White House's Office of Public Engagement in the president's first term. From those two roles, insiders say, Carson has both an understanding of how Washington works and a deep facility with campaign mechanics. The group's chairman is Jim Messina, Obama's 2012 campaign manager.¶ What will Organizing for Action actually do? That's still up in the air. The Obama campaign model relies on a simple concept -- people reaching out to their friends and neighbors -- made effective with sophisticated use of data, targeting, and online tools.¶ Thus far, attempts to rally the Obama troops have been tentative at best. The millions-strong Obama campaign email list, which helped the president raise hundreds of millions of dollars online in 2012, has mostly been used to hawk inaugural merchandise and for a couple of tentative-seeming call-your-congressman campaigns around the fiscal cliff and, last week, gun control. The gun-control push, which came on a Friday afternoon when an anti-abortion rally had taken many GOP members out of their offices, did not exactly inspire a panic on Capitol Hill.¶ Supporters believe there are an array of tactics available to OFA 4.0, starting with the kinds of humble activities -- spread the word on Facebook! Hold a house party with your neighbors! -- that, brought to mass scale, accrued so powerfully for Obama's campaigns. Many of Obama's "liberal" policy proposals are broadly popular, his opposition is disorganized and diffuse, and lawmakers do respond to outpourings of public pressure.¶ Still, it's not clear how effective the Obama machine can be when it doesn't have the concrete goal of turning people out to vote as its end point. Will call-in campaigns be a satisfying means of political engagement? Will supporters be called on to hold rallies, raise money, write letters to the editor?¶ Plenty of other potential pitfalls await Obama in his new push. If he does turn his organizational muscle on Republican legislators, they are likely to respond with outrage and claims that they're being bullied. Turning the big guns on Democrats could be even more delicate for Obama's relationships in Washington.¶ And supporters will only stay engaged as long as they believe OFA 4.0 is true to the principles they believe in, pointed out Howard Dean, the former DNC chairman, who has his own experience refashioning a presidential campaign apparatus under a new acronym: Democracy for America, the heir to the 2004 Dean for America campaign, still exists as a supporter of progressive causes.¶ Dean believes OFA 2.0 "fell apart" when Obama backed off of the public option for health-care reform, dispiriting his progressive base and making them reluctant to rally to his side. If the president doesn't hold fast to the "inspiring" promises he made in his second inaugural, Dean said, his supporters will fall away once again.¶ Dean also worried that if OFA 4.0 accepts corporate dollars, it will undermine the president's ideals. And by being separate from the DNC, he said, it could siphon needed donations away from Democrats, weaken the party, and create resentment among allies.¶ But if the OFA 4.0 gambit is successful in bringing Obama's grassroots army to bear on the battles of Washington, it could change the political dynamic irrevocably, bringing a whole new meaning to the notion of the "permanent campaign."¶ "Lots of presidents have tried to rally the public on an ad hoc basis," Dean said, pointing to Ronald Reagan exhorting Americans to call their members of Congress in support of his tax proposals -- a ploy that worked. "But I don't believe any president has ever maintained a standing grassroots army .... Obama built the best grassroots campaign I've ever seen by a mile. Nobody has done this successfully before, but if anyone can do it, he can."

#### Obama wins on sequester

Kornacki 2-6

Steve is a Political Columnist for Salon, “Obama’s Dare to the GOP,” <http://www.salon.com/2013/02/06/obamas_dare_to_the_gop/>

President Obama’s challenge to congressional Republicans to join with him in crafting legislation to delay the sequester puts the GOP in a tough spot. But it’s not impossible it’ll end up doing the same to Democrats too.¶ In brief remarks Tuesday afternoon, Obama called for passing a small package of revenue increases and spending cuts that would delay the implementation of the $1.2 trillion sequester, which is now scheduled to take effect March 1. A short-term fix would, in theory, spare the economy needless contraction and buy both parties time to craft an ever-elusive “grand bargain” – something Obama has pursued on and off with congressional Republicans for nearly two years now.¶ For the moment, Obama’s gambit puts the GOP on the defensive. The negative economic impact of the sequester, which is crafted to hit the Defense Department hardest and to spare Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, is fairly clear, and as March 1 nears the pressure to avoid it will grow. Defense contractors, traditionally a Republican-friendly constituency, will obviously push particularly hard for a workaround.¶ On top of this, the politics should play well for Obama. He didn’t spell out a specific blueprint on Tuesday, but his basic formula for a temporary fix – a “balanced” approach of more revenue from wealthy individuals or corporations and targeted spending cuts that won’t harm G.D.P. growth the way the sequester would – tends to test well in polling. As TPM’s Brian Beutler wrote, if Republicans resist, Obama will be free to tell voters that they “prefer the sequester to raising even a small amount of revenue from oil companies and other unpopular interests — that the only thing Republicans want more than the sequester is a wide range of cuts to services for the poor.”¶ As of now, though, this is the road Republicans are heading down. There is enormous, possibly prohibitive resistance within the party to any form of new revenue in the wake of the fiscal cliff deal, which raised rates on high-end earners. In response to Obama on Tuesday, House Speaker John Boehner said the GOP’s alternative to the sequester – a cuts-only plan that cleared the House last year but went nowhere in the Democratic Senate – remains party policy. And another top House Republican, who was among the first to express willingness to give in on revenues in the run-up to the fiscal cliff deal, suggested that accepting the sequester would be preferable to the sort of deal Obama is proposing.¶ It may just be that Republicans conclude the political consequences of the sequester would be less damaging than a “balanced” deal with Obama. After all, while refusing the latter might harm the economy and hurt the party’s overall national image, it would help protect members individually from conservative primary challenges. Obama surely knows this, which explains his decision to get the P.R. jump on his opponents; if there’s not going to be a deal before March 1, he wants to make sure the public knows who’s responsible.¶ But the political equation could change a bit if the GOP backs off and a short-term patch is passed. The discussion would then shift back to the grand bargain, with Obama making clear on Tuesday that the terms he offered the GOP before the fiscal cliff deal are still on the table.¶ That would mean that Social Security, which would be fully protected if the sequester takes effect, would be back on the chopping block, since the White House previously signaled to Republicans an openness to chained CPI – which would make the benefits formula less generous. Chained CPI is vigorously opposed by many on the left, which has long been nervous about the prospect of a grand bargain. Indeed, in earlier negotiations with Republicans, the White House also seemed willing to accept an increase in the Medicare eligibility age, another idea that’s anathema to liberals.¶ In other words, if Obama’s pressure campaign on the sequester works so well that Republicans give in, it will be a clear victory for the White House. But it could also be a short-term one, since it could easily unleash an ugly battle within the Democratic Party.

### 2NC Will Pass

#### More Reasons it passes:

#### A Insiders agree

National Journal 2-2

“Insiders Optimistic About Immigration Reform,” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/blogs/hotlineoncall/2013/02/insiders-optimistic-about-immigration-reform-02>

Cautious optimism: That's the best way to describe how both Democratic and Republican Political Insiders feel about the chances of comprehensive immigration reform, including a pathway to citizenship, passing Congress this year.¶ A majority of Democrats and Republicans think it's either very or somewhat likely that such legislation passes in the 113th Congress, while only 3 percent of Democratic Insiders and 2 percent of the Republican Insiders say it's very unlikely.¶ What is the likelihood of comprehensive immigration reform, including a pathway to citizenship, passing Congress this year?¶ Democrats¶ (107 votes) Republicans¶ (94 votes)¶ Very likely 39% 25%¶ Somewhat likely 50% 53%¶ Somewhat unlikely 8% 20%¶ Very unlikely 3% 2%¶ Democrats view Republicans as finally having to accept a political reality after losing decisively in 2012 and eager to jab the GOP over what they see as a political winner for their party.¶ "The GOP has gone from bigotry to opportunism faster than Sarah Palin can take down a caribou," said one Democratic Insider.¶ Indeed, some Democrats argue their opponents will be forced to back immigration reform because of demographic realities.¶ "Enough Republicans have seen the light to make it happen," said another Democratic Insider.¶ Republicans don't disagree but, as you would expect, they put it differently.¶ "Republicans get over their headache, after banging into the wall for years," said one Republican.

#### B Polling Edge

Washington Post 2-7

“Poll Shows Growing Support for Obama Immigration Reforms,” <http://www.heraldextra.com/news/national/poll-shows-growing-support-for-obama-s-immigration-reforms/article_029a631f-9df2-5d41-8d41-8075280a0ad3.html>

Americans have given President Barack Obama a major ratings boost on immigration as he and Congress debate the biggest immigration reforms in decades, according to a new Washington Post-ABC News poll.¶ By 49 to 44 percent, slightly more Americans now approve than disapprove of Obama on immigration. In July, Obama was deep underwater, with just 38 percent offering positive ratings and 52 percent negative.¶ Even after the shift, though, Obama's immigration marks continue to trail his overall approval rating, which stood at 55 percent in a January Post-ABC poll.¶ In addition, two key elements of current reform discussions receive even broader support than Obama: 83 percent support stricter border security, and 55 percent back a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants.

#### C Christians give cover

Politico 2-6

“Immigration’s Latest Ally: Christian Right,” <http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=DE17CC0D-F93D-4765-BBCA-054B710A5BD4>

The usual suspects pushing immigration reform have a new ally in the fight this time — the religious right.¶ Christian conservatives, who stayed on the sidelines in 2006 or opposed reform outright, have sprung into action for the cause.¶ (PHOTOS: At a glance: The Senate immigration deal)¶ They’re talking to their congregations from the pulpit. They’re urging lawmakers in private meetings to support reform. And they’re even calling for change publicly.¶ The efforts have dramatically changed the dynamics of the debate, so much so that Republicans anxious to vote yes on a deal might have the political cover to do it.¶ “I think it is night and day, particularly among social conservatives,” Faith and Freedom Coalition’s Ralph Reed told POLITICO of the support for immigration reform.¶ (Also on POLITICO: House GOP takes piecemeal approach on immigration)¶ Reed’s group released a letter Tuesday that outlines broad goals for reform, like keeping families together, reforming the visa system and securing the border.¶ High profile leaders are also weighing in. Mathew Staver, vice president of Liberty University, the college started by former TV minister Jerry Falwell, is on board. Focus on the Family, which for years has focused on issues like opposing abortion rights and gay marriage, is supporting immigration reform for the first time in its history — even using its radio broadcast that reaches millions to push its message.¶ “The issues had been so demagogued for the last five or six years, it was hopeless to get seriously into this,” said Tom Minnery or Focus on the Family. “It seems the time is better. The time has changed…That’s why we’ve become more active.”¶ Social conservatives are directly targeting GOP offices and trying to show that they can give cover to lawmakers in the South, West and Midwest, who are worried about facing retaliation at the ballot box in 2014.¶ “Many of the most hostile critics got beat, a fact not lost on the other House members,” said Richard Land of the Southern Baptist Convention, referring to Republicans who have lost their seats since 2006. “I think there’s a bigger coalition in the House for immigration reform than people think.”

#### D Business & Labor Support

 AP 2-6

“Business, Labor Agree on Immigration Reform,” <http://www.trivalleycentral.com/casa_grande_dispatch/national_news/business-labor-agree-on-immigration-reform/article_aad043c0-7072-11e2-854b-001a4bcf887a.html>

Unlikely allies, business and labor leaders joined in support of the White House’s immigration overhaul efforts Tuesday while also launching high-stakes negotiations to overcome an issue that has split them before — creating a guest-worker program to ensure future immigrants come to the U.S. legally.¶ The broad agreement on a need for immigration changes and a pathway to citizenship for an estimated 11 million illegal immigrants already here is driven largely by self-interest. Both business and labor see an overhaul of the nation’s broken immigration system as a way to boost economic competitiveness with other nations while increasing the ranks of workers and union members.¶ For President Barack Obama, a partnership between factions that have often been at odds — both with each other and with the White House — allows him to turn up pressure on Congress and try to isolate congressional Republicans who oppose parts of an immigration overhaul. Obama held separate private meetings at the White House on Tuesday with labor leaders and top business executives.

### AT PC no key

#### Public Popularity Key to Immigration

Murray 1-29

Mark is the Senior Political Editor at NBC News, “On Immigration and Changing Washington from the Outside,” <http://firstread.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/01/29/16755470-on-immigration-and-changing-washington-from-the-outside?lite>

Yet campaign rhetoric aside, Obama was admitting a simple truth about American politics at that Univision forum: The power to change policy comes from public opinion. And it also comes from the ballot box.¶ In other words, elections have consequences -- especially after more than 70 percent of Latinos backed Obama in the 2012 presidential election, up from 67 percent in 2008.¶ That explains why Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) -- who once championed comprehensive immigration reform but has opposed it ever since the '08 election -- is back on board.¶ "Elections, elections. The Republican Party is losing the support of our Hispanic citizens," McCain said at a news conference yesterday announcing his support of bipartisan principles to reform the nation's immigration system.¶ Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) put it another way. "The politics on this issue have been turned upside down," he said. "There is more political risk in opposing immigration reform rather than supporting it."¶ None of this is to say that immigration reform's passage through Congress is a sure thing. Already, opponents are asking that the Senate slow down consideration of any legislation. "No secret accord with profound consequences for this nation’s future can be rushed through. That means a full committee process and debate and amendments on the floor of the Senate," Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.) said in a statement yesterday.¶ But it does point to how outside forces -- and elections -- can change politics, at least for a while, on issues like immigration and taxes.

#### Obama’s first term proves it’s the only way to govern now

LA Times 2-4

“Obama Takes Second Term Agenda to the Campaign Trail,” [http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-obama-20130204,0,3889723.story](http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-obama-20130204%2C0%2C3889723.story)

Fresh off his first inauguration, Obama spent his political capital diving into healthcare reform, a bruising effort that took more than a year. His efforts to negotiate a far-reaching budget deal with the House speaker yielded nothing. But when he took to the road, he was able to win an extension of the payroll tax break and lower interest rates on federal student loans.¶ "They're making up for a major error of the first term, that he didn't use the bully pulpit as effectively to set the national debate," said Allan Lichtman, a presidential historian at American University. "He let a lot of the healthcare debate take place in Congress, so you had Congress setting the terms."¶ "In the second term, if he's going to get anything done, he has to get the public behind him," Lichtman continued. "Congress operates on fear and greed. The only way you get Congress to work with him is if they believe he has a big public movement behind him."¶ The president's approval ratings have risen in the four months since his reelection, but it's too soon to see whether he's boosted support for his signature issues. Obama has seized on issues that already have solid public support.¶ Whether a president has the power to generate a tide of public sentiment remains a matter of debate among political scientists and historians. Historians periodically examine whether President Reagan brought about a revolution in American politics or was the beneficiary of one already underway.¶ George C. Edwards III, a presidential scholar and political scientist at Texas A&M University, studied hundreds of polls on presidents and concluded that even the most accomplished orators usually failed to win public support for their top initiatives.¶ Despite Reagan's opposition to spending on social programs, for instance, public support for them rose during his tenure. Still, Reagan persuaded Democrats to pass his bills to cut taxes in 1981 and 1986, which some see as clear evidence that his skillful public diplomacy had an effect on his negotiations with Congress.¶ "Ronald Reagan was the great communicator because he was very powerful in selling ideas that people thought were crazy," Lichtman said. "Who would have thought an across-the-board tax cut would be adopted when it was? It was the persuasiveness of Ronald Reagan, talking about getting the government off your back."¶ With Obama, though, his opponents do not seem worried about the effect of his words, however eloquently delivered.

### AT Popular

#### New Nuclear Reactors are unpopular- Correctly Worded Questions prove

Mariotte ’12

Michael is Executive Director of Nuclear Information and Resource Service, “Nuclear Power and Public Opinion: What the Polls Say,” <http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/06/05/1097574/-Nuclear-Power-and-Public-Opinion-What-the-polls-say>

Public opinion on nuclear power matters. Should we build new reactors or not? If so, who should pay for them? Should we close existing reactors? Where should nuclear power rank among all the other possible sources of electricity generation? Where should we put our limited resources to attain the best possible energy future?¶ These are all fundamental questions, the answers to which could affect our future far more than, say, who will be the next Senator from Indiana. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, until recently—really the past two or three years—other than regularly-conducted, loudly-trumpeted and rarely relevant industry-sponsored polls, polling of public opinion on nuclear power (and a lot of other energy issues) was haphazard at best.¶ Gallup, for example, over the past 18 years as best as we can find out, has conducted only 10 polls (and most of these only asked a half-sample, putting their numbers into question) asking people their opinion on nuclear power. But beginning in 2009, Gallup has begun polling annually. Unfortunately, Gallup asks the exact same question, with the same wording, that the Nuclear Energy Institute’s (NEI) own well-tested polling does. And the NEI doesn’t ask questions that it doesn’t want the answers to. Even so, Gallup’s answers don’t quite match those NEI gets, and which are usually heavily promoted in the media by NEI.¶ To try to get a better sense of what the public really thinks about nuclear power (and since we can’t afford to conduct our own polling), we took a look at every poll we could find on the issue, and related energy issues, over the past two years, and in some cases further back. Yes, that includes GOP/Fox News favorite Rasmussen.¶ As DailyKos readers know, if not the general public, examining all the possible polls leads to a much greater confidence in conclusions than relying on a single poll. Thus, we have a fairly strong confidence that our conclusions are a good statement of where the American public is at on nuclear power and our energy future in the Spring of 2012.¶ Conclusion 1: The public does NOT want to pay for new nuclear power. It IS willing to pay for renewable energy.¶ This one is a slam dunk.¶ New nuclear reactors are simply too expensive for utilities to build with their own assets. Nor are banks willing to lend money for most nuclear projects; they’re considered too risky given the long history of cost overruns, defaults, cancellations and other problems. Thus, the only two means of financing a new reactor are to either get money from taxpayers, through direct federal loans or taxpayer-backed loan guarantees, or from ratepayers in a few, mostly Southern states, which allow utilities to collect money from ratepayers before reactors are built—a concept known either as “early cost recovery” or Construction Work in Progress (CWIP).¶ ORC International (which polls for CNN, among others) has asked a straightforward question for the past two years (March 2011 and February 2012) in polls commissioned by the Civil Society Institute: “Should U.S. Taxpayers Take on the Risk of Backing New Nuclear Reactors?” The answer? Basically identical both years: 73% opposed in 2011, 72% opposed in 2012.¶ Maybe using the work “risk” skews the poll, you think? So ORC also asked, “Do you favor or oppose shifting federal loan guarantees from nuclear energy to clean renewables?” The answer was basically the same: 74% said yes in 2011, 77% in 2012 with 47% “strongly” holding that opinion both years.¶ A third poll conducted by ORC for Civil Society Institute in March 2012 asked this question: ¶ “Utilities in some states are allowed to charge electricity ratepayers for “Construction Work in Progress” for new power plants. This means that ratepayers – instead of the companies – pay for construction of new nuclear reactors and other major power plants before any electricity ever reaches customers, thereby lowering the financial risks to shareholders. Knowing this, which of the following statements about “Construction Work in Progress” most closely reflects your view?”¶ The answer: fully 80% opposed CWIP.¶ Most pollsters have not asked similar questions; interestingly though, Rasmussen did in May 2012 for an undisclosed client. Their question: “The government is providing billions in loan guarantees to help the development of new nuclear plants. Would that money be better spent on the development of alternative new energy sources?” Unfortunately, Rasmussen did not publicize the results and hid them behind a paywall, which we were not inclined to pursue. But if anyone has access to that, we’d love to know what Rasmussen found.¶ Conclusion 2: Americans do not think nuclear power is “clean” energy, and still don’t want to pay for it.¶ Jumping back to ORC International, their March 2012 poll found this:¶ About two out of three Americans (66 percent) – including 58 percent of Republicans, 65 percent of Independents, and 75 percent of Democrats -- agree that the term “‘clean energy standard’ should not be used to describe any energy plan that involves nuclear energy, coal-fired power, and natural gas that comes from hydraulic fracturing, also known as ‘fracking.’”¶ and this:¶ About three out of four Americans (73 percent) agree that “federal spending on energy should focus on developing the energy sources of tomorrow, such as wind and solar, and not the energy sources of yesterday, such as nuclear power.” Fewer than one in four (22 percent) say that “federal spending on energy should focus on existing energy sources, such as nuclear, and not emerging energy sources, such as wind and solar.”¶ Meanwhile, the New York Times in May reported on a Harvard/Yale poll (also behind a paywall), conducted in 2011 but released in May 2012, that found that Americans are willing to pay an average of $162/year more for clean energy than they are paying now—an average 13% increase in electric bills. But when clean energy was defined as including nuclear power or natural gas, that support plummeted.¶ This is consistent with findings over the past decade, which have shown that nuclear power has typically ranked well below renewable energy sources, especially solar and wind, in public opinion, at times battling with coal for least-favorite U.S. energy source.¶ A March 2012 Gallup poll found that 69% of Americans support spending more government money on solar and wind power—with majorities among Democrats (84%) and Republicans (51%) alike. But support for “expanding the use of nuclear power” barely received a majority (52%) and then only due to Republican support: 64% of Republicans supported that idea, only 41% of Democrats.¶ Conclusion 3: On new reactors, how one asks the question matters.¶ Gallup and the Nuclear Energy Institute ask the same question: “Overall, do you strongly favor, somewhat favor, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose the use of nuclear energy as one of the ways to provide electricity in the U.S.?”¶ This question doesn’t really get to the issue of support for new nuclear reactors, although NEI typically tries to spin it that way. Although a question of support for current reactors wasn’t asked in any recent poll we saw, the public traditionally has been more supportive of existing reactors than new ones, and the question above could easily be interpreted as support for existing reactors, or even simple recognition that they exist. The results may also be skewed by the pollsters throwing nuclear in as “one of the ways,” without a context of how large a way.¶ Nonetheless, despite asking the same question, Gallup and NEI can’t agree on the answer. NEI, for example, in November 2011 asserted that 28% of the public strongly favors nuclear power with an additional 35% somewhat in favor. NEI found only 13% strongly opposed and another 21% somewhat opposed. A May 2012 NEI poll did not publicly break down the numbers into strongly vs somewhat, but claimed a similar 64-33% split between support for nuclear power and opposition.¶ Gallup, asking the same question in March 2012, found a narrower split. A smaller number was strongly in favor (23%, a drop of 5%) and a larger number strongly opposed (24%, increase of 3%)—overall an 8-point anti-nuclear swing among those with strong opinions. Those in the middle were 34% somewhat favor vs 16% somewhat opposed. The 2012 numbers were slightly worse for nuclear power than the identical question asked in March 2011, just before Fukushima.¶ But other polls suggest that Gallup and NEI may be asking the wrong question. For example, the LA Times reported on a Yale-George Mason University poll in April 2012 that found that support for new nuclear power had dropped significantly, from 61% in 2008 to 42% today.¶ Even Rasmussen in its May 2012 poll found that only 44% support building new reactors. That was good news for Rasmussen since it found that only 38% oppose them, with a surprising 18% undecided (surprising because no other poll we saw had such a high undecided contingent for any nuclear-related question).¶ Meanwhile the March 2012 ORC International poll found that:¶ “Nearly six in 10 Americans (57 percent) are less supportive of expanding nuclear power in the United States than they were before the Japanese reactor crisis, a nearly identical finding to the 58 percent who responded the same way when asked the same question one year ago. Those who say they are more supportive of nuclear power a year after Fukushima account for well under a third (28 percent) of all Americans, little changed from the 24 percent who shared that view in 2011.”¶ But perhaps the most telling, and easily the most interesting, poll comes from a March 2012 poll from the Yale Project on Climate Change Communications. Participants were asked, “When you think of nuclear power, what is the first word or phrase that comes to your mind?”¶ 29% of those polled said “disaster.” Another 24% said “bad.” Only about 15% said “good” and that was the only measurable group that had anything positive to say. That poll also found that, “…only 47 percent of Americans in May 2011 supported building more nuclear power plants, down 6 points from the prior year (June 2010), while only 33 percent supported building a nuclear power plant in their own local area.”¶ Conclusions¶ Americans are not exactly wild about the idea of building new nuclear reactors. Polls asking the question different ways arrive at different results; at the lowest common denominator it is safe to say the country is divided on the issue. But Americans clearly don’t want to pay for construction of new reactors. And the reality is that no utility wants to or even can spend its own money building new reactors—they’re just too expensive. Congress, State legislatures and Public Service Commissions would do well to heed that warning, especially since it crosses all party and political lines.¶ It is also clear that the American public does not see nuclear power as a “clean energy” source (nor, for that matter, “clean” coal or natural gas fracking). Congressional or state efforts to include these technologies in a “clean energy standard” or a clean energy bank concept are bound to fail.¶ Finally, for those of us who want to build a genuinely clean, nuclear-free and carbon-free energy future, there is this scintillating nugget: According to the April 2012 ORC International poll:¶ “More than eight out of 10 Americans (83 percent) – including 69 percent of Republicans, 84 percent of Independents, and 95 percent of Democrats -- agree with the following statement: ‘The time is now for a new, grassroots-driven politics to realize a renewable energy future. Congress is debating large public investments in energy and we need to take action to ensure that our taxpayer dollars support renewable energy-- one that protects public health, promotes energy independence and the economic well being of all Americans.”¶ The American people are ready for significant change in energy policy; it’s time we all stepped up our efforts to harness and help direct that sentiment to build the energy future we need and deserve.

### AT DOE

#### DOE links

Thomas McGarity, Endowed Chair in Administrative Law, University of Texas School of Law, May 2012, ARTICLE: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AS BLOOD SPORT: POLICY EROSION IN A HIGHLY PARTISAN AGE, 61 Duke L.J. 1671

The interchange-fee rulemaking experience illustrates how stakeholders in high-stakes rulemakings have begun going beyond the conventional responses to rulemaking initiatives by adopting a new toolbox of strategies better suited to the deeply divided political economy. If the players on one side of the policy debate perceive that they are unlikely to prevail in the administrative arena, they will move the implementation game to another arena - the White House, a congressional hearing, a political fundraising dinner, a think-tank white paper, talk-radio programs, attack advertising, telephone solicitation and "push polls," or Internet blogs. Many of these new venues were amply used in the battle that accompanied the interchange-fee rulemaking. In addition, although lawyers for the stakeholders employ the careful language of administrative law in arenas in which that language is expected, spokespersons and allies also employ the heated rhetoric of modern political discourse in arenas in which that language is more likely to succeed. This Part probes these, among other, contours of blood-sport rulemaking.

### A2: Winners Win

#### Obama influence is finite

Cillizza 2-6

Chris writes the Fix and Covers Politics for the Washington Post, “President Obama is Enjoying a Second Political Honeymoon. But how Long will it Last?” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/02/06/president-obama-is-enjoying-a-second-political-honeymoon-but-how-long-will-it-last/>

President Obama is enjoying a sort of second political honeymoon in the wake of his re-election victory last November with a series of national polls showing his job approval rating climbing from the middling territory where it lagged for much of the last several years.¶ President Obama is in the midst of a second honeymoon.¶ In the latest Real Clear Politics rolling average of all national polling, Obama approval is at 52 percent while his disapproval is at 43 percent. That may not seem like much but it marks a significant improvement over where he was for much of 2010 and 2011.¶ Here’s a look at Obama’s job approval trend line in Washington Post-ABC News polling from January 2011 until now:¶ Judging from his actions of late — most notably his surprising confrontational (and liberal) inaugural address — President Obama is well aware of the fact that he is enjoying a polling boom at the moment. And, even Republicans are tacitly acknowledging that Obama is living in a second honeymoon period by backing down on major legislative fights like the fiscal cliff and the debt ceiling.¶ The pertinent question then is how long it will last — and what the president can get done between now and when the good times (for him, at least) stop rolling.¶ Gallup has done considerable work on the lengths of political honeymoons and has concluded that they ain’t what they used to be. Here’s their chart documenting the relative honeymoon lengths — as defined by a job approval rating above the 55 percent mark — of presidents in their first terms:¶ As Gallup’s Jeffrey Jones wrote:¶ “Only one of the last six presidents — George H.W. Bush — had a honeymoon that extended beyond his ninth month in office. Bush’s ratings actually climbed for much of his first year and a half in office as the economy remained strong, several communist regimes fell in Europe, and the U.S. military was able to capture Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega and remove him from power.”¶ The explanations for the shortening of presidential honeymoons vary.¶ One theory is that modern presidents operate in a hyper-partisan world where the opposition party never rallies (or comes close to rallying) behind them. (In Gallup polling, nine of the ten most polarizing years of a presidency – as defined by the gap between presidential job approval among Democrats and job approval among Republicans — have come during the presidencies of George W. Bush and Obama.)¶ Because of that partisan division, modern presidents’ approval ratings start at a lower high point; that means the pace at which they dip below the 56 percent “honeymoon” mark is significantly hastened. The one and only Nate Silver makes just that point when examining second term presidential honeymoons in this post and accompanying chart:¶ Another factor contributing to the truncation of political honeymoons is that in the world of 24-hour cable networks, Twitter and the fracturing of the traditional media, the attention span of the American public is much shorter than it once was — meaning that momentum simply dies away much faster nowadays.¶ Regardless of the reason, it’s clear that Obama has a limited time — six months perhaps? — to take legislative advantage of his second political honeymoon.¶ He seems committed to taking on three separate and distinct fights during that time: 1) gun control 2) immigration reform 3) debt and spending. Each of those legislative scraps will shorten his honeymoon as he expends political capital to try to get what he wants out of a Congress — particularly in the House — that seems likely to be resistant.¶ And, it’s possible — given the glacially slow pace at which Congress works and the aforementioned partisanship that seems to seize any and every issue — that Obama’s honeymoon will fade well before he gets all three of those priorities accomplished.¶ A look back at the trend line on his job approval in his first term is telling in that regard.¶ Even though Obama started off considerably higher in his first term than he began his second term, by August 2009 he had dropped to 54 percent approval in WaPo-ABC polling — thanks to the bailout of the American auto industry, the fight over the economic stimulus package and the earlier positioning over his health-care bill.¶ Considering that Obama is — at best — in the mid-50s in terms of job approval at the moment and the fact that the past showdowns on fiscal issues have revealed the massively different approaches advocated by the two parties, it’s not at all far fetched to assume that taking on just one of those fights might be enough to end the president’s second term honeymoon.¶ In short: The time is now for Obama to act on his legislative priorities. His political honeymoon will almost certainly be over by the time Congress recesses for its month-long August break this summer.

### AT Space Add-On

#### Colonization's impossible and you should privilege short-term existential risks

Stross 7

(Charlie, "The High Frontier, Redux," http://www.antipope.org/charlie/blog-static/2007/06/the\_high\_frontier\_redux.html)

I'm going to take it as read that the idea of space colonization isn't unfamiliar; domed cities on Mars, orbiting cylindrical space habitats a la J. D. Bernal or Gerard K. O'Neill, that sort of thing. Generation ships that take hundreds of years to ferry colonists out to other star systems where — as we are now discovering — there are profusions of planets to explore. And I don't want to spend much time talking about the unspoken ideological underpinnings of the urge to space colonization, other than to point out that they're there, that the case for space colonization isn't usually presented as an economic enterprise so much as a quasi-religious one. "We can't afford to keep all our eggs in one basket" isn't so much a justification as an appeal to sentimentality, for in the hypothetical case of a planet-trashing catastrophe, we (who currently inhabit the surface of the Earth) are dead anyway. The future extinction of the human species cannot affect you if you are already dead: strictly speaking, it should be of no personal concern. Historically, crossing oceans and setting up farmsteads on new lands conveniently stripped of indigenous inhabitants by disease has been a cost-effective proposition. But the scale factor involved in space travel is strongly counter-intuitive. Here's a handy metaphor: let's approximate one astronomical unit — the distance between the Earth and the sun, roughly 150 million kilometres, or 600 times the distance from the Earth to the Moon — to one centimetre. Got that? 1AU = 1cm. (You may want to get hold of a ruler to follow through with this one.) The solar system is conveniently small. Neptune, the outermost planet in our solar system, orbits the sun at a distance of almost exactly 30AU, or 30 centimetres — one foot (in imperial units). Giant Jupiter is 5.46 AU out from the sun, almost exactly two inches (in old money). We've sent space probes to Jupiter; they take two and a half years to get there if we send them on a straight Hohmann transfer orbit, but we can get there a bit faster using some fancy orbital mechanics. Neptune is still a stretch — only one spacecraft, Voyager 2, has made it out there so far. Its journey time was 12 years, and it wasn't stopping. (It's now on its way out into interstellar space, having passed the heliopause some years ago.) The Kuiper belt, domain of icy wandering dwarf planets like Pluto and Eris, extends perhaps another 30AU, before merging into the much more tenuous Hills cloud and Oort cloud, domain of loosely coupled long-period comets. Now for the first scale shock: using our handy metaphor the Kuiper belt is perhaps a metre in diameter. The Oort cloud, in contrast, is as much as 50,000 AU in radius — its outer edge lies half a kilometre away. Got that? Our planetary solar system is 30 centimetres, roughly a foot, in radius. But to get to the edge of the Oort cloud, you have to go half a kilometre, roughly a third of a mile. Next on our tour is Proxima Centauri, our nearest star. (There might be a brown dwarf or two lurking unseen in the icy depths beyond the Oort cloud, but if we've spotted one, I'm unaware of it.) Proxima Centauri is 4.22 light years away.A light year is 63.2 x 103 AU, or 9.46 x 1012 Km. So Proxima Centauri, at 267,000 AU, is just under two and a third kilometres, or two miles (in old money) away from us. But Proxima Centauri is a poor choice, if we're looking for habitable real estate. While exoplanets are apparently common as muck, terrestrial planets are harder to find; Gliese 581c, the first such to be detected (and it looks like a pretty weird one, at that), is roughly 20.4 light years away, or using our metaphor, about ten miles. Try to get a handle on this: it takes us 2-5 years to travel two inches. But the proponents of interstellar travel are talking about journeys of ten miles. That's the first point I want to get across: that if the distances involved in interplanetary travel are enormous, and the travel times fit to rival the first Australian settlers, then the distances and times involved in interstellar travel are mind-numbing. This is not to say that interstellar travel is impossible; quite the contrary. But to do so effectively you need either (a) outrageous amounts of cheap energy, or (b) highly efficient robot probes, or (c) a magic wand. And in the absence of (c) you're not going to get any news back from the other end in less than decades. Even if (a) is achievable, or by means of (b) we can send self-replicating factories and have them turn distant solar systems into hives of industry, and more speculatively find some way to transmit human beings there, they are going to have zero net economic impact on our circumstances (except insofar as sending them out costs us money). What do I mean by outrageous amounts of cheap energy? Let's postulate that in the future, it will be possible to wave a magic wand and construct a camping kit that encapsulates all the necessary technologies and information to rebuild a human civilization capable of eventually sending out interstellar colonization missions — a bunch of self-replicating, self-repairing robotic hardware, and a downloadable copy of the sum total of human knowledge to date. Let's also be generous and throw in a closed-circuit life support system capable of keeping a human occupant alive indefinitely, for many years at a stretch, with zero failures and losses, and capable where necessary of providing medical intervention. Let's throw in a willing astronaut (the fool!) and stick them inside this assembly. It's going to be pretty boring in there, but I think we can conceive of our minimal manned interstellar mission as being about the size and mass of a Mercury capsule. And I'm going to nail a target to the barn door and call it 2000kg in total. (Of course we can cut corners, but I've already invoked self-replicating robotic factories and closed-cycle life support systems, and those are close enough to magic wands as it is. I'm going to deliberately ignore more speculative technologies such as starwisps, mind transfer, or AIs sufficiently powerful to operate autonomously — although I used them shamelessly in my novel Accelerando. What I'm trying to do here is come up with a useful metaphor for the energy budget realistically required for interstellar flight.) Incidentally, a probe massing 1-2 tons with an astronaut on top is a bit implausible, but a 1-2 ton probe could conceivably carry enough robotic instrumentation to do useful research, plus a laser powerful enough to punch a signal home, and maybe even that shrink-wrapped military/industrial complex in a tin can that would allow it to build something useful at the other end. Anything much smaller, though, isn't going to be able to transmit its findings to us — at least, not without some breakthroughs in communication technology that haven't shown up so far. Now, let's say we want to deliver our canned monkey to Proxima Centauri within its own lifetime. We're sending them on a one-way trip, so a 42 year flight time isn't unreasonable. (Their job is to supervise the machinery as it unpacks itself and begins to brew up a bunch of new colonists using an artificial uterus. Okay?) This means they need to achieve a mean cruise speed of 10% of the speed of light. They then need to decelerate at the other end. At 10% of c relativistic effects are minor — there's going to be time dilation, but it'll be on the order of hours or days over the duration of the 42-year voyage. So we need to accelerate our astronaut to 30,000,000 metres per second, and decelerate them at the other end. Cheating and using Newton's laws of motion, the kinetic energy acquired by acceleration is 9 x 1017 Joules, so we can call it 2 x 1018 Joules in round numbers for the entire trip. NB: This assumes that the propulsion system in use is 100% efficient at converting energy into momentum, that there are no losses from friction with the interstellar medium, and that the propulsion source is external — that is, there's no need to take reaction mass along en route. So this is a lower bound on the energy cost of transporting our Mercury-capsule sized expedition to Proxima Centauri in less than a lifetime. To put this figure in perspective, the total conversion of one kilogram of mass into energy yields 9 x 1016 Joules. (Which one of my sources informs me, is about equivalent to 21.6 megatons in thermonuclear explosive yield). So we require the equivalent energy output to 400 megatons of nuclear armageddon in order to move a capsule of about the gross weight of a fully loaded Volvo V70 automobile to Proxima Centauri in less than a human lifetime. That's the same as the yield of the entire US Minuteman III ICBM force. For a less explosive reference point, our entire planetary economy runs on roughly 4 terawatts of electricity (4 x 1012 watts). So it would take our total planetary electricity production for a period of half a million seconds — roughly 5 days — to supply the necessary va-va-voom. But to bring this back to earth with a bump, let me just remind you that this probe is so implausibly efficient that it's veering back into "magic wand" territory. I've tap-danced past a 100% efficient power transmission system capable of operating across interstellar distances with pinpoint precision and no conversion losses, and that allows the spacecraft on the receiving end to convert power directly into momentum. This is not exactly like any power transmission system that anyone's built to this date, and I'm not sure I can see where it's coming from. Our one astronaut, 10% of c mission approximates well to an unmanned flight, but what about longer-term expeditions? Generation ships are a staple of SF; they're slow (probably under 1% of c) and they carry a self-sufficient city-state. The crew who set off won't live to see their destination (the flight time to Proxima Centauri at 1% of c is about 420 years), but the vague hope is that someone will. Leaving aside our lack of a proven track record at building social institutions that are stable across time periods greatly in excess of a human lifespan, using a generation ship probably doesn't do much for our energy budget problem either. A society of human beings are likely to need more space and raw material to do stuff with while in flight; sticking a solitary explorer in a tin can for forty-something years is merely cruel and unusual, but doing it to an entire city for several centuries probably qualifies as a crime against humanity. We therefore need to relax the mass constraint. Assuming the same super-efficient life support as our solitary explorer, we might postulate that each colonist requires ten tons of structural mass to move around in. (About the same as a large trailer home. For life.) We've cut the peak velocity by an order of magnitude, but we've increased the payload requirement by an order of magnitude per passenger — and we need enough passengers to make a stable society fly. I'd guess a sensible lower number would be on the order of 200 people, the size of a prehistoric primate troupe. (Genetic diversity? I'm going to assume we can hand-wave around that by packing some deep-frozen sperm and ova, or frozen embryos, for later reuse.) By the time we work up to a minimal generation ship (and how minimal can we get, confining 200 human beings in an object weighing aout 2000 tons, for roughly the same period of time that has elapsed since the Plymouth colony landed in what was later to become Massachusetts?) we're actually requiring much more energy than our solitary high-speed explorer. And remember, this is only what it takes to go to Proxima Centauri our nearest neighbour. Gliese 581c is five times as far away. Planets that are already habitable insofar as they orbit inside the habitable zone of their star, possess free oxygen in their atmosphere, and have a mass, surface gravity and escape velocity that are not too forbidding, are likely to be somewhat rarer. (And if there is free oxygen in the atmosphere on a planet, that implies something else — the presence of pre-existing photosynthetic life, a carbon cycle, and a bunch of other stuff that could well unleash a big can of whoop-ass on an unprimed human immune system. The question of how we might interact with alien biologies is an order of magnitude bigger and more complex than the question of how we might get there — and the preliminary outlook is rather forbidding.) The long and the short of what I'm trying to get across is quite simply that, in the absence of technology indistinguishable from magic — magic tech that, furthermore, does things that from today's perspective appear to play fast and loose with the laws of physics — interstellar travel for human beings is near-as-dammit a non-starter. And while I won't rule out the possibility of such seemingly-magical technology appearing at some time in the future, the conclusion I draw as a science fiction writer is that if interstellar colonization ever happens, it will not follow the pattern of historical colonization drives that are followed by mass emigration and trade between the colonies and the old home soil. What about our own solar system? After contemplating the vastness of interstellar space, our own solar system looks almost comfortingly accessible at first. Exploring our own solar system is a no-brainer: we can do it, we are doing it, and interplanetary exploration is probably going to be seen as one of the great scientific undertakings of the late 20th and early 21st century, when the history books get written. But when we start examining the prospects for interplanetary colonization things turn gloomy again. Bluntly, we're not going to get there by rocket ship. Optimistic projects suggest that it should be possible, with the low cost rockets currently under development, to maintain a Lunar presence for a transportation cost of roughly $15,000 per kilogram. Some extreme projections suggest that if the cost can be cut to roughly triple the cost of fuel and oxidizer (meaning, the spacecraft concerned will be both largely reusable and very cheap) then we might even get as low as $165/kilogram to the lunar surface. At that price, sending a 100Kg astronaut to Moon Base One looks as if it ought to cost not much more than a first-class return air fare from the UK to New Zealand ... except that such a price estimate is hogwash. We primates have certain failure modes, and one of them that must not be underestimated is our tendency to irreversibly malfunction when exposed to climactic extremes of temperature, pressure, and partial pressure of oxygen. While the amount of oxygen, water, and food a human consumes per day doesn't sound all that serious — it probably totals roughly ten kilograms, if you economize and recycle the washing-up water — the amount of parasitic weight you need to keep the monkey from blowing out is measured in tons. A Russian Orlan-M space suit (which, some would say, is better than anything NASA has come up with over the years — take heed of the pre-breathe time requirements!) weighs 112 kilograms, which pretty much puts a floor on our infrastructure requirements. An actual habitat would need to mass a whole lot more. Even at $165/kilogram, that's going to add up to a very hefty excess baggage charge on that notional first class air fare to New Zealand — and I think the $165/kg figure is in any case highly unrealistic; even the authors of the article I cited thought $2000/kg was a bit more reasonable. Whichever way you cut it, sending a single tourist to the moon is going to cost not less than $50,000 — and a more realistic figure, for a mature reusable, cheap, rocket-based lunar transport cycle is more like $1M. And that's before you factor in the price of bringing them back ... The moon is about 1.3 light seconds away. If we want to go panning the (metaphorical) rivers for gold, we'd do better to send teleoperator-controlled robots; it's close enough that we can control them directly, and far enough away that the cost of transporting food and creature comforts for human explorers is astronomical. There probably are niches for human workers on a moon base, but only until our robot technologies are somewhat more mature than they are today; Mission Control would be a lot happier with a pair of hands and a high-def camera that doesn't talk back and doesn't need to go to the toilet or take naps. When we look at the rest of the solar system, the picture is even bleaker. Mars is ... well, the phrase "tourist resort" springs to mind, and is promptly filed in the same corner as "Gobi desert". As Bruce Sterling has puts it: "I'll believe in people settling Mars at about the same time I see people settling the Gobi Desert. The Gobi Desert is about a thousand times as hospitable as Mars and five hundred times cheaper and easier to reach. Nobody ever writes "Gobi Desert Opera" because, well, it's just kind of plonkingly obvious that there's no good reason to go there and live. It's ugly, it's inhospitable and there's no way to make it pay. Mars is just the same, really. We just romanticize it because it's so hard to reach." In other words, going there to explore is fine and dandy — our robots are all over it already. But as a desirable residential neighbourhood it has some shortcomings, starting with the slight lack of breathable air and the sub-Antarctic nighttime temperatures and the Mach 0.5 dust storms, and working down from there. Actually, there probably is a good reason for sending human explorers to Mars. And that's the distance: at up to 30 minutes, the speed of light delay means that remote control of robots on the Martian surface is extremely tedious. Either we need autonomous roots that can be assigned tasks and carry them out without direct human supervision, or we need astronauts in orbit or on the ground to boss the robot work gangs around. On the other hand, Mars is a good way further away than the moon, and has a deeper gravity well. All of which drive up the cost per kilogram delivered to the Martian surface. Maybe FedEx could cut it as low as $20,000 per kilogram, but I'm not holding my breath. Let me repeat myself: we are not going there with rockets. At least, not the conventional kind — and while there may be a role for nuclear propulsion in deep space, in general there's a trade-off between instantaneous thrust and efficiency; the more efficient your motor, the lower the actual thrust it provides. Some technologies such as the variable specific impulse magnetoplasma rocket show a good degree of flexibility, but in general they're not suitable for getting us from Earth's surface into orbit — they're only useful for trucking things around from low earth orbit on out. Again, as with interstellar colonization, there are other options. Space elevators, if we build them, will invalidate a lot of what I just said. Some analyses of the energy costs of space elevators suggest that a marginal cost of $350/kilogram to geosynchronous orbit should be achievable without waving any magic wands (other than the enormous practical materials and structural engineering problems of building the thing in the first place). So we probably can look forward to zero-gee vacations in orbit, at a price. And space elevators are attractive because they're a scalable technology; you can use one to haul into space the material to build more. So, long term, space elevators may give us not-unreasonably priced access to space, including jaunts to the lunar surface for a price equivalent to less than $100,000 in today's money. At which point, settlement would begin to look economically feasible, except ... We're human beings. We evolved to flourish in a very specific environment that covers perhaps 10% of our home planet's surface area. (Earth is 70% ocean, and while we can survive, with assistance, in extremely inhospitable terrain, be it arctic or desert or mountain, we aren't well-adapted to thriving there.) Space itself is a very poor environment for humans to live in. A simple pressure failure can kill a spaceship crew in minutes. And that's not the only threat. Cosmic radiation poses a serious risk to long duration interplanetary missions, and unlike solar radiation and radiation from coronal mass ejections the energies of the particles responsible make shielding astronauts extremely difficult. And finally, there's the travel time. Two and a half years to Jupiter system; six months to Mars. Now, these problems are subject to a variety of approaches — including medical ones: does it matter if cosmic radiation causes long-term cumulative radiation exposure leading to cancers if we have advanced side-effect-free cancer treatments? Better still, if hydrogen sulphide-induced hibernation turns out to be a practical technique in human beings, we may be able to sleep through the trip. But even so, when you get down to it, there's not really any economically viable activity on the horizon for people to engage in that would require them to settle on a planet or asteroid and live there for the rest of their lives. In general, when we need to extract resources from a hostile environment we tend to build infrastructure to exploit them (such as oil platforms) but we don't exactly scurry to move our families there. Rather, crews go out to work a long shift, then return home to take their leave. After all, there's no there there — just a howling wilderness of north Atlantic gales and frigid water that will kill you within five minutes of exposure. And that, I submit, is the closest metaphor we'll find for interplanetary colonization. Most of the heavy lifting more than a million kilometres from Earth will be done by robots, overseen by human supervisors who will be itching to get home and spend their hardship pay. And closer to home, the commercialization of space will be incremental and slow, driven by our increasing dependence on near-earth space for communications, positioning, weather forecasting, and (still in its embryonic stages) tourism. But the domed city on Mars is going to have to wait for a magic wand or two to do something about the climate, or reinvent a kind of human being who can thrive in an airless, inhospitable environment.

#### Multiple diseases destroy sustainability of life in space

Matin and Lynch 5

(2005, A. C. Matin, PhD in Microbiology, Professor of Microbiology and Immunology at Stanford University in Stanford, California, and Susan V. Lynch, PhD, Molcular Microbiology, Assistant Professor In Residence, Division of Gastroenterology, UC San Francisco, “Investigating the Threat of Bacteria Grown in Space,” Volume 71, Number 5, 2005/ASM News, <http://www.asm.org/asm/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000001523/znw00505000235.pdf> )

Although tantalizing, space is an inhospitable and dangerous frontier for those sent to explore it. Hence, progress towards more safely navigating and perhaps colonizing space are tasks that demand that we develop knowledge on several fronts, from designing radically new means of space transport to determining how space conditions inﬂuence biological processes. Several harmful effects of space on humans are documented. During extended missions in space, for example, bones lose mass, predisposing space travelers not only to fracture their bones but also to develop renal stones from resorbed bone material. Moreover, muscles atrophy, decreased blood production and volume damage the cardiovascular system, latent viruses (such as Varicella zoster, which causes shingles) tend to reactivate, the incidence of diseases such as bacterial cystitis increases, wound healing slows, pharmacologic agents act differently, and pyschological conditions such as claustrophobia and anxiety tend to be accentuated, in part because of disrupted sleep and dietary patterns. Amid these physical and psychological conditions, there is the added problem that astronauts in space are exposed to intense radiation, involving high-energy protons and nuclei of heavy elements with greater penetrating power and increased capacity to cause malignancies and other problems, than they would be on earth. Additionally, the diminished gravity of space and planets, referred to as microgravity, also poses a direct threat to human health.

### Solvency

#### Money doesn’t change the calculus – more fusion research doesn’t speed up commercialization

Hank Campbell, 10-15-2012, “Fusion In A Coffee Mug,” Science 2.0, http://www.science20.com/science\_20/fusion\_coffee\_mug-95126

They are basically correct about one part. Fusion is not ready yet. It may be another 50 years before it is ready. But, as much as it will send some in the broad audience into hysterical shrieks to read it, we have that 50 years and it will be time well spent. CO2 from energy companies have plummeted and the dirtiest source, coal, is in steep decline and producing levels of emissions not seen since Reagan was in his first term. Our current energy is getting cleaner and nothing else is ready to take its place - we'd need to build a nuclear plant every day for the next 50 years to meet our energy needs and even then we can do it only because fission energy is relatively efficient; if we instead tried to use solar power, the environmental energy darling du jour, it would be close to impossible. The 'greenmail' and environmental lawsuits that appear every time a decent-sized solar plant is even proposed makes it too flaky in a nation that wants a reliable energy plan.(1) Politicians think about 'the now' and fusion is not exciting people, despite its potential. Like solar power, it's already been promised for 60 years and made no huge advances. If a president comes into power who is a believer, it may get tens of billions of dollars in subsidies thrown at it, like solar power has, but here on Science 2.0 we would still ridicule it because you can't just throw money at a company or a school and have a basic research miracle spring to life. It takes time, and mistakes, and increments, before anything revolutionary happens. Instead of invoking yet another Cold War military-industrial pipe dream - government loves to build "Manhattan Project of X" behemoths despite none of them working since the actual Manhattan Project - a smaller, nimbler, 21st century way of doing science makes more sense when it comes to fusion. Lots of programs that are outside Big Science may lead to a real breakthrough and aren't 'all or nothing' financially. It's being done now, in both corporate- and government-funded science, and one recent program may be worth getting excited about.

### Fusion

#### Adaptation solves

Gladwell, 1999

Malcolm Gladwell, The New Republic, July 17 and 24, 1995, excerpted in Epidemics: Opposing Viewpoints, 1999, p. 29

In Plagues and Peoples, which appeared in 1977. William MeNeill pointed out that…while man’s efforts to “remodel” his environment are sometimes a source of new disease. they are seldom a source of serious epidemic disease. Quite the opposite. As humans and new microorganisms interact, they begin to accommodate each other. Human populations slowly build up resistance to circulating infections. What were once virulent infections, such as syphilis become attenuated. Over time, diseases of adults, such as measles and chicken pox, become limited to children, whose immune systems are still naïve.

### Leadership

#### Can’t export tech

Platts 10-1

[Platts is a leading global provider of energy, petrochemicals and metals information, and a premier source of benchmark price assessments for those commodity markets, “Export reform needed to increase US nuclear market share: NEI,” <http://www.platts.com/RSSFeedDetailedNews/RSSFeed/ElectricPower/6666149>]

**Export controls on technology related to nuclear power should be reformed** to allow US companies to capture a larger share of growing international markets, the Nuclear Energy Institute said Monday. The US Department of Commerce estimates the world market for nuclear power technology, fuel and related services and equipment at "upwards of" $750 billion over the next 10 years, Richard Myers, vice president for policy development, planning and supplier programs at NEI, said at a press conference Monday in Washington to release a report the US nuclear power industry commissioned on the topic. "It is a myth that the US nuclear supply chain has disappeared," Myers said. Most manufacturing of large "heavy metal" components for nuclear power plants, such as reactor vessels, is now done in Asia, but many US firms manufacture "precision components" for the nuclear industry and would stand to benefit from increased ability to compete with other countries, Myers said. **US licensing and regulatory reviews of nuclear exports**, however, **are "unduly burdensome," have confusing "layers of jurisdiction" shared by at least four federal agencies, and typically take at least a year to complete, "months longer" than reviews in other exporter countries**, he said. As a result, **the US export control regime is "far more complex and more difficult to navigate ... than comparable regimes in other nations**," Myers said. The report prepared by the law firm Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman for NEI said that "US agencies should be able to increase the efficiency of their license processing through stronger executive branch procedures. By signaling to potential customers that US exports may be licensed on a schedule comparable to those of foreign export control regimes, such an improvement could significantly 'level the playing field' for US exporters in the near term." Many such reforms can be accomplished "administratively," without the need for legislation, James Glasgow, a partner at Pillsbury who specializes in nuclear export law, said during the press conference. The US Department of Energy is currently amending some of its export regulations, known as the Part 810 rule, and reforming that rule could provide significant opportunities to US exporters, Glasgow said. Unfortunately**, some of DOE's proposed revisions to the rule go in the wrong direction, adding regulatory requirements and hurdles**, Myers said. **Some potential customers for US nuclear exports see DOE's Part 810 review as "the choke point" for an order, and "sometimes that's an evaluation criterion" for deciding whether to buy from a US firm**, Glasgow said. In such situations, delay in the review can be "the functional equivalence of denial" of permission for the export because the buyer looks elsewhere, he said.

## 1NR

### T

Lost the doc but it was T – financial incentive

# Round 6 v OU BC

## 1NC

### 1NC

#### 1. Interpretation: The role of the ballot is to determine if the enactment of a topical plan is better than the status quo or a competitive option. The 1ac must read and defend the implementation of such a topical plan.

#### 2. Violation:

#### A) “Resolved” implies a policy or legislative decision – means they must be resolved about a future federal government policy

Parcher 1

Jeff Parcher, former debate coach at Georgetown, Feb 2001 http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html

Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desirablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the preliminary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution.

#### B) USFG is the national government in DC

Encarta Online Encyclopedia, 2k

(http://encarta.msn.com)

“The federal government **of the U**nited **S**tates **is centered in** Washington **DC”**

#### C) Should means there is a practical reason for action

WordNet in ‘97

Princeton University, 1.6

**Should** v 1 : be expected to: “Parties should be fun” 2 : **expresses an** emotional**, practical,** or other **reason for doing something:** “You had better put on warm clothes”; “You should call your mother-in-law”; *“The State ought to repair bridges*”[syn**:** had better, ought]

#### 3. Vote Negative:

#### A) Decisionmaking - a limited topic of discussion that provides for equitable ground is key to decision-making and advocacy skills

Steinberg & Freeley 8

\*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45-

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Specifically, decisionmaking skills based on specific energy policy proposals are key to motivate legislative fence-sitters – the aff’s strategy is doomed to the status quo

Brown 11

[heath, PhD Political Science, Roanoke, Salem, VA, “narrative strategies used by interest groups during the 2008 presidental transition”, 2011 Pat-Net Conference]

Milbrath argues that interest groups must strategically present information so as to ¶ overcome the “perceptual screen” that shields policy makers from absorbing endless amounts ¶ of information. He suggests that groups use facts (scientific information about policy ¶ outcomes), arguments (normative explanations of justness or rightness of action), and power¶ (typically subtle offers of political support or threats of political retribution) to communicate ¶ their interests and make their case for policy action (or inaction). In a more recent approach, ¶ Esterling (2007, p. 79) makes the case that groups can use [using] “instrumental” – “research or ¶ evidence-based causal” arguments -- or “normative” – “intrinsic desirability” arguments. By ¶ emphasizing one of these approaches, a group is tacitly communicating the way it wants to ¶ persuade the target of the information. By emphasizing power or normative arguments, the ¶ group implies that the policy maker should make decisions based primarily on their political ¶ judgment and political future. Conversely, by emphasizing facts-based or instrumental ¶ arguments, the group implies that the policy maker should base decisions primarily on rational ¶ or scientific considerations. In practice, it is difficult to disentangle these two types of ¶ arguments and many groups will likely combine various ways to present information (Wright ¶ 1996; Rochefort and Cobb 1994). The dichotomy though does help clarify the persuasive or ¶ argumentative tone of the information and advice given by groups to policy makers. 6 ¶ While public perceptions of interest groups might suggest crass self-interest, ¶ manipulation, and deception, groups have an incentive to be forthright in the information they ¶ provide and arguments they make. A group that provides shoddy statistics or misleading ¶ arguments will be discounted in future interactions with the policy maker (Kersh 2009; ¶ Easterling 2007). John E. Chubb (1983, p. 145) writes in regard to energy interest groups: ¶ “information and advice that are solely self-serving threaten the bond of trust that facilitates ¶ the informal play of influence.” In fact, rather than targeting political opponents or fence ¶ sitters, much research suggests that groups prefer or are invited to lobby friends and allies over ¶ adversaries (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, 1999; Hall and Deardorff ¶ 2006; Bauer et al. 1963; Holyoke 2004; McCool 1990). If this is the case, the cost of ¶ misrepresenting or overstating information may be particularly high for those engaged in what ¶ Hall and Deardorff (2006) and others have called “legislative subsidy” (Hall and Deardorff 2006; ¶ Esterling 2007a). From this subsidy perspective, if a policy maker is sub-contracting information ¶ collection and analysis to an allied interest group, it behooves that group to be conscientious, ¶ thorough, and consistent in the information and advice it gives. And in many cases, as Wright ¶ (1996) contends, it is relatively easy for policy makers to check the authenticity of the ¶ information provided to them, sometimes simply through the contradictory information ¶ provided by other groups, thereby curtailing the inclination to blatantly misrepresent the truth. ¶ Furthermore, experimental research shows that factual or instrumental information is ¶ preferred by legislative staff (LaPira 2008) and neutral expert lobbyists have more legislative ¶ access than non-experts (Esterling 2007b). Facts may be useful on their own terms in ¶ formulating legislative decisions but scientific or statistically based arguments also serve as a 7 ¶ cue for policy makers to determine the credibility or reliability of the advice they are given ¶ (Sabatier 1978). ¶ Rather than convince those already in agreement, the approach taken by proactive ¶ theorists suggests that groups seek to convince legislative fence sitters or opponents to adopt ¶ the group’s position, advocate the group’s interests, or simply vote in the group’s way through ¶ the offer of, or refusal to give, political support (Smith 1984; Austen-Smith and Wright 1994; ¶ Wright 1996). Wright (1990) for one finds that groups which distribute campaign contributions ¶ to a wide group of legislators are then able to access a wider group, rather than just political ¶ allies (Wright 1990). Similarly, Heberling (2005) shows that one group, the AFL-CIO, seeks out ¶ legislators with unknown political preferences rather than targeting political allies (Heberling ¶ 2005). The field of interest group research has not yet resolved whether groups typically lobby ¶ friends, adversaries, or some combination of the two (Leech and Baumgartner 1998). This is ¶ likely due to the wide variation of group types and also policy domains in which groups operate. ¶ These inter-organizational and inter-policy differences affect the strategies employed and ¶ therefore the content of information presented during lobbying.

#### Switch-side is key to making those decisionmaking skills effective – EPA debates prove

Mitchell 10

(Gordon R., Associate Professor, Director of Graduate Studies, and Director of the William Pitt Debating Union at the University of Pittsburgh; Spring, “Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 1 – Kurr)

The preceding analysis of U.S. intelligence community debating initiatives highlighted how analysts are challenged to navigate discursively the heteroglossia of vast amounts of different kinds of data flowing through intelligence streams. Public policy planners are tested in like manner when they attempt to stitch together institutional arguments from various and sundry inputs ranging from expert testimony, to historical precedent, to public comment. Just as intelligence managers find that algorithmic, formal methods of analysis often don't work when it comes to the task of interpreting and synthesizing copious amounts of disparate data, public-policy planners encounter similar challenges. In fact, the argumentative turn in public-policy planning elaborates an approach to public-policy analysis that foregrounds deliberative interchange and critical thinking as alternatives to "decisionism," the formulaic application of "objective" decision algorithms to the public policy process. Stating the matter plainly, Majone suggests, "whether in written or oral form, argument is central in all stages of the policy process." Accordingly, he notes, "we miss a great deal if we try to understand policy-making solely in terms of power, influence, and bargaining, to the exclusion of debate and argument."51 One can see similar rationales driving Goodwin and Davis's EPA debating project, where debaters are invited to conduct on-site public debates covering resolutions crafted to reflect key points of stasis in the EPA decision-making process. For example, in the 2008 Water Wars debates held at EPA headquarters in Washington, D.C., resolutions were crafted to focus attention on the topic of water pollution, with one resolution focusing on downstream states' authority to control upstream states' discharges and sources of pollutants, and a second resolution exploring the policy merits of bottled water and toilet paper taxes as revenue sources to fund water infrastructure projects. In the first debate on interstate river pollution, the team of Seth Gannon and Seungwon Chung from Wake Forest University argued in favor of downstream state control, with the Michigan State University team of Carly Wunderlich and Garrett Abelkop providing opposition. In the second debate on taxation policy, Kevin Kallmyer and Matthew Struth from University of Mary Washington defended taxes on bottled water and toilet paper, while their opponents from Howard University, Dominique Scott and Jarred McKee, argued against this proposal. Reflecting on the project, Goodwin noted how the intercollegiate [End Page 106] debaters' ability to act as "honest brokers" in the policy arguments contributed positively to internal EPA deliberation on both issues.52 Davis observed that since the invited debaters "didn't have a dog in the fight," they were able to give voice to previously buried arguments that some EPA subject matter experts felt reticent to elucidate because of their institutional affiliations.53 Such findings are consistent with the views of policy analysts advocating the argumentative turn in policy planning. As Majone claims, "Dialectical confrontation between generalists and experts often succeeds in bringing out unstated assumptions, conflicting interpretations of the facts, and the risks posed by new projects."54 Frank Fischer goes even further in this context, explicitly appropriating rhetorical scholar Charles Willard's concept of argumentative "epistemics" to flesh out his vision for policy studies: Uncovering the epistemic dynamics of public controversies would allow for a more enlightened understanding of what is at stake in a particular dispute, making possible a sophisticated evaluation of the various viewpoints and merits of different policy options. In so doing, the differing, often tacitly held contextual perspectives and values could be juxtaposed; the viewpoints and demands of experts, special interest groups, and the wider public could be directly compared; and the dynamics among the participants could be scrutizined. This would by no means sideline or even exclude scientific assessment; it would only situate it within the framework of a more comprehensive evaluation.55 As Davis notes, institutional constraints present within the EPA communicative milieu can complicate efforts to provide a full airing of all relevant arguments pertaining to a given regulatory issue. Thus, intercollegiate debaters can play key roles in retrieving and amplifying positions that might otherwise remain sedimented in the policy process. The dynamics entailed in this symbiotic relationship are underscored by deliberative planner John Forester, who observes, "If planners and public administrators are to make democratic political debate and argument possible, they will need strategically located allies to avoid being fully thwarted by the characteristic self-protecting behaviors of the planning organizations and bureaucracies within which they work."56 Here, an institution's need for "strategically located allies" to support deliberative practice constitutes the demand for rhetorically informed expertise, setting up what can be considered a demand-driven rhetoric of science. As an instance of rhetoric of science scholarship, this type of "switch-side public [End Page 107] debate"57 differs both from insular contest tournament debating, where the main focus is on the pedagogical benefit for student participants, and first-generation rhetoric of science scholarship, where critics concentrated on unmasking the rhetoricity of scientific artifacts circulating in what many perceived to be purely technical spheres of knowledge production.58 As a form of demand-driven rhetoric of science, switch-side debating connects directly with the communication field's performative tradition of argumentative engagement in public controversy—a different route of theoretical grounding than rhetorical criticism's tendency to locate its foundations in the English field's tradition of literary criticism and textual analysis.59 Given this genealogy, it is not surprising to learn how Davis's response to the EPA's institutional need for rhetorical expertise took the form of a public debate proposal, shaped by Davis's dual background as a practitioner and historian of intercollegiate debate. Davis competed as an undergraduate policy debater for Howard University in the 1970s, and then went on to enjoy substantial success as coach of the Howard team in the new millennium. In an essay reviewing the broad sweep of debating history, Davis notes, "Academic debate began at least 2,400 years ago when the scholar Protagoras of Abdera (481–411 BC), known as the father of debate, conducted debates among his students in Athens."60 As John Poulakos points out, "older" Sophists such as Protagoras taught Greek students the value of dissoi logoi, or pulling apart complex questions by debating two sides of an issue.61 The few surviving fragments of Protagoras's work suggest that his notion of dissoi logoi stood for the principle that "two accounts [logoi] are present about every 'thing,' opposed to each other," and further, that humans could "measure" the relative soundness of knowledge claims by engaging in give-and-take where parties would make the "weaker argument stronger" to activate the generative aspect of rhetorical practice, a key element of the Sophistical tradition.62 Following in Protagoras's wake, Isocrates would complement this centrifugal push with the pull of synerchésthé, a centripetal exercise of "coming together" deliberatively to listen, respond, and form common social bonds.63 Isocrates incorporated Protagorean dissoi logoi into synerchésthé, a broader concept that he used flexibly to express interlocking senses of (1) inquiry, as in groups convening to search for answers to common questions through discussion;64 (2) deliberation, with interlocutors gathering in a political setting to deliberate about proposed courses of action;65 and (3) alliance formation, a form of collective action typical at festivals,66 or in the exchange of pledges that deepen social ties.67 [End Page 108] Returning once again to the Kettering-informed sharp distinction between debate and deliberation, one sees in Isocratic synerchésthé, as well as in the EPA debating initiative, a fusion of debate with deliberative functions. Echoing a theme raised in this essay's earlier discussion of intelligence tradecraft, such a fusion troubles categorical attempts to classify debate and deliberation as fundamentally opposed activities. The significance of such a finding is amplified by the frequency of attempts in the deliberative democracy literature to insist on the theoretical bifurcation of debate and deliberation as an article of theoretical faith. Tandem analysis of the EPA and intelligence community debating initiatives also brings to light dimensions of contrast at the third level of Isocratic synerchésthé, alliance formation. The intelligence community's Analytic Outreach initiative invites largely one-way communication flowing from outside experts into the black box of classified intelligence analysis. On the contrary, the EPA debating program gestures toward a more expansive project of deliberative alliance building. In this vein, Howard University's participation in the 2008 EPA Water Wars debates can be seen as the harbinger of a trend by historically black colleges and universities (HBCUS) to catalyze their debate programs in a strategy that evinces Davis's dual-focus vision. On the one hand, Davis aims to recuperate Wiley College's tradition of competitive excellence in intercollegiate debate, depicted so powerfully in the feature film The Great Debaters, by starting a wave of new debate programs housed in HBCUS across the nation.68 On the other hand, Davis sees potential for these new programs to complement their competitive debate programming with participation in the EPA's public debating initiative. This dual-focus vision recalls Douglas Ehninger's and Wayne Brockriede's vision of "total" debate programs that blend switch-side intercollegiate tournament debating with forms of public debate designed to contribute to wider communities beyond the tournament setting.69 Whereas the political telos animating Davis's dual-focus vision certainly embraces background assumptions that Greene and Hicks would find disconcerting—notions of liberal political agency, the idea of debate using "words as weapons"70—there is little doubt that the project of pursuing environmental protection by tapping the creative energy of HBCU-leveraged dissoi logoi differs significantly from the intelligence community's effort to improve its tradecraft through online digital debate programming. Such difference is especially evident in light of the EPA's commitment to extend debates to public realms, with the attendant possible benefits unpacked by Jane Munksgaard and Damien Pfister: [End Page 109] Having a public debater argue against their convictions, or confess their indecision on a subject and subsequent embrace of argument as a way to seek clarity, could shake up the prevailing view of debate as a war of words. Public uptake of the possibility of switch-sides debate may help lessen the polarization of issues inherent in prevailing debate formats because students are no longer seen as wedded to their arguments. This could transform public debate from a tussle between advocates, with each public debater trying to convince the audience in a Manichean struggle about the truth of their side, to a more inviting exchange focused on the content of the other's argumentation and the process of deliberative exchange.71 Reflection on the EPA debating initiative reveals a striking convergence among (1) the expressed need for dissoi logoi by government agency officials wrestling with the challenges of inverted rhetorical situations, (2) theoretical claims by scholars regarding the centrality of argumentation in the public policy process, and (3) the practical wherewithal of intercollegiate debaters to tailor public switch-side debating performances in specific ways requested by agency collaborators. These points of convergence both underscore previously articulated theoretical assertions regarding the relationship of debate to deliberation, as well as deepen understanding of the political role of deliberation in institutional decision making. But they also suggest how decisions by rhetorical scholars about whether to contribute switch-side debating acumen to meet demand-driven rhetoric of science initiatives ought to involve careful reflection. Such an approach mirrors the way policy planning in the "argumentative turn" is designed to respond to the weaknesses of formal, decisionistic paradigms of policy planning with situated, contingent judgments informed by reflective deliberation.

#### B) Dialogue - Unbridled affirmation makes research impossible and destroys dialogue in debate, making deliberation impossible – that makes limits a prior question

Hanghoj 8

http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf¶ Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008 ¶ Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish¶ Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of¶ Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have¶ taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the¶ Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab¶ Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant¶ professor.

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

### 1NC

#### The working class must coalesce in material action against financial exploitation especially in the context of energy planning. The aff’s notion of agency uniquely undermines the materialist anti-capitalist revolutionary knowledge key to survival

Callinicos 2k10

[Alex, Bonfire of Illusions: The Twin Crisis of the Liberal World, Polity, professor of European studies King’s College – London, DPhil – Oxford, p. 139-43]

There are other strong reasons to press for a break with the logic of competitive accumulation. The scientific evi-dence that the emission of greenhouse gases - most notably C02 - caused by human activity is generating profound and irreversible processes of climate change is now beyond dispute. It is also very widely agreed that preventing these processes reaching a disastrous scale requires the rapid adoption and implementation of drastic targets for cutting CO2 emissions. But while the targets, particularly since the eclipse of the Bush gang, have become more ambitious, the actual emissions have continued to rise. The most plausible explanation appeals to the logic of competition. The problem is, yet again, one of collective action. Evi- dently it is in everyone's interest to avoid drastic climate change. But no individual capital or state is willing to shoulder the additional costs involved in moving to a low- carbon economy. In international negotiations, the leading states play a game of pass-the-parcel - the US demanding that India and China adopt tough targets, the latter asking why they should bear the burden of two centuries of industrialization mainly in the North. The EU, despite its pre- tensions to be a master of 'soft power' that has transcended bad old nationalism, is particularly ineffectual. Germany has vocally and largely successfully defended its car firms against what they regarded as excessively tough targets. And the economic crisis has provided many governments with a perfect excuse to go slow in reducing reliance on fossil fuels. The logic of competitive accumulation here threatens the future of the human species.20 The implication is that any sustainable alternative to •capitalism has to be based, not on the market, but on democratic planning. In a democratically planned economy the allocation of resources would be the outcome of a democratic political process that would set overall priori- ties for the economy. There are some models of how this could work. One is Albert's Parecon, or participatory economics. This involves an economy of workers' and consumers' councils in which individuals and enterprises submit proposals for their share of society's resources and a process of gradual adjustments (Albert calls them 'iterations') takes place while technical experts come up with a plan that would give everyone as much as possible of what they want. The main weakness of this model is that it mimics a bit too closely the workings of a market economy, in which claims on resources are driven by individual demands. Albert is an anarchist, and his commitment to decentralization here goes too far. The allocation of society's resources isn't a neutral technical issue. It's a political question that requires some sort of collective and democratic decision-making process to choose between what would often be competing views of the priorities of the society in question. From this perspective, Pat Devine offers a superior model of what he calls negotiated coordination. Here the allocation of resources is largely the outcome of discussion between producers, consumers and other affected groups, but within the framework of overall decisions about economic priorities made democratically at the national and international level.21 Plainly there is much more to be said - and, above all, to be done - about democratic planning. All the same, the importance of the kind of work being done by Albert Devine and others is that they begin to break down the prejudice against planning and to sketch out how an economy that rejected the market could manage to be both democratic and efficient. But any break with capitalism couldn't take the form of an instantaneous leap into a fully planned economy. Marx long ago argued in the 'Critique of the Gotha Programme' that a new workers' state would inherit a society deeply marked by capitalism. Initially, it would have to make compromises with the old order, and gradually move towards a society governed by the communist principle 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!'22 Similarly today a government breaking with capitalism would need to make a decisive shift towards an economy in which priorities were decided democratically rather than left to the anarchy of competition. This would involve critically taking control of the financial markets, nationalizing under workers' control key sectors of the economy, and extending social provision on the basis of a progressive tax system that redistributed wealth and income from rich to poor. These measures, radical though they are, would still leave in place many aspects of a market economy. Large sectors would remain in private hands. Continuous pressure and the introduction of new mea- sures would be necessary to move the economy as a whole towards the principles of democratic planning. One key step would be to weaken the power of the capitalist labour market, which today rules our lives. In my view, the best way to do this would be to intro- duce universal direct income. In other words, every resi- dent of the country would receive, as of right, an income that met their basic needs at a relatively low but neverthe- less decent level. This would serve two goals. First, it would ensure a basic level of welfare for everyone much more efficiently than existing systems of social provision. (People with greater needs because they had children or were disabled or whatever would receive a higher basic income.) Secondly, having a guaranteed basic income would greatly reduce the pressure on individuals to accept whatever job was on offer on the labour market. One of the main presuppositions of capitalism - that workers have no acceptable alternative to wage labour - would be removed. The balance of power between labour and capital would shift towards the workers, irrespective of the nature of their employer.23 More broadly, the question of power is crucial. One obvious challenge to the kind of vision of change I have just sketched out is how to ensure that the direction of change would be towards a democratically planned economy rather than back to market capitalism or maybe to the kind of state capitalism that ended up dominating the Soviet Union. The only guarantee that counts is that levers of political power are in the hands of the workers and the poor themselves. As long as the state takes the form that it does today, of a bureaucratically organized, hierarchical set of apparatuses whose managers' interests are bound up with those of capital, any improvement in society can only be temporary and fragile. This is why the strategy of ignoring the state advocated by Holloway is so badly mistaken. If we are to move towards a democratically planned economy, then the existing state has to be confronted and broken. This task can only be achieved through the development of a different kind of power, one based on the self- organization of workers and other poor people that devel- ops out of their struggles against capital. The great revolutionary movements of the twentieth century offered some glimpses of this power - from the workers' and sol- diers' councils of the Russian Revolution of October 1917 to the workers' shoras during the Iranian Revolution of 1978-9. The self-organization displayed by the Bolivian popular movement during the insurrections of October 2003 and May-June 2005 showed that the contemporary movements against neoliberalism can generate this kind of power as well.24 A democratically planned economy would be the core of a self-managing society, one in which directly elected workplace and neighbourhood councils took responsibil- ity for their own affairs and linked together to make deci- sions for society at large. The key insight that Marx had during the Paris Commune of 1871 was that these forms of organization would develop before the new society was created, in the process of fighting the old society. The same methods of self-organization that would be the basis of a self-managing society are needed by the exploited and oppressed to resist and, ultimately, to overthrow capital itself. The overthrow of capital is itself a process. The dilemma that Albert imagines confronting a workers' cooperative in a market economy would face any society that was beginning to introduce the principles of democratic plan- ning in a world still ruled by capitalism. It was responsible for the corruption and eventual destruction of the Russian Revolution of October 1917. Any breakthrough in one part of the world could only survive by spreading and progressively overturning the logic of capital on a global scale. The globalization of capital has produced a global- ization of resistance. Struggles in different parts of the world contaminate each other. Chiapas and Seattle had global reverberations. The two European countries with the most advanced and combative social movements, France and Greece, have exerted a degree of mutual influ- ence on one another. The movements in Latin America have become a beacon to all those fighting neoliberalism. "We are still a very long way from overturning capitalism even in one country. Indeed, the more one seeks to elabo- rate on the shape of an alternative to capitalism the more one is overawed by the immensity of the task. The biggest immediate obstacle that confronts anyone seeking to address it is the chronic political weakness of the radical anticapitalist left on a global scale. Nevertheless, the present crisis has torn a huge hole in neoliberalism both as an ideology and as a mode of organizing capital- ism. The market no longer seems like a second nature unamenable to change or control. Those who are prepared to seize this moment boldly can help to ensure that the boundaries of the possible really are widened, allowing the billions of victims of capitalism finally to escape.

#### The affirmative’s claim to performatively effect change locates agency in rhetorical performances like the precious 1ac. this shuts down materialist coalitional anti-capitalist movements.

GUNN AND CLOUD 2K10

[Joshua gunn and dana cloud, Phd Communicatoins, University of Texas Austin, Agentic Orientation as magical Voluntarism, Communication Theory]

Notably, Campbell’s statement on the status of agency does not attempt to reverse the posthumanist turn, but rather, sets out to reconcile the theoretical perspectives of Judith Butler and Michelle Balif with close textual reading practices that, until the crisis of agency, were assumed to have singular, self-transparent authors. Similarly,¶ John Lucaites’ call to jettison agency as a concept and locate power, instead, in historically particular rhetorical performances ‘‘in relationship to a set of perceived or constituted tensions . . . between cultural, institutional, and technological norms and structures’’ is a theoretical compromise: Agency is best understood on a caseby-case basis, leading to a multiplicity of conceptions of agency (Lucaites, 2003, paras. 1–2). Carolyn R. Miller’s (2007) recharacterization of agency as an attribution that makes certain kinds of symbolic action possible also ﬁgures a subject’s actions between the constraints of an exterior and the motives of an interior. The most widely known, explicitly dialectical positions on agency in rhetorical studies, however, are those of James Arnt Aune, Dana Cloud, and other Marxist critics. For example, critical of certain posthumanist theories of agency (namely, those of Greene 1998; 2004; 2007), Cloud, Macek, & Aune (2006) argue that social groups, especially class-based groups, harbor a capacity for political action grounded in their material circumstances: Either workers and their allies claim the real agency of that they possess and take the chance of making a world in which they are free in body as well as mind; or they resign themselves to generation after generation of grinding exploitation, settling for the meaningful but insufﬁcient consolations of sporadic, creative, ungrounded, and symbolic resistance. (2006, p. 81) Cloud, Macek, & Aune (2006) argue not only that ordinary people must mobilize collectively in order to pressure or overthrow employers and institutions, but also that it is the intersection of consciousness and experience that is generative of agency. In other words, as Cloud (2005) explains, working class agency is a product of both the experience of embodied labor and explicit political intervention and collective organizing. Agency in this view is not primarily characteristic of individuals; rather, the working class is a particular kind of collective agent that can manifest a real challenge to the capitalist system. In contrast, to believe that one can individually effect political change, or worse, to believe that one is powerless to effect political change, is to succumb to oppressive structures, economic and otherwise. Again, agency is located in the tensions between a larger structure and the (collective)¶ subject (also see Jameson, 1977).

#### Alternative text: vote negative to reject the 1ac in favor of materialist revolutionary knowledge production against capitalism.

#### Ecological catastrophe necessitates materialist revolutionary dialectics against capitalism’s exploitation to ensure survival.

Foster 2k11

[john bellamy,  professor of sociology at the University of Oregon and also editor of Monthly Review, Since the Great Financial Crisis hit in 2008, Foster has been sought out by academics, activists, the media, and the general public as a result of his earlier prescient writings on the coming crisis. He has given numerous interviews, talks, and invited lectures, as well as written invited commentary, articles, and books on the subject]

In the twenty-first century it is customary to view the rise of planetary ecological problems as a surprising development scarcely conceivable prior to the last few decades. It is here, however, that we have the most to learn from the analysis of nineteenth-century thinkers who played a role in the development of ecology, including both early ecological scientists and classical historical materialists. Science has long warned of the negative, destructive side of the human transformation of the earth—a warning which the system, driven by its own imperatives, has continually sought to downplay. Indeed, what distinguishes our time from earlier centuries is not so much the conservation of catastrophe, which has long been recognized, but rather the accelerated pace at which such destruction is now manifesting itself, i.e., what I am calling the accumulation of catastrophe. The desertification arising in pre-capitalist times, partly through human action, manifested itself over centuries, even millennia. Today changes in the land, the atmosphere, the oceans, indeed the entire life-support system of the earth, are the product of mere decades. If in the past, Darwin was struck that in a mere three centuries after European colonization, the ecology of the island of St. Helena had been destroyed to the point that it was reduced to “desert”—today, in only two generations, we have altered the biogeochemical processes of the entire planet.28The absence of a historical perspective on the conservation, even accumulation, of catastrophe is a major barrier to needed change in our time. Many environmentalists, including some who perceive themselves as being on the left, persist in believing that we can address our immense and growing ecological problems without altering our fundamental social-production relationships. All that is necessary in this view is the combined magic of green technology and green markets. Short-term fixes are presumed to be adequate solutions, while society remains on the same essential course as before. Indeed, the dominant perspective on ecology can be characterized, I believe, as consisting of three successive stages of denial: (1) the denial altogether of the planetary ecological crisis (or its human cause); (2) the denial that the ecological crisis is fundamentally due to the system of production in which we live, namely capitalism; and (3) the denial that capitalism is constitutionally incapable of overcoming this global ecological threat—with capital now being presented instead as the savior of the environment.The first stage of ecological denial is easy to understand. This is the form of denial represented by Exxon-Mobil. Such outright denial of the destructive consequences of their actions is the automatic response of corporations generally when faced with the prospect of environmental regulations, which would negatively affect their bottom lines. It is also the form of absolute denial promoted by climate-change denialists themselves, who categorically reject the reality of human agency in global climate change. The second stage of denial, a retreat from the first, is to admit there is a problem, while dissociating it from the larger socioeconomic system. The famous IPAT formula, i.e. Environmental Impact = Population x Consumption x Technology (which amounts to saying that these are the three factors behind our environmental problems/solutions), has been used by some to suggest that population growth, the consumption habits of most individuals, and inappropriate technology carry the totality of blame for environmental degradation. The answer then is sustainable population, sustainable consumption, and sustainable technology. This approach, though seemingly matter-of-fact, and deceptively radical, derives its acceptability for the vested interests from the fact that it generally serves to disguise the more fundamental reality of the treadmill of capitalist production itself.29 The third stage of denial, a last-ditch defense, and exhibiting a greater level of desperation on the part of the established order, is, I would argue, the most dangerous of all. It admits that the environmental crisis is wrapped up with the existence of capitalism, but argues that what we need is an entirely new kind of capitalism: variously called “sustainable capitalism,” “green capitalism,” “natural capitalism,” and “climate capitalism” by thinkers as various as Al Gore, Paul Hawken, Amory and L. Hunter Lovins, and Jonathon Porritt.30 The argument here varies but usually begins with the old trope that capitalism is the most efficient economic system possible—a form of “spontaneous order” arising from an invisible hand—and that the answer to ecological problems is to make it more efficient still by internalizing costs on the environment previously externalized by the system. Aside from the presumed magic of the market itself, and moral claims as to “the greening of corporations,” this is supposed to be achieved by means of a black box of technological wonders. Implicit in all such views is the notion that capitalism can be made sustainable, without altering its accumulation or economic growth imperative and without breaking with the dominant social relations. The exponential growth of the system ad infinitum is possible, we are told, while simultaneously generating a sustainable relation to the planet. This of course runs up against what Herman Daly has called the Impossibility Theorem: If the whole world were to have an ecological footprint the size of the United States we would need multiple planets.31 The idea that such a development process can persist permanently on a single planet (and indeed that we are not at this point already confronting earthly limits) is of course an exercise in delusion, bordering on belief in the supernatural. “Capitalism,” as the great environmental economist K. William Kapp once wrote, is “an economy of unpaid costs.”32 It can persist and even prosper only insofar as it is able to externalize its costs on the mass of the population and the surrounding environment. Whenever the destruction is too severe the system simply seeks to engineer another spatial fix. Yet, a planetary capitalism is from this standpoint a contradiction in terms: it means that there is nowhere finally to externalize the social and environmental costs of capitalist destruction (we cannot ship our toxic waste into outer space!), and no external resources to draw upon in the face of the enormous squandering of resources inherent to the system (we can’t solve our problems by mining the moon!). Market-based solutions to climate change, such as emissions trading, have been shown to promote profits, and to facilitate economic growth and financial wealth, while increasing carbon emissions. From an environmental standpoint, therefore, they are worse than nothing—since they stand in the way of effective action. Nor are the technologies most acceptable to the system (since not requiring changes in property relations) the answer. So-called “clean coal” or carbon capture and storage technologies are economically unfeasible and ecologically dubious, and serve mainly as an ideological justification for keeping coal-fired plants going. Worse still, are geoengineering schemes like dumping sulfur particles in the atmosphere or iron filings in the ocean (the first in order to deflect the sun’s rays, the second in order to promote algal growth to increase ocean absorption of carbon). These schemes carry with them the potential for even greater ecological disasters: in the first case, this could lead to a reduction of photosynthesis, in the second the expansion of dead zones. Remember the Sorcerer’s Apprentice!33 The potential for the accumulation of catastrophe on a truly planetary level as a result of geoengineering technology is so great that it would be absolute folly to proceed in this way—simply in order to avoid changes in the mode of production, i.e., a fundamental transformation of our way of life, property relations, and metabolism with nature. Science tells us that we are crossing planetary boundaries everywhere we look, from climate change, to ocean acidification, to species destruction, to freshwater shortages, to chemical pollution of air, water, soil, and humans. The latest warning sign is the advent of what is called “extreme weather”—a direct outgrowth of climate change. As Hansen says: “Global warming increases the intensity of droughts and heat waves, and thus the area of forest fires. However, because a warmer atmosphere holds more water vapor, global warming must also increase the intensity of the other extreme of the hydrologic cycle—meaning heavier rains, more extreme floods, and more intense storms driven by latent heat.” Scientists involved in the new area of climate-attribution science, where extreme weather events are examined for their climate signatures, are now arguing that we are rapidly approaching a situation where the proverbial “‘hundred-year’ flood” no longer occurs simply once a century, but every few years. Natural catastrophes are thus likely to become more severe and more frequent occurrences in the lives of all living beings. The hope of some scientists is that this will finally wake up humanity to its true danger.34 How are we to understand the challenge of the enormous accumulation of catastrophe, and the no less massive human action required to address this? In the 1930s John Maynard Keynes wrote an essay entitled “Economic Possibilities of Our Grandchildren,” aimed at defending capitalism in response to revolutionary social challenges then arising. Keynes argued that we should rely for at least a couple more generations on the convenient lie of the Smithian invisible hand—accepting greed as the basis of a spontaneous economic order. We should therefore continue the pretense that “fair is foul and foul is fair” for the sake of the greater accumulation of wealth in society that such an approach would bring. Eventually, in the time of our “grandchildren”—maybe a “hundred years” hence (i.e., by the early 2030s)—Keynes assumed, the added wealth created by these means would be great enough that we could begin to tell the truth: that foul is foul and fair is fair. It would then be necessary for humanity to address the enormous inequalities and injustices produced by the system, engaging in a full-scale redistribution of wealth, and a radical transformation of the ends of production.35 Yet, the continued pursuit of Keynes’s convenient lie over the last eight decades has led to a world far more polarized and beset with contradictions than he could have foreseen. It is a world prey to the enormous unintended consequences of accumulation without limits: namely, global economic stagnation, financial crisis, and planetary ecological destruction. Keynes, though aware of some of the negative economic aspects of capitalist production, had no real understanding of the ecological perils—of which scientists had already long been warning. Today these perils are impossible to overlook. Faced with impending ecological catastrophe, it is more necessary than ever to abandon Keynes’s convenient lie and espouse the truth: that foul is foul and fair is fair. Capitalism, the society of “après moi le déluge!” is a system that fouls its own nest—both the human-social conditions and the wider natural environment on which it depends. The accumulation of capital is at the same time accumulation of catastrophe, not only for a majority of the world’s people, but living species generally. Hence, nothing is fairer—more just, more beautiful, and more necessary—today than the struggle to overthrow the regime of capital and to create a system of substantive equality and sustainable human development; a socialism for the twenty-first century.

### Case

#### The Space Trader tale actively MUTES and erases the historical voices of white abolistionists and cynically dismisses any involvement by white persons as an immediate failure to challenge racism. This leads to cycles of reverse racism and internalization which turn the case and deny solvency for the aff.

Clark 96

[Leroy d. a critique of professor derrick a bell’s thesis of the permanence of racism and his strategy of confrontation”, professor of law catholic university, Denver university law review, 73:1]

Professor Bell argues that whites, perceiving a benefit for themselves, control black progress towards equality.25 A corollary to this theme is¶ "Racism's Secret Bonding": whites, especially poor and working class whites, ignore their common class interests with poor and working class blacks in their avid search to bond with other whites against blacks.26¶ These last notions come together in "The Space Traders."" If "The Afrolantica Awakening" is Professor Bell's suppressed dream of wholesale emigration, then "The Space Traders" is his nightmare of wholesale expulsion. In the story, a strange unrecognizable group from another planet comes to America and proposes a deal: if all African-Americans are forced on to their spaceships for a return to their home star, they will provide gold, chemicals to cleanse the environment, a safe nuclear engine, and fuel. The offer comes during a conservative administration not supported by blacks (read Reagan- Bush). The Space Trader's proposal is debated, but exclusively in terms of the interests of whites. Whites recruit a black conservative professor (Golightly) to urge blacks to agree to leave. Golightly is promised a personal escape before¶ the mass expulsion. Golightly urges black leaders to support the proposal as a trick to get whites to oppose it. The black leaders distrust Golightly and dis- miss his strategy. Finally, the administration argues that it is blacks' patriotic duty to leave America for the general welfare, and achieves a constitutional provision to accommodate the same.¶ "The Space Traders" is Professor Bell's projection of a future holocaust for African-Americans. I prefer to relate the story to the American past, and confront the question of whether, lurking in the wings for blacks, there is an American version of the Nazi "final solution." From one perspective, the se- cession of the Southern States from the Union, which precipitated our Civil War, is as close as America has come to the ominous threat to expel blacks that Professor Bell creates fictionally in "The Space Traders." Rebellious white southerners proposed taking black slaves into a separate land-the plantation. The pay-off to the North was the end of strife and conflict over the importation of slaves, and the end of a nation divided into territories where slaves could or could not be owned.¶ The actual history of this near "holocaust" for blacks contradicts Professor Bell's predictions. White abolitionists saw the Confederates as the "Space Traders" of their day, and fought a bloody and costly Civil War to successful- ly prevent blacks from being carried off into the continued hell of slavery. None of this history of positive white involvement in ending slavery is recog- nized in *Faces;* rather, Professor Bell excoriates "television writers" of Alex¶ Haley's novel, *Roots,* for creating "good white folks" who "eased the slaves' anguish," thus absolving white viewers from "recognizing American slavery as¶ a burden on the nation's history."2 The eminent historian, John Hope Frank- lin, claimed that many abolitionists were committed to ending slavery out of moral and religious conviction, without concomitant limited personal self- interests.29 **By** contrast, Professor Bell, in an article, asserts that the constitu- tional amendments freeing the slaves and giving them the vote were designed to keep the Republican party in office."¶ Milner Ball, writing, ironically, to defend Professor Bell from criticisms made by Randall Kennedy, said: "[P]eople possessed by an ideology 'are simply no longer able to see certain facts.".'3' This statement may well cap- ture Professor Bell's dilemma. He appears to be operating out of a tightly wound ideology that most whites cannot be trusted, even-if one is referenc- ing poor whites-to act in their *own* best interest-and that whites always subvert black interests.¶ This ideology requires Professor Bell to proclaim, and more importantly, believe, that "[n]obody can free us but ourselves,"32 and that "few whites are ready to actively promote civil rights for blacks."33 Thus, *Faces* includes blacks martyred or exiled during the freedom struggle. 4 There is, however,¶ o mention of the hundreds of white students who joined the civil rights movement in dangerous areas in the South during the 1960s, or of those like Michael Schwerner and Andrew Goodman, who were murdered because of their involvement. 5 Ostensibly sympathetic white female characters appear in only two"instances in *Faces,*and both are stick figures designed to underscore Professor Bell's themes of black danger, pain, and impending defeat.36¶ Nowhere in *Faces* or *Confronting Authority* is there a recognition of the long history of effective white cooperation with blacks in ending segregation, such as the fact that two major civil rights organizations, the NAACP and the Urban League, originated with whites and blacks acting cooperatively.37 No- where in either book is there a recognition of white financing of the civil rights movement. Black lawyers, like Charlie Houston and Thurgood Marshall, theorized the legal battle to end state-enforced racial segregation, but when Professor Bell and I were lawyers for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, at least one third of the lawyers were white."s¶ Indeed, from the very beginning, some talented and dedicated whites have been critical actors producing positive results in the black freedom struggle. That they may only have been the "few" whites that Professor Bell claims would "actively support civil rights for blacks" does not defeat the point. Most movements began with a "few." The larger public, white *and* black, becomes educated and drawn toward their direction. Those few, however, must possess special resources; they must, like President Lincoln, occupy a pivotal position, or must be especially dedicated, strategically smart, and talented.39¶ One would not expect a heroic, self-sacrificing stance, which is **by** defini- tion unique, from the bulk of the white American public. Naturally, the masses of whites, and their leaders, will embrace a direction more rapidly when their interests are fostered. That does not, per se, stamp whites as having low char- acter, for blacks as a group are no different than whites in that regard. Blacks completely sacrificed their own interests only when they were forced to do so--during slavery. While black and white interests can diverge, there is no inherent antagonism when there is a simple demand for racial integration.' Whites and blacks may benefit in different ways and thus have different moti- vations for seeking racial equality, but in the long run, both groups will enjoy a less strife-ridden, more harmonious society.4 Indeed, why bemoan the fact, as Professor Bell does, that white interests can be fostered while black inter- ests are served? Blacks should give the highest priority to circumstances which satisfy mutual interests; those advances will be the most stable and enduring.

#### Turn: the aff relies on a static notion of whiteness as white supremacy- that politics contributes to the project of white supremacy.

Michael J. **Monahan,** Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Marquette University, Racial Justice and the Politics of Purity, 20**08**, <http://www.temple.edu/isrst/Events/documents/MichaelMonahanUpdated.doc>

The abolitionist/elimitavist position demands that any legitimately anti-racist endeavor stand simultaneously as a rejection of race, or at least racialized identity. As Alcoff and Outlaw have argued (though in different ways), this demands that one have an ahistorical sense of identity – that one reject the way in which one’s “interpretive horizon” has been positioned by one’s racial membership. Again, this is because the abolitionist ontology both reduces whiteness to white supremacy – whiteness just is – purely - an affirmation of white supremacy, and offers an effectively disembodied account of agency, such that the only way to be anti-racist is to reject whiteness. But what I have been trying to show is the way in which the history of white people has always been one of ambiguity and contestation over the meaning of whiteness (and that the same is true, though in different ways, for members of all racial categories). The history is one of different people who were white in certain important ways, but were not white in other ways, or at least were white in ways different from other white people, engaging in a process of arbitrating the meaning and significance of that whiteness. Part of the project of white supremacy, therefore, was not merely the domination of non whites, but the determination of the meaning of whiteness as fixed, given, and above all, pure. It is a history of brutal conquest, genocide, chattel slavery, torture, and Jim Crow, and by no means do I wish to suggest that we ignore or “white wash” that history. But it is also the history of John Brown, Sophie Scholl, the San Patricio Brigade, and, among others, those Irish servants in Barbados who risked their lives alongside enslaved Africans. The insistence that antiracism must reject whiteness – that John Brown, in struggling against white supremacy, was therefore not white –capitulates to the politics of purity. ¶ We must understand racial membership, therefore, not as a static and pure category of identity, but as an ongoing context for negotiating who “we” are (both as individuals and as groups) and how we relate to each other. Because races, like all social categories, are historical, and this history gives them meaning and significance, their reality is manifest both politically (in how our social structures and organizations take shape and interact) and individually (in how we understand ourselves and our place in the world). But, and this is the crucial point for my approach, the histories themselves are histories of contestation of meaning, and fraught with ambiguity, such that we participate in the process of shaping the meaning of race not only in the here and now, but also its meaning and significance historically. The elimitavist ontology insists, therefore, not only on purity for racial categories themselves (one either is or is not white), but also employs a politics of purity in its approach to history. That is, it treats the history of whiteness purely as a history of white supremacy, and any individuals or groups who break politically with white supremacy thereby demonstrate their non-whiteness. What I am calling for is a rejection of purity in both of these senses. Racial memberships and the identities that go along with them never really function as all or nothing categories (though they may pretend to do exactly that), and to ignore white struggles against white supremacy is as much of an inadequate interpretation of history as it would be to ignore white affirmation of white supremacy. And this is true for all racial categories and identities. They are all fraught with ambiguity, indeterminacy, and even outright contradiction, and part of my claim is that the damage is done in large part by trying to conceive of them as purified of that ambiguity and contradiction, for it is that insistence on purity that links racial categories to oppressive norms.

#### Investments in nuclear power trade off with investment in renewables which are key to solve warming

Carbon Control News 7/7/2008

“Activists make new economic case against nuclear's climate benefits”, lexis

A number of new reports have emerged arguing that investments in nuclear power could contribute to climate change, rather than reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, because those investments would divert limited resources from more cost-effective clean energy alternatives. The reports aim to counter the nuclear industry's inroads in casting nuclear power as a solution to global warming and highlight the contentious nature of the debate over what role -- if any -- nuclear should play in federal polices to address climate change.  Presumptive Republican presidential nominee John McCain (AZ) has said his administration would seek to build 45 new nuclear power plants by 2030 in order to stave off the worst effects of global warming. Meanwhile, industry officials point out that nuclear power is currently the largest source of low-carbon power in the United States. Nuclear plants are also "the lowest-cost producer of base-load electricity," according to the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), with the costs of operating a plant amounting to 1.76 cents per kilowatt-hour.  But environmentalists are increasingly citing rising construction costs and lingering concerns surrounding the disposal of radioactive nuclear waste to claim nuclear energy is not a long-term solution to climate change. And some environmentalists are now arguing that by diverting resources from more cost-effective renewable and energy efficiency investments, proponents of nuclear energy may actually be making attempts to mitigate global warming more difficult. Yet in a recent article for the conservative Heritage Foundation, Jack Spencer and Nick Loris write that, "Nuclear power must be expanded if CO2 caps are to work." They argue that unlike wind and solar power, which are intermittent and incapable of providing consistent base-load energy, nuclear power is capable of meeting growing demand for energy without emitting greenhouse gases.  While environmentalists point to the high costs of constructing a plant, the authors maintain those costs are not as high when considered in the context of the full lifetime operation of a nuclear plant. In fact, they write that, "Given the low cost needed to operate a nuclear plant, lifetime costs are very low once the plant has been constructed. It is therefore difficult to conclude that wind or solar power should be built at all."  Currently, NEI estimates construction costs for a new nuclear plant to be between $6 billion and $7 billion, while the utility company Florida Power & Light, which has plans to construct two new nuclear reactors, recently estimated that costs for a single reactor could be as high as $12 billion. But Spencer and Loris write that, "Additional production will allow these costs to be spread, thus lowering costs overall. Further savings should be achieved by applying lessons learned from initial construction projects. Because nuclear plants could have an operating life of 80 years, the benefit could be well worth the cost."  But those arguments have prompted a rebuttal from environmentalists and some economists. In a paper recently released by the environmental think tank Rocky Mountain Institute, "The Nuclear Illusion," Amory Lovins and Imran Sheikh concede that nuclear power, at least from a climate change perspective, far outperforms coal power, which currently provides around half of U.S. electricity. But the authors argue that nuclear power's decentralized, low-carbon competitors -- wind, solar, hydro, and cogeneration power -- can displace more coal power per dollar at a faster pace.  "New nuclear power costs far more than its distributed competitors, so it buys far less coal displacement per dollar than the competing investments it stymies," the authors write. "And its higher relative cost than nearly all competitors, per unit of net CO2 displaced, means that every dollar invested in nuclear expansion will worsen climate change by buying less solution per dollar."  Sheikh tells Carbon Control News that he and Lovins wrote the article, in part, because, "We're seeing this perceived resurgence in nuclear power because it's carbon-zero, or roughly carbon-zero, and since climate change is becoming such a hot topic." The paper was released now, Sheikh says, as a way to counter the increased focus on nuclear power as an answer to climate change, and to show "we can offer more climate protection for less money" by pursing efficiency and small, decentralized electricity production -- what is termed "micropower." His advice for lawmakers? "Just let all types of generation and efficiency compete on a level playing field, and when that happens micropower will probably win."  That is an argument Sheikh and Lovins repeatedly make in their paper: let investors choose energy sources, not politicians, because subsidies will only distort the market and possibly delay effective action on climate change. The authors argue that "full U.S. deployment" of decentralized micropower, including recovered waste-heat cogeneration and wind power, and end-use efficiency measures could replace much of nuclear energy's current U.S. market share "without significant land-use, reliability, or other constraints, and with considerable gains in employment" -- and without federal subsidies.  In April testimony before the House Select Committee on Global Warming and Energy Independence, Lovins noted that nuclear energy has attracted "no private risk capital despite U.S. taxpayer subsidies that can now total about $13 billion per new nuclear plant--roughly its entire cost." While politicians may decide to approve further subsidies for nuclear, "Heroic efforts at near- or over-100% subsidization will continue to elicit the same response as defibrillating a corpse: it will jump, but it won't revive."

#### Positive feedbacks ensure runaway warming, causes extinction

Speth 2008

[James, dean of the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies at Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut. Currently he serves the school as the Carl W. Knobloch, Jr. Dean and Sara Shallenberger Brown Professor in the Practice of Environmental Policy, The Bridge @ the Edge of the World, pg. 26]

The possibility of abrupt climate change is linked to what may be the most problematic possibility of all—"positive" feedback effects where the initial warming has effects that generate more warming. Several of these feedbacks are possible. First, the land's ability to store carbon could weaken. Soils and forests can dry out or burn and release carbon; less plant growth can occur, thus reducing nature's ability to remove carbon from the air. Second, carbon sinks in the oceans could also be reduced due to ocean warming and other factors. Third, the potent greenhouse gas methane could be released from peat bogs, wetlands, and thawing permafrost, and even from the methane hydrates in the oceans, as the planet warms and changes. Finally, the earth's albedo, the reflectivity of the earth's surface, is slated to be reduced as large areas now covered by ice and snow diminish or are covered by meltwater. All these effects would tend to make warming self-reinforcing, possibly leading to a greatly amplified greenhouse effect. The real possibility of these amplifying feedbacks has alarmed some of our top scientists. James Hansen, the courageous NASA climate scientist, is becoming increasingly outspoken as his investigations lead him to more and more disturbing conclusions. He offered the following assessment in 2007: "Our home planet is now dangerously near a 'tipping point.' Human-made greenhouse gases are near a level such that important climate changes may proceed mostly under the climate system's own momentum. Impacts would include extermination of a large fraction of species on the planet, shifting of climatic zones due to an intensified hydrologic cycle with effects on freshwater availability and human health, and repeated worldwide coastal tragedies associated with storms and a continuously rising sea level. .. . "Civilization developed during the Holocene, a period of relatively tranquil climate now almost 12,000 years in duration. The planet has been warm enough to keep ice sheets off North America and Europe, but cool enough for ice sheets on Greenland and Antarctica to be stable. Now, with rapid warming of o.6°C in the past 30 years, global temperature is at its warmest level in the Holocene. "This warming has brought us to the precipice of a great 'tipping point” If we go over the edge, it will be a transition to 'a different planet,' an environment far outside the range that has been experienced by humanity. There will be no return within the lifetime of any generation that can be imagined, and the trip will exterminate a large fraction of species on the planet.

#### Unrestricted nuclear energy produces massive violence to native communities – causes colonization and genocide

Goldtooth in 2010

Tom B.K. Goldtooth is the Executive Director of The Indigenous Environmental Network, a network of indigenous communities worldwide. He is a leader of environmental and climate justice issues and the rights of Indigenous peoples. He is co-producer of an award-winning documentary Drumbeat For Mother Earth, which addresses the effects of bio-accumulative chemicals on indigenous communities. Wicazo Sa Review, fall 2010, The State of Indigenous America Series: Earth Mother, PiÃ±ons, and Apple Pie, pp 11-28, 2010.

The United States consumes a third of the resources of our sacred Earth Mother. This includes the resources of the oceans. This level of consumption that feeds the addictive appetite of the United States and its industrialized society causes continued intrusions and invasions into other peoples’ territories, including our indigenous homelands. A society based upon conquest and expropriation of the sacred is not sustainable. The current national and global economic system with its global corporations, fi nancial institutions, and governmental bureaucracies cannot survive without an ever-increasing supply of natural resources: forests, industrial agriculture, minerals, coal, uranium, oil and natural gas, fi sh, wildlife, water, and land. The dominant society’s economic paradigm, at all levels, places rapid economic growth, the quest for individual and corporate accumulation of wealth, and a race to exploit natural resources as its foundation. This economic system disregards the finite limits of Earth Mother in terms of natural resource availability, consumption, waste generation, and absorption. These issues continue to be compounded by the increasingly toxic nature and destructive practices of energy systems and mineral extractive industries, industrial-level agriculture, and a production system that creates wasteful by-products that few people want stored in their backyards. Many Tribal Nations are located in remote areas where municipal, industrial, federal, and military toxic and radioactive wastes continue to be dumped, burned, and stored. Recently, with the popularity of waste-to-energy incinerators and biomass plants, developers are coming into indigenous territories promoting these polluting facilities as green energy and green economy ventures. Our communities and villages are high health-risk communities from decades of radioactive and toxic exposure. There is a legacy of toxic chemicals disproportionately contaminating indigenous peoples. These chemicals bioaccumulate and biomagnify in the food chain of both processed foods and indigenous traditional and subsistence food systems. Most federal environmental, ecological, and health risk assessment management and assessment models do not protect the indigenous peoples of the United States, Canada, and the world. Our children are especially vulnerable. The current extraction of materials, the production of waste, and the level of consumption within industrial development are not sustainable. Indigenous peoples and indigenous organizations in North America and worldwide understand that Earth Mother and her resources cannot sustain the consumption and production needs of this modern industrialized society, including the waste that is created. This includes the high level of energy that is required to power up industrial production and consumption. Our communities still live in the reality of outdated, toxic, and unsustainable energy policies. Colonization has always been about land and who owns and controls it. Some of our indigenous traditional territories—full of coal, oil, gas, and uranium—are under attack by mining companies. Other sources of energy development such as large hydro dam projects in North America and throughout the world have flooded our territories, including our homelands, culture, history, and burial sites. This is not sustainable development. **P E A K O I L** The end of cheap energy, what is called “peak oil,” is bringing dramatic shifts in North America and the world. Depletions of inexpensive, or conventional, oil and gas supplies threaten the survival of industrial nations and industrialism itself, at its present scale. Long distance transportation, industrial food systems, complex urban and suburban systems, and many market commodities basic to our present way of life, including autos, plastics, chemicals, pesticides, and refrigeration, are all rooted in the basic assumption of an ever-increasing, inexpensive energy supply. This is not sustainable. Unconventional oil and fossil fuel reserves remain plentiful, but have not been economically feasible to obtain and process until the recent decade. While the world is talking about mitigating climate change, it is business-as-usual with the expansion of fossil fuel development within or near indigenous territories. Under the Obama administration, the push for American energy security is opening a wide doorway for expanding unconventional fossil fuel development. Following are current unconventional oil developments in indigenous territories: 1. Our brothers and sisters at the top of the world in Alaska are being bombarded by the threats of increased oil development, both on land and offshore. Resisting Environmental Destruction on Indigenous Lands (REDOIL), an Alaska Native grassroots alliance, has been resisting efforts of the United States and Shell to pursue oil drilling in the sensitive Arctic region, including the offshore Outer Continental Shelf areas of the Beaufort and Chukchi seas. Offshore oil drilling, as proposed by President Obama, threatens Alaska Natives’ way of life, and perpetuates U.S. addiction to oil and the concentration of greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to global warming and climate change. It is of utmost importance to institute a federal time-out on the proposed offshore development within the Outer Continental Shelf areas in Alaska. It has not been proven whether cleaning up spills in broken ice conditions is possible. The implications to subsistence ways of life and human health of Alaska coastal communities have not been adequately reviewed. Impacts to polar bears and other threatened and endangered Arctic marine species have not been thoroughly studied. 2. The public in the United States and even in Canada are not aware of what is happening in the tar sands “sacrifice” zone of northern Alberta, Canada. These tar sands are the second largest oil deposit in the world, bigger than Iraq, Iran, or Russia, exceeded only by Saudi Arabia. For years, the mining and processing of this heavy crude, tarlike substance was too expensive to process and was considered unconventional. Binational agreements between the United States and Canada will eventually import 80 percent of the Alberta tar/ oil sands crude oil to feed U.S. energy needs resulting in unprecedented human rights violations and ecological destruction in the homelands of the Mikisew Cree, Athabasca Dene, and the Métis. Tar sands development has completely altered the Athabasca delta and watershed landscape, with deforestation of the boreal forests, open pit mining, in situ mining, dewatering of the water systems, toxic contamination, and degradation to the ecosystem. Canada is not meeting its Kyoto Protocol climate agreements due to the carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions released by the tar sands development. This tar sands expansion has been called the tip of the nonconventional fuels iceberg and consists of a fossil fuel far more carbon intensive than conventional oil. This tip of the iceberg in the development of unconventional fossil fuels includes oil shale, liquid coal, ultra-heavy oils, and ultra-deep offshore deposits. Extraction of these bottom-of-the-barrel fuels emits higher levels of greenhouse gases and creates ecological devastation. In Utah, on federal lands, there is an emerging frenzy of companies lining up to tap the tar sands and oil shale there. 3. The toxic legacy left by fossil fuel and uranium development on indigenous lands remains today and will persist for generations, even without additional development. Mines and electrical generation facilities have had devastating health and cultural impacts on our indigenous peoples at all stages of the energy cycle, ranging from cancer from radioactive uranium waste in Laguna Pueblo and the Navajo Nation in New Mexico, to respiratory illness caused by coal-fi red power plant and oil refi nery air emissions on and near Native lands, such as Fort Berthold Three Affi liated Tribes in North Dakota or the Navajo of the Shiprock area of northwest New Mexico, to acute respiratory illnesses of the Ponca Nation in north central Oklahoma. Indigenous communities have been targeted in all proposals for long-term nuclear waste storage, such as the Western Shoshone in Nevada, or the Prairie Island Mdewankanton Dakota community in eastern Minnesota who live next door to a nuclear power reactor and are experiencing elevated incidences of cancer and other illnesses. The history of resource exploitation, including conventional energy resources, in indigenous territories was highlighted by the recently settled Elouise Cobell lawsuit against the Department of the Interior on behalf of individual Native landowners. The systematic exploitation by the U.S. government and corporations of conventional energy resources has run an equally long and often deadly course in our lands. Under federalism, our energy resource Tribes have supplied access to abundant natural resources under U.S. federal trust protection at rock-bottom prices in sweetheart deals promoted by the federal government. Yet many of our local communities and families living in remote areas of Tribal reservations often go unserved or underserved by the benefi ts of such development. Even the most recent U.S. energy legislation and incentives are designed to encourage the development of Tribal resources, with mechanisms for fast-tracking the siting and permitting process. Development must not be a forced choice. For the United States to provide incentives for further fossil fuels and uranium development in indigenous territories will only continue the pattern of ignoring the well-being of our communities and Alaska Native villages in favor of short-sighted proposals that exploit the vulnerabilities of poor, politically isolated communities. When considering energy and climate change policy, it is important that the White House and federal agencies, and even our emerging Tribal leaders, our youth, and Native academia, consider the history of energy and mineral exploitation and Native Nations, and the potential to create a dramatic change with innovative policies. Too often Native Nations are presented with a false choice: either to develop polluting energy resources or remain in dire poverty. Economic development need not come at the expense of maintaining spiritual principles, cultural identity, and thriving ecosystems.

## 2NC

### Overview

#### Topical version of the aff—incentivize energy on different cites, or decentralized renewables which allow for community control, eliminate siting restrictions near minority communities, or tax the rich to lead to energy in communities and inner cities – effective decisionmaking allows these to be effective

Hager 92

Hager, professor of political science – Bryn Mawr College, ‘92

(Carol J., “Democratizing Technology: Citizen & State in West German Energy Politics, 1974-1990” Polity, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 45-70)

¶ What is the role of the citizen in the modern technological state? As political decisions increasingly involve complex technological choices, does a citizen's ability to participate in decision making diminish? These questions, long a part of theoretical discourse, gained new salience with the rise of grassroots environmental protest in advanced industrial states. In West Germany, where a strong environmental movement arose in the 1970s, protest has centered as much on questions of democracy as it has on public policy. Grassroots groups challenged not only the construction of large technological projects, especially power plants, but also the legitimacy of the bureaucratic institutions which produced those projects.¶ Policy studies generally ignore the legitimation aspects of public policy making.2 A discussion of both dimensions, however, is crucial for understanding the significance of grassroots protest for West German political development in the technological age and for assessing the likely direction of citizen politics in united Germany.¶ In the field of energy politics, West German citizen initiative groups tried to politicize and ultimately to democratize policy making.3 The technicality of the issue was not a barrier to their participation. On the contrary, grassroots groups proved to be able participants in technical energy debate, often proposing innovative solutions to technological problems. Ultimately, however, they wanted not to become an elite of "counterexperts," but to create a political discourse between policy makers and citizens through which the goals of energy policy could be recast and its legitimacy restored. Only a deliberative, expressly democratic form of policy making, they argued, could enjoy the support of the populace. To this end, protest groups developed new, grassroots democratic forms of decision making within their own organizations, which they then tried to transfer to the political system at large. The legacy of grassroots energy protest in West Germany is twofold.¶ First, it produced major substantive changes in public policy. Informed citizen pressure was largely responsible for the introduction of new plant and pollution control technologies. Second, grassroots protest undermined the legitimacy of bureaucratic experts. Yet, an acceptable forum for a broadened political discussion of energy issues has not been found; the energy debate has taken place largely outside the established political institutions. Thus, the legitimation issue remains unresolved. It is likely to reemerge as Germany deals with the problems of the former German Democratic Republic. Nevertheless, an evolving ideology of citizen participationa vision of "technological democracy"-is an important outcome of grassroots action.

#### Bell’s narrative is insufficient—only tying it to provisional improvements in the law and pragmatic policy change actualizes anti-racism—proves T version solves better

Delgado and Stefancic 89

DERRICK BELL'S CHRONICAL OF THE SPACE TRADERS: WOULD THE U.S. SACRIFICE

PEOPLE OF COLOR IF THE PRICE WERE RIGHT? Richard Delgado Jean Stefancic Derrick Bell's Chronicle of the Space Traders: Would the U.S. Sacrifice People of Color if the Price Were Right? Richard Delgado Seattle University School of Law Jean Stefancic Seattle University School of Law 1991 University of Colorado Law Review, Vol. 62, 1991 Seattle University School of Law Research Paper¶ One of the leading commentators on race in the United States, Richard Delgado has appeared on Good Morning America, the MacNeil-Lehrer Report, PBS, NPR, the Fred Friendly Show, and Canadian NPR. Author of over 150 journal articles and 27 books, his work has been praised or reviewed in The Nation, The New Republic, the New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal. His books have won eight national book prizes, including six Gustavus Myers Awards for outstanding book on human rights in North America, the American Library Association’s Outstanding Academic Book, and a Pulitzer Prize nomination. Stanley Fish described his career and book, The Rodrigo Chronicles, in the following terms: “Richard Delgado is a triple pioneer. He was the first to question free speech ideology; he and a few others invented critical race theory; and he is both a theorist and an exemplar of the importance of storytelling in the workings of the law. This volume brings all of Delgado’s strengths together in a stunning performance.” Before joining the Seattle University faculty, Delgado spent fourteen years at the University of Colorado Law School as the Charles Inglis Thompson Professor of Law and five years at the University of Pittsburgh where he was University Distinguished Professor of Law & Derrick Bell Fellow. In his spare time, Delgado co-edits two book series, serves as consultant to government agencies, and enjoys discovering the neighborhoods of Seattle.

Bell's Chronicle is a classic Jeremiad--a tale aimed at making a powerful group aware of its¶ own iniquitous history and potential for more of the same. It aims at kindling conscience and¶ jarring complacency. It performs this function ably: its pessimistic message rings true. Yet,¶ people cannot live without hope, without signposts, without some indication that the future will¶ not be a continuation of the present. [FN48] Storytelling is essential for social movement,¶ precisely because it insists that our choice of narrative matters. [FN49]¶ It matters precisely because we are learning that the quest for a universal theory of law or¶ culture is fruitless but nevertheless continues. There is no one single Good, no single best law,¶ no single best way of governing ourselves. [FN50] There are only multiple perspectives; nothing¶ is static, our ideas are constantly evolving, we redefine ourselves without end. Microcosmic¶ goods--acts of kindness and compassion--may ultimately be all that we can have and know.¶ [FN51] If the law aims for these, it may accomplish more than it has in the past--when it¶ ignored particularity, overlooking concrete, demonstrable evil in the vain hope of finding a¶ universal Good.

### AT Aff OW

#### Echo Chamber DA - This rejection of structured clash makes debate into an echo chamber. This impoverishes their project even if it is right

Talisse 5

Professor of Philosophy @Vandy¶ Robert, Philosophy & Social Criticism, Deliberativist responses to activist challenges, 31(4) p. 429-431

The argument thus far might appear to turn exclusively upon different conceptions of what reasonableness entails. **The deliberativist view** I have sketched hold that reasonableness **involved some degree of** what we may call **epistemic modesty. On this** view, **the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reflect the best available reasons,** and so she enters into public discourse **as a way of testing her views against the objections** and questions of those who disagree; hence she implicitly hold that **her present view is open to reasonable critique** and that others who hold opposing views may be able to offer justifications for their views that are at least as strong as her reasons for her own. Thus any mode of **politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justification is unreasonable**. The activist sees no reason to accept this. Reasonableness **for the activist** consists in the ability to act on reasons that upon due reflection seem adequate to underwrite action; **discussion with those who disagree need not be involved**. **According to the activist,** there are certain cases in which he does in fact know the truth about what justice requires and in which **there is no room for reasoned objection.** Under such conditions, **the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice; it is therefore irrational**. It may seem that we have reached an impasse. However, there is a further line of criticism that the activist must face. To the activist’s view that at least in certain situations he may reasonably decline to engage with persons he disagrees with (107), the deliberative democrat can raise the phenomenon that Cass Sunstein has called ‘group polarization’ (Sunstein, 2003; 2001A; ch. 3; 2001b: ch. 1). To explain: consider that political **activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether; they often engage in rallies,** demonstrations, teach-ins, workshops, and other activities in which they are called to make public the case for their views. Activists also must engage in deliberation among themselves when deciding strategy. Political movement must be organized, hence those involved must decide upon targets, methods, and tact’s; they must also decide upon the content of their pamphlets and the precise messages they most wish to convey to the press. **Often the audience in both of these deliberative contexts will be a self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists**. **Group polarization** is a well-documented phenomenon that **has ‘been found all over the world** and is many diverse tasks’; it means that ‘members of a deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in the direction indicated by’ predeliberation tendencies’ (Sunstein, 2003: 81-2). Importantly, **in group that ‘engage in repeated discussions’** over time, **the polarization is even more pronounced** (2003: 86). Hence discussion in a small but devoted activist enclave that meets regularly to strategize and protest ‘should produce a situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than those of an individual member before the series of deliberations began’ (ibid.).17 The fact of group polarization is relevant to our discussion because the activist has proposed that **he may reasonably decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees** in cases in which the requirement of justice are so clear that he can be confidents that has the truth .Group polarization suggest that even deliberatively confronting those with whom we disagree is essential even we have the truth. **For even if we have the truth, if we do not engage opposing views,** but instead deliberate only with those with whom we agree, our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth ,In order to avoid polarization, deliberation must take place within heterogeneous ‘argument pools’ (Sunstein, 2003: 93). This of course does not mean that there should be no groups devoted to the achievement of some common political goal; it rather suggest that a engagement with those with whom one disagrees is essential to the proper pursuitof justice. Insofar as the activist denies this, he is unreasonable.

### 2nc at: we meet

You don’t meet – there’s a national referendum which isn’t USFG action

Wing 9

Bessie Dutton Murray Professor of Law & Associate Dean for Faculty Development, University of Iowa, College of Law. A.B. 1978, Princeton University; M.A. 1979, UCLA; J.D. 1982, Stanford Law School. Many thanks to my research assistants Saba Baig, Kevin Dawson, Atanna Essama, and Elizabeth He.

11 Berkeley J. Afr.-Am. L. & Pol'y 49

The U.S. ends up convening a constitutional convention and amending the Constitution. The resolution, which passes quickly, says: "Without regard to the language or interpretations previously given any other provision of this document, every United States citizen is subject at the call of Congress to selection for special service for periods necessary to protect domestic interests and international needs." n55 The Supreme Court refuses to intervene in this "political question" as there are "no judicially manageable standards" for resolving the issue. n56 The amendment is ratified in a national referendum 70-30%. The result validates amendments to the selective service laws that authorize blacks to be inducted for service along the terms of the Space Traders' offer.

#### Just buying it is not a financial incentive

Nelson 93

(Edward W., Chairman – Payment Subcommittee in OPTN/UNOS Ethics Committee, “Financial Incentives for Organ Donation,” Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 6-30, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/bioethics.asp?index=4)

**Definition of Financial Incentives**  A definition of terms is **necessary prior to a discussion of the concept of financial incentives** for organ donation. First, financial incentives, as discussed here, do not mean additional monies spent for public or professional education or recognition and counseling of organ donor families. Because the concept of financial incentives fundamentally changes the process of organ procurement, it has been argued that the term "donor" is no longer applicable and would need to be replaced by a term such as 'vendor." The term "rewarded gifting" has been suggested and has been justly criticized as an oxymoron by those opposed to financial incentives and a despicable euphemism by those who promote this concept. Of greatest practical significance is the **distinction between "incentive" and "payment"** since a system of financial incentives may indeed be a viable option if, as interpreted by law, **"incentives" do not amount to "purchases"** and "donors" are therefore not transformed into 'vendors."

### AT Edu - Girioux

#### BOUNDED knowledge is good – debate should be maintained as a DISCIPLINARY space. This SEVERS the internal link between SKILL production and SUBJECT production

McArthur 10

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Department of Higher & Community Education, University of Edinburgh, Paterson’s Land,

Holyrood Road, Edinburgh EH8 8AQ, UK

Giroux’s critical pedagogy rests upon a commitment to public spaces for learning, where diverse forms of knowledge can be exchanged and developed; where students and teachers engage critically with those knowledges, and with one another; and through which genuine democratic ideals can be pursued. Disciplines are regarded as antithetical to these aims, because they are considered closed, elitist and to perpetuate conservative forms of relationships and types of knowledge. Thus, critical pedagogy seeks, instead, to escape disciplinary boundaries and build interdisciplinary spaces in which such public and political realms can exist and prosper. Looking anew at disciplines I suggest that there is an alternative view of disciplines to that outlined above. In this view disciplines are complex, contested and permeable spaces. I further propose that, if critical pedagogues such as Giroux can, in Proust’s term, look with new eyes at disciplines, they will hopefully see dynamic and safe structures that could provide real and robust allies in the fight to protect higher education from narrow, largely economic, interpretations of its role, and instead promote higher education as a democratic space which supports greater social justice. In this section I seek to encourage this new look at disciplines by first outlining my conception of them as complex, contested and permeable structures, in contrast to Giroux’s perspective of disciplines as static, elitist and limiting. Secondly, I argue that interdisciplinarity and disciplinarity should be thought of as complementary spaces, rather than alternatives. Finally, I discuss how the act of looking anew at disciplines may help critical pedagogy strengthen its own theoretical and practical stances. If critical pedagogy is to challenge narrow commercial and commodified conceptualisations of higher education, it needs to refocus on its commitment to action, rather than pure theory, and looking anew at disciplines as potential allies may be a first step in doing this. Disciplines: complex, contested and permeable I am not arguing that disciplines have not at various times acted conservatively or have not valued stasis over change. Certainly, at different times, disciplinary structures have proven effective homes for forces resistant to change – both epistemologically and politically. Many of us can no doubt relate to the description of ‘the food-fights that go on within disciplines’, and ‘the most absurd yet intense and devastating attempts to expel from the center and marginalize people whose perspectives are different’ (Bérubé and Nelson 1995, 192). My argument, instead, is that these examples or snapshots of experience do not tell the whole story about the dynamic nature of disciplinarity. Those who take a long-term historical view of the development of disciplines, such as the authors of the essays within Anderson and Valente’s (2002) volume on Disciplinarity at the fin de siècle, reveal the degree of change, debate and contestation – of evolution, fracturing and succession – within such disciplinary structures. Thus, the editors state: ‘what has often been lacking in our current disciplinary debates is a longer perspective that would enable us to understand better their historical conditions and developments’ (1). Taking this long view is, I suggest, essential to looking anew at disciplines. It is also rather paradoxical that critical pedagogues accuse disciplines of privileging certain forms of knowledge; critical pedagogy does this too. Such privileging is indeed, surely part of the inherently political nature of pedagogy? What is crucial are the choices made between different forms of knowledge, the awareness of such choices, and the motivations for and outcomes of these choices. If Giroux’s critical pedagogy could take a sufficiently long-term view of the development of disciplines, this would afford a better understanding of their intrinsically dynamic nature. Without this long view, there is the danger of falling into the trap of what Plotnitsky (2002, 75) describes as ‘extreme epistemological conservatism’ in one’s analysis of disciplines. In his illuminating account of the development of quantum physics, Plotnitsky explores the link between disciplinarity and radicality. He argues that non-classical epistemology, ways of knowing that differ from that upon which the discipline has previously been based, form part of the ongoing development of a discipline such as physics. Indeed, ‘Radicality becomes the condition of disciplinarity rather than, as it may appear at first sight and as it is often argued by the proponents of classical theories, being in conflict with it’ (2002, 49). In contrast, Giroux appears to suggest that only in interdisciplinary fields such as cultural studies can non-classical or alternative forms of knowledge be brought together with more traditional epistemologies (Aronowitz and Giroux 1991; Giroux 1992). Giroux’s position is based upon his strong association of disciplines with canonical forms of knowledge and a rigid adherence to textual authority. The alternative is to see disciplines as Davidson (2004) does; as spaces with boundaries that are ‘flexible, culturally determined, interdependent and relative to time’ (302). Parker’s (2002) concept of ‘new disciplinarity’, encompassing a distinction between subjects and disciplines, helps illuminate the emancipatory potential of disciplinary spaces. She describes subjects as groupings which ‘can be reduced to common transferable and equivalent subject-specific skills’ (375), with an emphasis on ‘the end product, and skills and competencies’ that aggregate over set periods (375). It is true that subjects are inclusive, in the sense that nearly anyone can take part in studying them, but, as Parker argues, they are also passive – ‘they are taught, learned, delivered’ (374). In contrast, Parker views a discipline as something that is ‘practiced and engaged with’ (375). Disciplines are ongoing, evolving communities. Subjects permit only transmissive or bankable knowledge, while disciplines allow for transgressive and creative approaches. Disciplines offer spaces for students and teachers to interact critically. Disciplines can encompass diverse and shifting knowledge communities. Giroux’s fear that disciplines impose particular forms of knowledge, discourse and learning on students is not without foundation. However, I argue it is based on examples of poor practice, rather than anything inherent to the nature of academic disciplines. Disciplines are, and should be, sites of contestation and challenge; of competing and conflicting ‘takes’ on knowledge. What disciplines have internally in common is a shared discourse in which to undertake such conflict, and to do so with rigour. In her discussion of attitudes to disciplinarity among French academics, Donahue (2004) observes that: ‘They accounted for its contestatory nature, describing their own research groups as negotiated, arguing back-and-forth, and suggesting that this contested nature is part of what students must learn to navigate’ (68).

## 1NR

### Case

#### Multiple statistical measures prove a trend towards equality---this isn’t to say that everything is OK, but that falsifiable claims matter for assessing impacts AND that engagement can be effective

Currie 8

<http://www.american.com/archive/2008/november-11-08/the-long-march-of-racial-progress/>

Duncan Currie is managing editor of THE AMERICAN. Speechwriter and Policy Advisor in U.S. Senate Washington D.C. Metro Area | Government Administration Current: Speechwriter and Policy Advisor, Office of Senator John Cornyn at United States Senate Past: Editorial Director at The George W. Bush Institute, Deputy Managing Editor at National Review, Managing Editor at The American Enterprise Institu... Education: Harvard University

Measuring racial progress is all about perspective. Since Appomattox, the struggle for racial equality has seen triumphs and setbacks alike. On balance, however, the story of race relations in America is one of extraordinary change and transformation. According to Princeton historian James McPherson, the rate of black illiteracy dropped from roughly 90 percent in 1865 to 70 percent in 1880 and to under 50 percent in 1900. “From the perspective of today, this may seem like minimal progress,” McPherson wrote in his 1991 book, Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution (a collection of essays). “But viewed from the standpoint of 1865 the rate of literacy for blacks increased by 200 percent in fifteen years and by 400 percent in thirty-five years.” McPherson also noted that the share of school-age black children attending school jumped from 2 percent in 1860 to 34 percent in 1880. “During the same period,” he said, “the proportion of white children of school age attending school had grown only from 60 to 62 percent.” In 1908, 100 years before the election of America’s first black president, there was a bloody race riot in Springfield, Illinois, which began when an angry mob surrounded a prison where a black man falsely accused of rape was being held. As columnist George Will has observed, “The siege of the jail, the rioting, the lynching, and mutilating all occurred within walking distance of where, in 2007, Barack Obama announced his presidential candidacy.” Over the past century, the racial attitudes of white Americans have undergone a sea change. The shift toward greater racial tolerance was driven by many factors, including blacks’ participation in World War II, the integration of professional sports and the military, and the civil rights movement. “Even as Americans were voting more conservatively in the 1980s, their views on race were becoming more liberal,” Wall Street Journal senior editor Jonathan Kaufman wrote recently. “More than three quarters of whites in 1972 told pollsters that ‘blacks should not push themselves where they are not wanted.’ Two-thirds of whites that same year said they opposed laws prohibiting racial discrimination in the sale of homes. Forty percent said whites had the right to live in segregated neighborhoods.” However, “By the end of 1980s, all those numbers had fallen markedly and [they] continued to fall through the following decades.” As University of Michigan sociologist Reynolds Farley points out in a new paper, there are now 41 African Americans serving in the House of Representatives, compared to only six when the Kerner Commission issued its famous report on race and poverty in 1968. During the years following the Kerner Report, “The slowly rising incomes of black men and the more rapidly rising incomes of black women produced an important economic change for African Americans,” Farley writes. “In 1996, for the first time, the majority of blacks were in the economic middle class or above, if that means living in a household with an income at least twice the poverty line.” According to Farley, “Only three percent of African Americans could be described as economically comfortable in 1968. That has increased to 17 percent at present. This is an unambiguous sign of racial progress: one black household in six could be labeled financially comfortable.” He notes that the black-white poverty gap “is much smaller now” than it was in the late 1960s. Residential and marriage trends are also encouraging. “The trend toward less residential segregation that emerged in the 1980s and accelerated in the 1990s continues in this century,” says Farley. Meanwhile, interracial marriage rates have increased dramatically. “At the time of the Kerner Report, about one black husband in 100 was enumerated with a white spouse. By 2006, about 14 percent of young black husbands were married to white women.”

# Round 8 v Minnesota EH

## 1NC

### 1NC- Theory

#### Interpretation- the aff cannot claim advantages not tied to the implementation of the plan.

#### Key to predictable limits- infinite number of benefits the aff could claim to their speech act our discourse- impossible to get offense against.

#### And, extra T – any solvency not tied exclusively and intrinsically to the plan is extra-topical, you should NOT evaluate these impacts because to do so would be unfair as their method of actualizing this offense it’s within the literal resolution making it unpredictable meaning that an absence of offense to the non-plan parts of the 1ac is only proof of abuse, not a reason to err aff. And even if they spot us this ground in CX, that’s insufficient because it is the research pre-debate which determines what is predictable. Independent voter.

#### Key to education- can’t clash with portions off the aff that aren’t pdicated off of affirming the resolution- clash is key to two way education

#### Voting issue for fairness and education

### Fetish K

**“FETISH” CARRIES the irrational connotation deriveD from the European slave traders’ depictions of African religions and the xenophobia inherent in the use of the term “fetish”. THIS CONCEPT CARRieS THE BAGGAGE OF the TORTURE AND EXECUTIOn OF people who used objects labelled “feitshs” IN FRENCH COLONIAL AFRICA. VOTE TO REJECT THIS RACIST analysis.**

**Dr. Wexler 2K1**[Anna, PhD., Harvard, Research in African Literatures 32.1 (2001) 83-97]

Unable, by virtue of experience, to contain the power of these objects exclusively within psychological, socioeconomic, semantic, or other explanatory models of Western social science, I was also aware of their resonance as fetish within the colonial discourse that legitimated conquest and slavery. As Suzanne Blier explains in "Truth and Seeing," the term only recently abandoned, was used especially for the more potent, anxiety producing, less socioaesthetically refined African forms, such as Kongo minkisi and the bociô arts of Dahomê. Linking the irrational and the antiaesthetic, the fetish served as a quintessential designator of otherness in the service of colonial conquest and enslavement of the peoples of West and Central Africa. Haitian cloth-covered figures are said by Blier ("Vodun") to be possibly bociô-related forms. By granting them spirit-driven efficacy, I feared them. In my fear was not only respect but also the polluting legacy of the fetish and the debasing of their maker. **The long shadow of the fetish extends from depictions of "Guinea," or the coast of West Africa, in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century travelogues written by European traders into the evolutionary theory of eighteenth-century Enlightenment philosophers and beyond to the more familiar usages in psychoanalytic, Marxist, and modernist aesthetic theory**. As William Pietz explains in a brilliant series of essays ("The Problem of the Fetish I," 1985; "The Problem of the Fetish II," 1987; and "The Problem Fetish IIIa," 1988), **the pidgin term fetisso developed from the Portuguese feitiço, meaning objects or practices relating to witchcraft. In the fifteenth century, the Portuguese, who controlled West African maritime trade, distinguished between idolo and feitiço. The former referred to a statue representing a deity, the latter to an object often worn on the body and spiritually empowered by combining ritually prescribed materials. The emphasis was on the concrete efficacy of the feitiço as opposed to the idolo, viewed as a medium of worship. African religion was classified as feitiçaria as opposed to idolatria**. As Pietz remarks, "The use of a term meaning 'witchcraft' to characterize the religion, and thus the principle of social order, of an entire people was unprecedented" ("Fetish II": 37). **The pidgin term fetisso became popular as other Europeans and African middlemen and mulatto communities entered the trade in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. African priests were referred to as fetisseros**, and the phrase "to make or take the fetiche" developed. From this set of terms Pietz traces the origin of the concept of the fetish ("Fetish IIIa"). **Inanimate objects such as wooden figures, amulets, stones, and bones were considered the quintessential fetisso. This complex of terms was used by European merchants to signify the otherness of African cultures and obstacles they presented to** so-called rational commercial relations (**or European trading interests) by giving religious value and power to certain objects that consequently transgressed strictly economic terms of assessment and blocked the "natural" development of market forces.** Enlightenment thinkers were introduced to the concept of "fetish religion" through a book written in 1702 by the Dutch merchant Willem Bosman, A New and Accurate Account of the Coast of Guinea. Copies of the French edition, for example, were found in the libraries of Newton and Locke. **Fundamental to the** new **conceptual baggage of the term fetish as it developed into the eighteenth century was the idea of the African's false notion of causality crystallized in belief in the power of inanimate material objects to transform human situations and promoted by manipulative priests seeking to exploit popular fears attached to these forms.** [End Page 84] "**Fétichisme," a word coined by the French philosopher Charles de Brosse in 1757, came to be associated with the intentionality of material objects as the "religious delusion that blocks recognition of rational self-interest and social order"** (Pietz, "Fetish IIIa" 121), **a paradigm of antirationality. In the ensuing discourse, the African mind was theorized as the benighted foil to the European enlightened by the scientific understanding of the mechanistic impersonality of nature. The impact of this construct on slaves and free blacks** in the French colony of Saint-Domingue, by the latter half of the eighteenth century the most valuable colony in the West and the largest market for the slave trade (see James; Trouillot), **as well as on the young republic of Haiti born in revolutionary struggle from its ashes, was tragic and palpable**. As the Haitian scholar Laënnec Hurbon points out in Le barbare imaginaire, the definitive work on anti-Vodou discourse, by the early eighteenth century **those who used** gad-kò (spiritually charged, protective figures), and other **objects termed fetishes, for therapeutic purposes in the French colony were ruthlessly tortured as both sorcerers and charlatans** who achieved power over others through deception. Fears and prohibitions of such practices and associated "charms" and "amulets" were further fueled by the effective use of poisons against the colonists by the revolutionary maroon, ritual leader, and prophet Makandal and his followers. Shortly after his execution in 1758, the Upper Council of Le Cap (a principal city and commercial center) declared illegal the making of "makandals," or packets containing Christian artifacts as well as bones, nails, roots, and additional materials used for protection against sadistic masters, attracting lovers, luck in games, harming enemies, and other purposes (see Dayan; Fick). The use of poisons, which were referred to as wanga during that period, was closely associated with these packets as the next step up on the ladder of aggressive magic (see Pluchon). Those slaves and free blacks accused of poisoning by the planters and colonial authorities were often burned alive (see Fick).

#### Counteradvocacy text- Do the 1ac without the discourse of fetish.

**Rejecting the term fetish is critical to combating the history of coloinialism surrounding the term.**

**Hauser-Renner**, University of Zürich**, 2008**
(HEINZ, History in Africa, Volume 35 “Examining Text Sediments–Commending a Pioneer Historian as an “African Herodotus”: On the Making of the New Annotated Edition of C.C. Reindorf’s History of the Gold Coast and Asante”)

Following the suggestions and arguments of Fage in the 1950s, Grey in the 1960s, and Verdier and Cissoko in the mid-1980s, I have attempted to avoid the use of such terms like “chief,” “tribe,” “feudalism,” “kingdom,” “fetish” etc. in the introduction and translations.[244](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.baylor.edu/journals/history_in_africa/v035/35.hauser-renner.html#f244) Although they were used **[End Page 292]** by Reindorf himself, and in spite of their usage in modern Ghana and by many African scholars, I advocate that either more neutral English terms and/or the original term in the Gã (or other African languages in other contexts) be used.[245](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.baylor.edu/journals/history_in_africa/v035/35.hauser-renner.html#f245) **The terms “fetish**” and “tribe” **clearly have a negative connotation** on the one hand **and they are imprecise and often blur the view of the researcher on the historical reality on the other.** A term such as “chief” occurring in the English *History* is contrasted with at least five corresponding expressions in the Gã text. **The use of unsuitable Western vocabulary falsifies the African situation and tends to identify it with other cultures, thus robbing it of its inmost character, its authenticity, and its vital force**.[246](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.baylor.edu/journals/history_in_africa/v035/35.hauser-renner.html#f246) Yankah noted that the confusion caused by mistranslating the Akan okyeame as “linguist” would not have arisen if the cultural uniqueness of this office had been recognized and truly acknowledged.[247](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.baylor.edu/journals/history_in_africa/v035/35.hauser-renner.html#f247)**People engaged in African research have a duty to re-examine the tools they use to establish the nature of institutions and concepts,** to define African terms and use them in their studies just as Wilks, McCaskie and others have done in the context of Asante history and culture. In 1952 Fage has already argued that **there is the very great difficulty of knowing deeply enough about the background on either side of the colonial relationship to avoid dangerously superficial judgements**. It is all too easy, even for Englishmen to talk loosely and glibly about “the British government,” or “the Colonial Office,” or “British colonial policy” . . . without realising that each of these is a short-hand term for something immeasurably complex.[248](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.baylor.edu/journals/history_in_africa/v035/35.hauser-renner.html#f248) African scholars are compelled to query the terminology and concepts they use and by writing more “Ideengeschichte” gain a clearer understanding of African thought.[249](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.baylor.edu/journals/history_in_africa/v035/35.hauser-renner.html#f249) Reindorf’s Gã text is at times ambiguous, even **[End Page 293]** obscure, and a proper translation cannot be guaranteed at every point. In a considerable number of cases the translation has perforce been influenced by informed guesses based on my increasing knowledge of Gã philosophy of language, familiarity with Reindorf’s way of thinking and use of language, and on research on Gã history and culture in general. However, difficult passages and terminology are referred to, commented on, and discussed in the annotations. Matters of style have been the most problematic and challenging aspect of the translation work. Gã style of the nineteenth century (both in writing and speaking) is obviously not the same as today because attitudes toward language and its use cannot be divorced from specific cultural beliefs and practices over time. In the absence of any systematic linguistic diachronic study on style—apart from Yankah’s work on Akan in 1995—one might guess (relying on personal obvervation anyway) that certain features of style are not strictly adhered to in modern speech, while compliance to the same or other features of style used in the nineteenth century is enjoined, depending on the contexts.[250](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.baylor.edu/journals/history_in_africa/v035/35.hauser-renner.html#f250)

### Word Pic

**Text- The United States federal government should substantially reduce restrictions on oil production and substantially increase financial incentives for wind production and solar production in the United States.**

#### Counterplan competes- it doesn’t capitalize the term “federal government”

#### Capitalizing the term “federal government” creates tacit acceptance of state power

Lock 02

[Neil, “State Your Terms!”]

In English, capital letters are not normally used for nouns, except for proper names and for the first word of a sentence. However, it is conventional to use capital letters for the names of establishment institutions and personages. Examples of such words are government, king, parliament, president, state, church, pope. To dignify these words with capital letters – Government, President, State, Church, for example – gives to the reader an almost subliminal message of power, respect and even reverence. But, as historians and lovers of freedom know, many of these organisations and individuals have shown, by their actions, that they are not worthy of any such respect or reverence.

#### And capitalization empowers state bureaucracy

Parkinson 03

[Rob Parkinson has 35 years of experience in management communications — gained as a consultant, an instructor, a manager, an editor and a writer in both government and the private sector. He has specialized in briefings for senior executives for 15 years, including six years as the editor for the Deputy Minister of Natural Resources, Government of Canada. In that capacity, he designed departmental standards for executive documents that brought about dramatic improvements in the quality of briefing material prepared for the Minister and the Deputy Minister. M.B.A from the University of Ottowa. “Writing for Results”]

We often overuse capitals — sometimes out of fear of offending important people, sometimes to show that a certain word is important to us. However, overuse of capitals, particularly when addressing outside readers, can convey the image of a bureaucracy that is overawed by its own concepts and processes.

#### STRONG STATE BUREAUCRACY MAKES GENOCIDE AND WAR INEVITABLE

Martin 90

[Brian Martin, associate professor in [Science, Technology and Society](http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/ssmac/sts/index.html) at the University of Wollongong, UPROOTING THE WAR SYSTEM,, <http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/90uw/uw07.html>)]

Is the state system really so bad? War is the most obvious indictment of the system, and this alone should be enough to justify questioning the state. As wars have become more destructive, there is no sign that any steps to re-examine or transform the state system are being taken by state elites. This should not be surprising. War is not simply a by-product of the state system, to be moderated and regulated when it becomes too dangerous to populations. Rather, war is part and parcel of the state system, so the destructiveness of war makes little difference. State elites (and many others) see the world as a state-structured world, and all action is premised on this perspective. War is the external manifestation of state violence. Political repression is its internal form. Political freedoms are not only at a premium under military dictatorships and state socialism, but are also precarious in the representative democracies, especially in relation to 'national security.' One of the most telling indictments of the state system is found in Leo Kuper's book *Genocide*. Kuper documents the most horrific exterminations in this century, including the killing of the Jews by the Nazis, the massacre of the Bangladeshis by the Pakistan army in 1971 and the extermination in Cambodia beginning in 1975. What is damning of the state system is the reluctance of governments (and of that assemblage of state actors, the United Nations) to intervene against even the most well documented genocidal killing. The reason for this reluctance is the concern for the autonomy of the state. In short, maintaining the 'integrity' of the state system is more important for state elites than intervening against genocide. There are many other social problems caused, sustained or aggravated by the state, including suppression of dissent, state support for corporate elites, and the activities of spy agencies and secret police. These problems stem essentially from the system of unequal power and privilege which the state both is part of and sustains. The state is not the only way to embody and sustain unequal power and privilege: it is a particular way involving bureaucracies for administration and military forces for defending against external and internal enemies.

### 1NC

#### Immigration passes now

Dionne 2-6 (EJ, Columnist – Washington Post, “GOP Will Back Immigration Reform,” 2013, <http://www.goerie.com/article/20130206/OPINION09/302069992/EJ-Dionne%3A-GOP-will-back-immigration-reform>)

That's the comparison to keep in mind to understand the extraordinary transformation of Beltway politics on immigration reform. Until Obama was re-elected, party competition translated into Republican efforts to block virtually everything the president wanted to accomplish. On immigration, at least, the parties are now competing to share credit for doing something big. It's wonderful to behold. Republicans who always held views on immigration similar to the president's -- notably Sen. John McCain -- are now free to say so. Other Republicans who thought a hard line on the issue was a political winner have been forced by the electoral facts to change their minds. Democrats, aware of how important Latino votes are to their party's future, are determined to get immigration reform done. Nothing is certain in Washington, especially in the Republican-led House of Representatives, but the odds that we will finally fix a broken immigration system are very high. The behind-the-scenes wrangling over the choreography of last week's twin immigration announcements -- by a bipartisan group of senators and by the president in a speech in Nevada -- shows how strong the bias toward action has become. We've become so accustomed to the politics of obstruction that we forget there is still such a thing as legislative craftsmanship. The Jan. 25 proposal by eight senators of their ideas for reform was months in the making as Sens. Charles Schumer, D-N.Y., and Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., worked closely with their colleagues to prepare for this moment. But Obama felt compelled to make clear early on that immigration reform was one of his highest priorities. The Senate negotiators worried that if Obama got out front with positions more progressive than theirs, particularly on a speedier path to citizenship for illegal immigrants, he could foil their efforts to reach accord. This fear reflected the GOP's Obama-can't-win response to whatever he does. Until now, Republicans criticized him for not taking "leadership" in pushing for immigration reform. But as soon as he was ready to speak out, the GOP switched direction, warning that his leadership was the last thing they wanted -- and could get in the way of a compromise. Thus did House Speaker John Boehner use a spokesman to instruct Obama to be "careful not to drag the debate to the left and ultimately disrupt the difficult work that is ahead in the House and Senate." As it happened, by letting it be known that he planned to give an immigration speech, Obama sped up the timetable of the Senate group, said a House Democrat active on the issue, and even encouraged a small collection of House Republicans eager for reform to let it be known that they, too, were working toward compromise. Obama sought to thread the political needle by laying out his principles while holding off on proposing a bill of his own. He would send up legislation only "if Congress is unable to move forward in a timely fashion." A relieved Schumer, using words almost never heard in Washington, declared that the president "is handling this perfectly." There will be much posturing over the next several months. By going slightly to the progressive side of the senators, Obama may ease the way for Republicans to strike a deal since they will be able to claim they stayed to the president's right. Conservative supporters of reform, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida, will keep saying critical things about the president to preserve their credibility with the right. And if Boehner is interested in reform, he, too, must play a delicate game of distancing himself from Obama to persuade his most conservative colleagues to acquiesce to a vote on a bill. But make no mistake: This is immigration reform's time. It was poignant to hear McCain state plainly and eloquently what he has always felt. "We have been too content for too long," he said, "to allow individuals to mow our lawn, serve our food, clean our homes and even watch our children, while not affording them any of the benefits that make our country so great." Thanks to an election, those words are no longer politically incorrect inside John McCain's party.

#### Obama popularity Key

LA Times 2-4

“Obama Takes Second Term Agenda to the Campaign Trail,” [http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-obama-20130204,0,3889723.story](http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-obama-20130204%2C0%2C3889723.story)

Fresh off his first inauguration, Obama spent his political capital diving into healthcare reform, a bruising effort that took more than a year. His efforts to negotiate a far-reaching budget deal with the House speaker yielded nothing. But when he took to the road, he was able to win an extension of the payroll tax break and lower interest rates on federal student loans.¶ "They're making up for a major error of the first term, that he didn't use the bully pulpit as effectively to set the national debate," said Allan Lichtman, a presidential historian at American University. "He let a lot of the healthcare debate take place in Congress, so you had Congress setting the terms."¶ "In the second term, if he's going to get anything done, he has to get the public behind him," Lichtman continued. "Congress operates on fear and greed. The only way you get Congress to work with him is if they believe he has a big public movement behind him."¶ The president's approval ratings have risen in the four months since his reelection, but it's too soon to see whether he's boosted support for his signature issues. Obama has seized on issues that already have solid public support.¶ Whether a president has the power to generate a tide of public sentiment remains a matter of debate among political scientists and historians. Historians periodically examine whether President Reagan brought about a revolution in American politics or was the beneficiary of one already underway.¶ George C. Edwards III, a presidential scholar and political scientist at Texas A&M University, studied hundreds of polls on presidents and concluded that even the most accomplished orators usually failed to win public support for their top initiatives.¶ Despite Reagan's opposition to spending on social programs, for instance, public support for them rose during his tenure. Still, Reagan persuaded Democrats to pass his bills to cut taxes in 1981 and 1986, which some see as clear evidence that his skillful public diplomacy had an effect on his negotiations with Congress.¶ "Ronald Reagan was the great communicator because he was very powerful in selling ideas that people thought were crazy," Lichtman said. "Who would have thought an across-the-board tax cut would be adopted when it was? It was the persuasiveness of Ronald Reagan, talking about getting the government off your back."¶ With Obama, though, his opponents do not seem worried about the effect of his words, however eloquently delivered.

#### Public would hate plan- thermostatic response

Sides ’10

John is Professor of Political Science at Georgetown, “The Public is a Thermostat,” <http://themonkeycage.org/blog/2010/06/22/the_public_is_a_thermostat/>

David Brooks sees the public as largely opposed to the policies of the Obama administration and the Democratic majorities in Congress. He believes that this reflects a miscalculation on the Democrats’ part: the public is not that liberal.¶ Some Kool-Aid sippers on the left say the problem is that Republicans have better messaging (somehow John Boehner became magically charismatic to independents). Others say the shift to the right is a product of bad economic times. But Dr. Faustus saw a deeper truth. Moderate suburban voters do not see the world as liberals do, even in the most propitious circumstances, and never will.¶ But there is another possibility: the public is simply a thermostat. When government spending and activism increases, the public says “too hot” and demands less. When spending and activism decreases, the public says “too cold” demands more. Here is Christopher Wlezien in a 1995 paper (gated):¶ We observe that the signals the public sends to policymakers, in the form of preferences for “more” or “less” spending, react to changes in policy…[T]here is negative feedback of spending decisions on the public’s relative preferences, whereby the public adjusts its preferences for more spending downward when appropriations increase, and vice versa.¶ Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson, writing in chapter 9 of The Macro Polity, refer to “the governing system as a thermostat.” Erikson et al. show that the public’s “mood”—a general measure of the policies it desires—moves in the opposite way as policy:¶ The correlation between policy innovation in one administration and before-after mood change is a strongly negative -0.76…The more liberal the policy stream, the more conservative is the change in mood. Notably, the most liberal presidency (Johnson’s full term ending in 1968) is associated with the greatest public reaction in the conservative direction. Similarly, the conservative presidencies of Reagan and Eisenhower moved the public in a liberal direction.¶ Brooks is wrong to assume that the public’s reaction to Democratic policies indicates a enduring ideological disjuncture or a failure of public relations. The public may not be more conservative. It may simply be saying “too hot.” As Matt put it in his email to me:¶ Current trends would not show that Democrats have been unusually unsuccessful in moving public opinion but that policy ideology in public opinion typically moves against the direction of policymaking. The public requests liberal policies, gets them, and then moves in the other direction; they then get more conservative policies and move against them.¶ Brooks wants to score this moment as a victory or defeat for someone—in this case, a defeat for liberalism and the Democrats. But If policy and thermostatic public opinion is cyclical, then any victory or defeat is temporary. The ebb and flow is the more important dynamic.

#### Citizenship solves the deficit

Tucker 10

Cynthia is a columnist for The Atlanta Journal-Constitution. “We need immigrants to help pay the deficit,” Nov 19, http://blogs.ajc.com/cynthia-tucker/2010/11/19/we-need-immigrants-to-help-pay-the-deficit/

Recommendations for taming the deficit include raising the retirement age, raising the federal gas tax and ending the mortgage interest deduction for homeowners. Ouch!¶ But there is a palliative that would ease the pain: Put 11 million illegal immigrants on a path to legalization. And don’t touch birthright citizenship!¶ Yes, you heard that right: Granting legal residency to illegal immigrants will eventually help sop up some of the federal budget’s red ink. I know that’s counterintuitive since so many citizens have come to believe that Mexican landscapers and Guatemalan maids are a drain on the treasury. But the fact is that their relative youth is just what the U.S. economy needs.¶ The explosion of the long-term deficit is largely the consequence of an aging population, with more retirees depending on taxes from fewer workers. While the recession, two unfunded wars and Bush-era tax cuts fueled the immediate deficit, a tsunami of long-term red ink will swamp the budget in about ten years, as a massive wave of baby boomers leaves the workplace.¶ So we need as many younger workers as we can find to help support the coming crush of senior citizens. The U.S. is lucky enough to have a higher birthrate than many other Westernized democracies, even among native-born women. Immigrants are an added demographic bonus.¶ “When some people think of immigrants, they think of people coming in and immediately absorbing our resources,” said Emory economist Jeffrey Rosensweig. “Most immigrants come here to work. They’re young workers, and they’re paying taxes.” Why not add all of them to the federal tax rolls?

#### Long Term Deficit kills hegemony causes nuclear war

Khalilzad 11

Zalmay Khalilzad, the United States ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United Nations during the presidency of George W. Bush and the director of policy planning at the Defense Department from 1990 to 1992, February 8, 2011, “The Economy and National Security; If we don’t get our economic house in order, we risk a new era of multi-polarity,” online: <http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad>

Without faster economic growth and actions to reduce deficits, publicly held national debt is projected to reach dangerous proportions. If interest rates were to rise significantly, annual interest payments — which already are larger than the defense budget — would crowd out other spending or require substantial tax increases that would undercut economic growth. Even worse, if unanticipated events trigger what economists call a “sudden stop” in credit markets for U.S. debt, the United States would be unable to roll over its outstanding obligations, precipitating a sovereign-debt crisis that would almost certainly compel a radical retrenchment of the United States internationally.¶ Such scenarios would reshape the international order. It was the economic devastation of Britain and France during World War II, as well as the rise of other powers, that led both countries to relinquish their empires. In the late 1960s, British leaders concluded that they lacked the economic capacity to maintain a presence “east of Suez.” Soviet economic weakness, which crystallized under Gorbachev, contributed to their decisions to withdraw from Afghanistan, abandon Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and allow the Soviet Union to fragment. If the U.S. debt problem goes critical, the United States would be compelled to retrench, reducing its military spending and shedding international commitments.¶ We face this domestic challenge while other major powers are experiencing rapid economic growth. Even though countries such as China, India, and Brazil have profound political, social, demographic, and economic problems, their economies are growing faster than ours, and this could alter the global distribution of power. These trends could in the long term produce a multi-polar world. If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new international order will emerge. The closing of the gap between the United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical competition among major powers, increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another, and undercut our will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher risk of escalation.¶ The stakes are high. In modern history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership. By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world wars.¶ American retrenchment could have devastating consequences. Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats. Under this scenario, there would be a heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation, or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict. Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions.¶ As rival powers rise, Asia in particular is likely to emerge as a zone of great-power competition. Beijing’s economic rise has enabled a dramatic military buildup focused on acquisitions of naval, cruise, and ballistic missiles, long-range stealth aircraft, and anti-satellite capabilities. China’s strategic modernization is aimed, ultimately, at denying the United States access to the seas around China. Even as cooperative economic ties in the region have grown, China’s expansive territorial claims — and provocative statements and actions following crises in Korea and incidents at sea — have roiled its relations with South Korea, Japan, India, and Southeast Asian states. Still, the United States is the most significant barrier facing Chinese hegemony and aggression.

### 1NC- States

#### CP text: the 50 States and all relevant Territories should enter into a compact on:

substantially reducing restrictions on oil production and substantially increasing financial incentives for wind production and solar production in the United States. **The Compact should collect revenue via a Clean Energy Community Finance Initiative.**

#### Compacts solve faster than the federal government

Mountjoy ‘01

John is a policy analyst with the council of State Governments, “Interstate Compacts Make a Comeback,” Spring <http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/ncic/Comeback.pdf>

Some may question the need for interstate compacts to address multi-state policy issues. Why ¶ not leave such regulation to the feds? ¶ “Interstate compacts help us maintain state control,” said Gary McConnell, director of the ¶ Georgia Emergency Management Agency. ¶ During his 10 years as GEMA director, McConnell has played an instrumental role in developing ¶ and promoting a successful interstate compact —the Emergency Management Assistance ¶ Compact, or EMAC. EMAC allows state emergency management agencies to cooperate and ¶ share resources in the event of natural and man-made disasters. ¶ “We can go to the federal government for all kinds of help when natural disasters strike, but the ¶ states [cooperating under an interstate compact] can provide specific resources quicker, which ¶ are likely to be problem specific,” McConnell said. “It’s less bureaucratic, and it’s far cheaper. ¶ It’s easier for us under EMAC to obtain resources from surrounding states than it is to use ¶ federal assistance, which we’d end up having to pay more for anyway. I suspect this is the case ¶ with many other interstate compacts as well.” ¶ “States are rediscovering that they have the power to address their own problems better than the ¶ federal government,” said Rick Masters, The Council of State Governments’ legal counsel and ¶ special counsel for interstate compacts. ¶ CSG, which has tracked interstate compacts for more than 40 years, maintains a clearinghouse of ¶ compact information. More recently, CSG helps administer EMAC and is facilitating the update ¶ of the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision and the Interstate Compact on ¶ Juveniles. Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution laid the legal foundation for interstate ¶ compacts: “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep ¶ Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another ¶ State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent ¶ Danger as will not admit of delay.” Compacts actually preceded the Constitution, having been ¶ used in colonial times to resolve boundary disputes between colonies. ¶ Prior to the 1920s, interstate compacts were typically bi-state agreements, addressing boundary ¶ disputes and territorial claims. In fact, only 36 interstate compacts were formed between 1783 ¶ and 1920. It is only in this century that states have turned to interstate compacts to facilitate ¶ cooperative solutions to multi-state problems. ¶ After a lull in the late 1970s and early 1980s, interstate compacts are beginning to enjoy a ¶ resurgence. Since the early 1990s, states have initiated or updated several high-profile compacts. ¶ Examples include EMAC, the Interstate Compact on Industrialized/Modular Buildings and the ¶ Interstate Insurance Receivership Compact. Interstate compacts can set the framework for cooperative solutions to today’s cross-state ¶ challenges, from policing drugs to supplying energy or controlling sprawl. ¶ “Issues within the states are becoming more complex and aren’t confined by state boundaries. As ¶ a result, solutions are becoming multi-state as well. Compacts are the only tool that is truly ¶ adequate for addressing these multi-state issues,” said Bill Voit, senior project director at The ¶ Council of State Governments. ¶ An example is an interstate compact being considered to facilitate taxation of e-commerce. ¶ Opponents of Internet taxation claim that it would be virtually impossible for online vendors to ¶ comply with the complex, often confusing system of state and local sales and use taxes. Since ¶ Internet sales are expected to reach $184 billion annually by 2004, states have a vested interest in ¶ breaking down this and other barriers to taxing online transactions. ¶ Congress currently is considering the Internet Tax Moratorium Equity Act (S. 512) to help states ¶ simplify their sales and use taxes, in part by authorizing states to enter into an Interstate Sales ¶ and Use Tax Compact. The compact would create a “uniform, streamlined sales and use tax ¶ system,” convenient to remote sales. ¶ At least 18 states are considering the model streamlined sales tax legislation in 2001. Kentucky, ¶ South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming already have signed bills into law. ¶ Existing interstate compacts, many drafted in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, are ripe for ¶ amendment and revision. Technology and the Internet now make the sharing of information ¶ seamless and immediate, yet several interstate compacts are plagued by inadequate ¶ administration. ¶ “Not only do we see the development of new compacts, but we are seeing the re-examination of ¶ existing compacts…revising them to keep pace with our changing world,” Masters said. ¶ Developed in 1937, the Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers is ¶ one example of a compact in need of update. Adopted by all 50 states, the compact regulates the ¶ movement of parolees and probationers across state lines. The burgeoning offender population ¶ and the ease with which offenders now can travel have created several problems for the compact, ¶ including: frequent violations of compact rules, inability to enforce compliance, difficulty in ¶ creating new rules and slow, unreliable exchange of case information. ¶ The antiquated compact needed a replacement that would provide states the authority, ¶ enforcement tools and resources to adequately track and ensure supervision of parolees and ¶ probationers. ¶ The new interstate compact, the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision, provides ¶ these solutions. The new compact includes mechanisms for enforcement, accountability, resource provision, information sharing and state-to-state cooperation. Currently, the compact ¶ has been introduced in 39 states and enacted in 18. ¶ Just as technology can smooth the operation of interstate compacts, alternative dispute resolution ¶ techniques can increase their self-sufficiency. Enforcement tools within interstate compacts need ¶ to utilize more of the mediation and arbitration services that have proven successful throughout ¶ state government. By developing additional self-contained enforcement mechanisms, compact ¶ members would not need to rely solely on the crowded docket of the U.S. Supreme Court. ¶ States should further utilize interstate compacts to address new problems and create new ¶ methods of interstate cooperation. If not, federal preemption in certain policy areas is a distinct ¶ possibility.

### Case

No solve oil addiction

#### Plan kills birds which are keystone species

Sutton and Tomich 5

Victoria Sutton and Nicole Tomich, 2005, Victoria Sutton is Visiting Lecturer (Fall 2004) Yale University, Professor of Law, Texas Tech University, Ph.D. in Environmental Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas and Nicole Tomich has a JD from Texas Tech University School of Law, “Harnessing Wind is Not (by Nature) Environmentally Friendly”, Pace Environmental Law Review, 92.

2.0 THE IMPACT OF WIND FARMS ON THE ENVIRONMENT Any artificial structure, such as a wind turbine, is likely to have a significant negative impact on the surrounding natural en- vironment.19 This reality increases in magnitude when the surrounding environment encompasses threatened or endangered species.20 Studies in Europe have revealed that the public’s perception of bird impacts can be a major factor in deciding whether a wind farm will gain acceptance and receive the proper permitting for a particular location.21 Furthermore, the minimal amount of existing scientific research on the environmental impacts of wind- generated power is considered by some to be developer-driven, and therefore incomplete, biased, and flawed.22 Whether “flawed” or not, there is existing literature on the negative impacts of wind power on the environment, and these impacts are discussed infra. 2.1 Impact of Wind Power on Birds Evidence of negative impacts on birds from interaction with wind generation first arose in the late 1980s.23 Since then, turbine blades have been proven to injure and kill birds-particularly birds of prey, known as raptors, some of which are threatened or endangered.24 These birds, such as the Bald Eagle,25 become victims of the wind turbines, primarily because of the height at which they fly. An early study of just one wind farm site in Al- tamont Pass, California, reported hundreds of raptors being killed yearly.26 Studies from the site, which hosts 6,500 wind turbines on 190 kilometers of property reveal: (1) turbines within 500 feet of canyons, which are typically prey areas, are associated with higher mortality rates; (2) mortality at end turbines is higher, but is just as high within strings of turbines where there are gaps of 35 meters or more between turbines; and (3) the lower the turbine density, the higher the mortality rates.27 The Altamont study was validated in the 1990s when migrating endangered Griffon Vul- tures were dying near Tarifa, Spain from collisions with wind tur- bine rotor blades.28 Bird collisions with wind generators can occur in a number of different ways: (1) a bird may strike the non-moving part of a tur- bine, such as the tower or motor box; (2) a bird may hit the spin- ning rotor blades; or (3) a bird may become caught in the strong pressure wave, or “wake” of a rotor blade.29 Wake collisions can cause a bird to become disoriented, lose control, and collide with the turbine, or be thrown down • onto the ground or into the ocean.30 The speed of revolving rotor blades can also contribute to “motion smear,” which is the degradation of the visibility of rap- idly moving objects, causing birds not to see them and fly straight into them.31 One study estimates that approximately 10,000 to 40,000 birds are killed each year by wind turbines in the United States.32 In comparison, approximately 60 million to 80 million yearly bird deaths result from vehicles, with an additional 40 million to 50 million deaths attributed to communication tower impacts.33 While the second set of figures seem to dwarf the importance of 10,000 to 40,000 birds killed annually by wind turbines, comparison studies are often flawed because they tend to focus on “cumulative impact” data rather than focusing on losses suffered by a particular species.34 Such studies compare the total mortalities from various sources, instead of the risk emanating from each separate source.35 Using the figures above, and factoring in approximately 230 million registered motor vehicles in the United States in the year 2000, the result is a low average of 0.3 bird deaths per vehicle per year.36 Furthermore vehicle deaths are much less likely to affect endangered or threatened raptors. Collisions are not the only threat posed to birds by wind power development. Wind farms can also become a barrier to movement, causing a migrating species to fly around rather than through a particular production site.37 A wind farm may also block daily home-range movements of a particular species, for instance, birds flying to and from preferred feeding and roosting sites.38 A wind farm that intersects a major migration path can cause a species to reroute adding stress and forcing the species to exert extra energy.39 The lighting of turbines may also pose a large threat to birds. Aviation lights that blink or rotate, have long been associated with bird mortality.40 Lighting dangers become amplified during bad weather such as fog, or heavy rain, increasing reflection and refraction, thus increasing mortality.41 Installed wind energy generating capacity increased by an average of 32% annually from 1998-2002;42 this ever-increasing growth rate combined with the various threats discussed supra, creates a unique and rapidly growing threat to bird populations and habitats.

#### Extinction

Diner 94

[Major David, Judge Advocate General's Corps, 143 Mil. L. Rev. 161, Lexis]

**Biologically diverse ecosystems are characterized by a large number of specialist species, filling narrow ecological niches.** These ecosystems inherently are more stable than less diverse systems. "The more complex the ecosystem, the more successfully it can resist a stress. . . . [l]ike a net, in which each knot is connected to others by several strands, such a fabric can resist collapse better than a simple, unbranched circle of threads -- which if cut anywhere breaks down as a whole." 79 **By causing widespread extinctions, humans have artificially simplified many ecosystems**. As biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of ecosystem failure. The spreading Sahara Desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are relatively mild examples of what might be expected if this trend continues. Theoretically, **each new animal or plant extinction,** with all its dimly perceived and intertwined affects, **could cause total ecosystem collapse and human extinction. Each new extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an aircraft's wings, 80 [HU]mankind may be edging closer to the abyss.**

**Solar causes NF3 increases – that causes extreme warming**

**Conniff ‘12**

Guggenheim Fellow, 08 (Richard, National Magazine Award-winning writer, has written for Yale e360 about carbon offsets and clean coal, November 13, “The Greenhouse Gas That Nobody Knew,” http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2085, d/a 8-2-12, ads)

**When industry began using NF3** **in** high-tech **manufacturing**, **it was hailed as a way to fight global warming. But new research shows that this gas has 17,000 times the warming potential of carbon dioxide and is rapidly increasing in the atmosphere** – and **that's turning an environmental success** story **into a public relations disaster**.¶ Hypothetical question: You’re heartsick about global warming, so you’ve just paid $25,000 to put a solar system on the roof of your home. How do you respond to news that it was manufactured with a chemical that is 17,000 times stronger than carbon dioxide as a cause of global warming?¶ It may sound like somebody’s idea of a bad joke. But last month, **a study from the Scripps Institution of Oceanography reported that** nitrogen trifluoride (**NF3**), with a global warming potential of 17,000, **is now present in the atmosphere at four times the expected level and rapidly rising**. **Use of NF3 is** currently **booming**, **for** products from computer chips and flats-screen LCDs to thin-film **solar photovoltaics**, **an economical and increasingly popular solar power format**.¶ Moreover, the Kyoto Protocol, which limits a half-dozen greenhouse gases, does not cover NF3. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change now lists it among five major new greenhouse gases likely to be included in the next phase of global warming regulation, after 2012. And while that may be reassuring, it also suggests the complicated character of the global warming problem.

#### Consumption and consumerism are inevitable and build ethical democratic solidarity

**Cohen 2**

(Patricia, Writer for the New York Times, citing James B. Twitchell, Professor of English at the University of Florida, “In Defense Of Our Wicked, Wicked Way”, The New York Times, July 7, <http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/jtwitche/nytimesarticle.pdf>)

''I CAN stand here and look at this for hours,'' said James B. Twitchell as he parked himself in front of the bottled water section in City Market, just past the jars of $30-per-pound teas and behind the eight-foot display of imported olive oils.¶ Mr. Twitchell, a professor of English at the University of Florida in Gainesville, specializes in the Romantic poets, but his real obsession is shopping. Given the choice of reading literary theorists like Foucault or gazing at shelves stacked with artfully shaped bottles of water piled up like Jay Gatsby's beautifully tailored shirts, he would quickly choose the latter. ''There is more that I can sustain myself with at the water aisle than in all of modern criticism,'' he said.¶ In a series of books, the latest of which is ''Living It Up: Our Love Affair With Luxury'' (Columbia University Press), Mr. **Twitchell has detailed the consumption habits of Americans** with all the scholarly delight of a field anthropologist who has discovered the secret courting rituals of a remote tribe. **He is** exquisitely **attuned to the** subtle **gradations of status conferred by the labels on what people wear, eat, drink, drive and freeze ice cubes in.¶** And he is not alone. **Whether prompted by the 90's spendathon or** the **endless fascination** not only **with shopping,** but with **reading about shopping**, a new title by an academic or journalist on the subject appears practically every week. Burlington, where Mr. Twitchell grew up and where he now spends summers, was singled out by David Brooks in his wickedly funny ''Bobos in Paradise'' as a model Latte Town, a city that has perfectly reconciled the mercenary instincts of the bourgeoisie with the artistic spirit of the bohemians to create an upscale consumer culture.¶ What distinguishes Mr. Twitchell's study of excessive consumerism, though, is that he applauds it. To him, Evian and Pellegrino, Vermont Pure and Dasani are evidence of what could be called his trickledown theory of luxury: that **the defining characteristic of today's society is the average person's embrace of u**nnecessary **consumption**, **superficial indulgence, wretched excess and endless status-seeking**. Oh, earthly paradise!¶ Once defined by exclusiveness, luxury is now available -- **whether in the form of** limited-edition coffee at **Starbucks or Michael Graves tea kettles at Target** -- to all. And that, Mr. Twitchell maintains, **is a good thing**. Sure, he argues in his book, buying essentially useless luxury items ''is one-dimensional, shallow, ahistorical, without memory and expendable. But **it is** also strangely **democratic and unifying. If what you want is peace on earth, a unifying system** that transcends religious, cultural and caste differences, well, whoops!, **here it is. The Global Village** is not the City on the Hill, not quite the Emerald City, and certainly not quite what millennial utopians had in mind, but **it** **is closer to equitable distribution of rank than what other systems have provided.''¶** That is, to say the least, a minority report. For centuries, philosophers, artists and clerics railed against luxury. Ecclesiastical courts forbade most people from eating chocolate, drinking coffee or wearing colors like Prussian blue and royal purple -- ''luxuria'' that signaled living above one's God-ordered place.¶ Thorstein Veblen offered the first modern critique of ''conspicuous consumption'' in his 1899 treatise ''The Theory of the Leisure Class.'' Post-World War II social critics and economists extended Veblen's critique to the expanding middle class. John Kenneth Galbraith warned in ''The Affluent Society'' of the binge afflicting the postwar generation. Unwitting consumers, he said, were essentially suckered by admen and salesmen into spending money on things they didn't need.¶ In his 1970 study ''The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism'' Daniel Bell argued that ''the culture was no longer concerned with how to work and achieve, but with how to spend and enjoy.'' This trend, he warned, could end up undermining the very work ethic that made capitalism function.¶ That, obviously, did not happen. If anything people worked more so they could spend more. In ''The Overspent American,'' Juliet B. Schor noted that **people no longer compared themselves with** others in the same income bracket, but with **the richer and more famous they saw on television, propelling them to spend more** than they could afford.¶ To Mr. Twitchell, the naysayers are scolds and spoilsports. **Indoor plumbing, sewing machines, dishwashers, college educations, microwaves, coronary bypasses, birth control and air travel all began as luxury items for the wealthy.¶** Nor are buyers mindlessly duped by canny advertisers into buying items they don't really want, he said. Quite the opposite. They enjoy the sensual feel of an Hermès silk tie, the briny delicacy of Petrossian caviar or simply the sensation of indulging themselves. **These things may not bring happiness, but neither does their absence from the lives of people too poor to afford them.¶** It may seem an odd moment to champion luxury. The spectacular boom of the 90's now looks as if it was partly built on spectacular sleight of hand, with Enron, Global Crossing, Adelphia and WorldCom all recently admitting that billions in reported profits were nonexistent. The moment seems ripe for a chastened culture to repent its indulgences. Reassessing the get-and-spend ethic -- not defending consumerism -- might well be the defining current of the next few years.¶ The problem with Mr. Twitchell's view, said Robert H. Frank, author of ''Luxury Fever,'' is that our sense of what we need to live comfortably keeps spiraling upward. It is not that luxury spending isn't good for particular individuals, but that it is bad for society overall. ''It's like when everybody stands up for a better view, you don't see better than before,'' Mr. Frank said from his home in Ithaca. There's a lot of waste in luxury spending. Instead of building safer roads or providing better health care, we are spending that money on bigger diamonds and faster cars.¶ Mr. Twitchell is unpersuaded, however. Walking down Church Street, Burlington's busy pedestrian mall, he pointed out the transformation that the consumer culture has wrought in his hometown. Lean and tanned, with cropped gray hair and rounded tortoise-shell glasses, Mr. Twitchell looks a bit like Dennis the Menace's father after Dennis has grown up, moved across the country and given his old man a few years to recover. ''Church Street once serviced needs, now it services desires,'' Mr. Twitchell said. The optician's shop is gone, and so is Sears and JCPenney. He pointed out the Ann Taylor store, where the Masonic temple used to be. A chic French children's store sits in the old bank.¶ ''The key to modern luxe is that most of us can have a bit of it on the plate,'' Mr. Twitchell said. ''I can't own a Lexus, but I can rent one. I can't go to Bermuda for a winter, but I can have a time share for a weekend. I don't own a yacht but I'm taking a Princess cruise.''¶ The process of democratization is mirrored in Mr. Twitchell's family history. His great-grandfather Andrew A. Buell made his fortune building wooden boxes from Adirondack lumber. Driving up Lodge Road to ''the hill,'' where Mr. Buell built a red stone Romanesque mansion with a copper-topped tower, Mr. Twitchell passed the Burlington Country Club, which his grandfather Marshall Coleman Twitchell helped found. The family's sprawling former home is now a women's dormitory, and the surrounding 66-acre estate serves as the University of Vermont's Redstone campus. A couple of blocks from the hilltop, both in location and status, is the relatively modest white wooden house that Mr. Twitchell, the son of Marshall Coleman Twitchell Jr., an ophthalmologist, and his sisters grew up in.¶ At that time, said Mr. Twitchell, now 59, one's social place was determined by birth, or ''what I call the lucky sperm culture.'' Today, birth-ordained status has been supplanted by store-bought status. Mr. Twitchell has no regrets about this lost world. ''Though I was a beneficiary of it, I'm glad it's over,'' he said. ''There is something refreshing about the material world that downtown Burlington opened up.'' Compared to the traditional ways of marking status -- race, parentage, accent, private schools -- one's purchases are a preferable way of telling who's up and who's down, he said.¶ On that point, Mr. Twitchell is not alone. Gary Cross, a historian at Penn State University, said that consumer culture in one sense is ''democracy's highest achievement, giving meaning and dignity to people when workplace participation, ethnic solidarity and even representative democracy have failed.''¶ Still, as Mr. Cross argued in 2000 in ''An All-Consuming Century: Why Commercialism Won in Modern America,'' ''most of us, no matter our politics, are repulsed by the absolute identity of society with the market and individual choice with shopping.''¶ True enough, Mr. Twitchell readily conceded. But he maintains the critics are missing the essential characteristic of luxury spending. ''Luxury has very little to do with money or things,'' he said. ''Luxury is a story we tell about things,'' and it's ultimately the story we are after. That is, our purchases are imbued with elaborate narratives about the life we want to live.¶ It is advertisers and manufacturers who give objects meaning by constructing the stories about them, Mr. Twitchell said, and that meaning is as much a source of desire as the object itself. Think of the elaborate fantasies spun by marketers like Ralph Lauren and Martha Stewart.¶ It goes for whatever you're buying, whether it's Jimmy Choo, Birkenstock or Payless shoes. When Mr. Twitchell, a dedicated factory outlet shopper, flashes his member's card at Sam's Club, ''the allure is not just that I'm saving money,'' he said, ''but that I'm smarter and savvier, that I'm duping the duper.''¶ Or consider an experiment he performed on his colleagues. He told some English professors that he was going to spend $6,000 to buy an 1850 copy of Wordsworth's ''Prelude.'' Brilliant idea, everyone said. A few days later, Mr. Twitchell told the same colleagues that he had changed his mind and was going to use the $6,000 to buy a used BMW. ''I could have said that I was investing in a collection of Beanie Babies comics or a diamond pinkie ring for the shocked response that I got,'' he wrote.¶ **Critics of consumption will say they are making a moral argument**, Mr. Twitchell said, but ''often **what is condemned as luxury is really just a matter of taste.''**¶ To Mr. Twitchell, **as long as human beings crave sensation, they will desire material goods and luxurious** ones at that, Wall Street scandals notwithstanding. ''If this year it's Enron and WorldCom, then another year it was Long-Term Capital Management,'' he said.¶ **Recessions may come and go, but consumption is eternal.** The ad slogan is right: Diamonds are forever.

**Capitalism key to space**

**Blundell,** director general of the Institute for Economic Affairs, **2004** (John, “Mission to Mars must go private to succeed,” February 2, http://www.iea.org.uk/record.jsp?type=news&ID=166)

What **we need** is **capitalists in space**. Capitalism needs property rights, enforcement of contracts and the rule of law. The ideological tussle does not cease once we are beyond the ionosphere. With the exception of Arthur C Clarke, none of us imagined the entertainment potential from satellites. Geostationary lumps of electronic gadgetry beam us our BSkyB television pictures. I remain in awe that Rupert Murdoch can place a device in the skies above Brazil that sends a signal to every home in each hemisphere. Who could have foreseen that **mobile phones** could keep us chattering without any wiring, or that **global position techniques** could plot where we all are to within a metre? **These are business applications. Business is already in space. Markets detect and apply opportunities that are not envisaged by** even the most accomplished **technicians.** I’m not saying Murdoch has special competences. I imagine he is as baffled by digital miracles as I am. The point is that **companies define** and refine **what public bodies cannot achieve**. Lift the veil of course and all those satellite firms are an intricate web of experts supplying ideas and services**. We have an infant space market.** What use will the Moon be? Is there value on Mars other than the TV rights? The answer is nobody can know. We can only make some guesses. The Spanish ships that set off for the US thought they would get to India. The Portuguese knew they’d reach China. The English followed them westwards seeking gold. In fact, they got tobacco. Events always confound expectations. The arguments for putting men on Mars are expressly vague from President Bush. Perhaps he was really bidding for votes. From my reading **the best results may be medical. Zero**, or low**, gravity techniques** may **allow therapies** of which we are ignorant. It seems facetious to suggest **tourism may be a big part of space opportunity** but as both the North and South poles are over-populated and there is a queue at the top of Mount Everest, a trip to the Sea of Tranquility may prove a magnet for the wealthy. Instead of NASA’s grotesque bureaucracy it may be Thomas Cook will be a greater force for exploration. NASA could be a procurement body. It need not design and run all space ventures. It could sub-contract far more extensively. Without specialised engineering expertise it is not easy to criticise projects such as the shuttle. It seems to be excessively costly and far too fragile. **There are private space entrepreneurs already**. They are tiddlers up against the mighty NASA. Yet Dan **Goldin, the NASA leader, says he favours the privatisation of space: "We can’t afford to do solar system exploration until we turn these activities over to the** cutting edge **private sector**..."Some may say that commercialising portions of NASA’s functions is heresy. Others may think we are taking a path that will ruin the wonders of space. I believe that **when NASA can creatively partner, all of humankind will reap the benefits of access to open space".** Is it possible the Moon has a more noble future than merely a branch office of NASA? Is it tolerable that Mars could be a subsidiary of the USA? Could it be nominally a further state of the union? These are not silly questions. In time space will be defined by lawyers and accountants as property rights will need to be deliberated. One possibility may be that both environments are so hostile that Mars and the Moon will never be more than token pockets for humanity. On the evidence so far it is the orbiting satellites that have made us see the Earth through new eyes. We can survey and explore the planet better from 200 miles up than stomping on the surface. The emerging commercial body of space law is derived from telecommunications law. It is perplexing and contrary to our immediate senses. How can you own or exchange something as intangible as digital messages bouncing off satellites? Yet we all pay our mobile phone bills. Many of the business results of space exploration are unintended consequences of NASA’s early adventures. Computer development would probably have been slower but for the need for instrumentation for Apollo. Are there prospects for Scottish firms in space? The prizes will not go to only the mega corporations. Perhaps Dobbies, the Edinburgh garden centre group, can create new roses by placing pots beyond gravity. Edinburgh University laboratories, or rather their commercial spin offs, could patent new medicines. Is it possible the genetic magicians at the Bush could hitch a ride into space and extend their discoveries? NASA is a monopolist. All monopolies are bad for business. They only stunt opportunities. They blunt alternatives. **By opening space to entrepreneurship we will be starting on** what FA Hayek memorably describes as "a **discovery procedure". Science is an open system. So is capitalism.**

**Solves extinction**

**Pelton in ’03**

 (Joseph, Director of the Space and Advanced Communications Research institute at George Washington University and Executive Director of the Arthur C. Clarke Foundation, “COMMENTARY: Why Space? The Top 10 Reasons”, September 23, http://www.space.com/news/commentary\_top10\_030912.html)

Actually **the lack of a space program could get us all killed**. I dont mean you or me or my wife or children. I mean that Homo sapiens as a species are actually endangered. Surprising to some**, a well conceived space program may well be our only hope for long-term survival**. The right or wrong decisions about space research and exploration may be key to the futures of our grandchildren or great-grandchildren or those that follow. Arthur C. Clarke, the author and screenplay writer for 2001: A Space Odyssey, put the issue rather starkly some years back when he said: **The dinosaurs are not around** today **because they did not have a space program**. He was, of course, referring to the fact that we now know **a** quite largish **meteor** crashed into the earth, released poisonous Iridium chemicals into our atmosphere and created a killer cloud above the Earth that **blocked out the sun** for a prolonged period of time. This **could have been foreseen and averted with a sufficient**ly advanced **space program**. But this is only one example of how space programs, such as NASAs Spaceguard program, help protect our fragile planet. **Without a space program we would not know about the large ozone hole in our atmosphere**, the hazards of **solar radiation,** the path of **killer hurricanes** or many other environmental dangers. But this is only a fraction of the ways that space programs are crucial to our future. He Continues… Protection against catastrophic planetary accidents: It is easy to assume that an erratic meteor or comet will not bring destruction to the Earth because the probabilities are low. The truth is **we are bombarded from space daily. The dangers are greatest not from a cataclysmic collision, but from not knowing enough about solar storms, cosmic radiation and the ozone layer. An enhanced Spaceguard Program is actually a prudent course that could save our species** in time.

#### Cap is inevitable

Walter Russell **Mead, 2008**. James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College , The Australian, “Boom and bust the way of the West”, Dec 5, 2008,

And those 300 years have been marked by one financial crisis after another. Even before the English began to dominate global markets, the Dutch suffered though the tulip bubble of the 17thcentury. There was the South Sea bubble of the early 18th century. There were the panics of the Napoleonic wars, followed by successive and intensifying panics and crashes during the 19th century. **Financial crises have continued throughout the 20th century and now into the 21st. And none of those panics and crashes interrupted or fundamentally altered the liberal capitalist path of development**. It is possible, of course, that this time is different, but **history gives us sound reason to believe that this kind of economic crisis does not mean the system is failing or has failed.** Indeed, **economic crisis is intrinsic to the capitalist economic system. It's not pleasant, but it is a regular and inevitable part of our lives.** This is **because the essence of capitalism is change.** Capitalism constantly forces us to innovate, to do things differently, and as the economy changes we no longer understand it as well as we once did. In the past 25 years we have seen a series of revolutionary changes taking place in financial markets. **We have seen extraordinary progress in the way information technology has been harnessed for the purposes of market trading. There have been new kinds of securities developed.** The crisis occurred because market participants and regulators no longer fully understand how the toe bone is connected to the foot bone in an international financial crisis. But **none of this means capitalism has failed; it means capitalism is succeeding. The history of the world economy shows us that crisis and panic have been our teachers. It is only through the study of past crashes that we have been able to understand risks and trade-offs in markets. We will come to grips with our past failures and figure out ways to protect against the problems that have landed us here, at least until markets develop a new level of complexity that defeats us and leads to yet another meltdown.**

**Psychoanalysis can’t be scaled up to explain society or politics – they can’t explain our impacts and definitely can’t solve**

**Sharpe**, lecturer, philosophy and psychoanalytic studies, and Goucher, senior lecturer, literary and psychoanalytic studies – Deakin University, **‘10**

(Matthew and Geoff, Žižek and Politics: An Introduction, p. 182 – 185, Figure 1.5 included)

Can we bring some order to this host of criticisms? It is remarkable that, for all the criticisms of Žižek’s political Romanticism, no one has argued that the ultra- extremism of **Žižek’s political position might reflect his untenable attempt to shape his model for political action on the curative** final **moment in clinical psychoanalysis.** The differences between these two realms, listed in Figure 5.1, are nearly too many and too great to restate **– which has** perhaps **caused** the theoretical oversight**.** The key thing is this. **Lacan’s** notion of **traversing the fantasy involves** the **radical transformation of people’s subjective structure: a refounding of** their most **elementary beliefs** about themselves, the world, and sexual difference. **This is** undertaken **in the security of the clinic**, on the basis of the analysands’ voluntary desire to overcome their inhibitions, symptoms and anxieties.

As a clinical and existential process, it has its own independent importance and authenticity. **The analysands**, in transforming their subjective world, **change the way they regard the objective**, shared social reality outside the clinic. But they do not transform the world. **The political relevance of the clinic** can only be (a) as a supporting moment in ideology critique or (b) as a fully- fl edged model of politics, provided that the political subject and its social object are ultimately identical. Option (*b*), Žižek’s option, **rests on the idea**, not only **of a subject** who becomes who he is only through his (mis) recognition of the objective sociopolitical order, but **whose ‘traversal** of the fantasy’ **is immediately identical with** his **transformation of the socio- political system** or Other. Hence, according to Žižek, we can analyse the institutional embodiments of this Other using psychoanalytic categories. In Chapter 4, we saw Žižek’s resulting elision of the distinction between the (subjective) Ego Ideal and the (objective) Symbolic Order. **This leads him to analyse our entire culture as a single subject–object,** whose perverse (or perhaps even psychotic) structure is expressed in every manifestation of contemporary life. Žižek’s decisive political- theoretic errors, one substantive and the other methodological, are different (see Figure 5.1)

The *substantive problem* is to equate any political change worth the name with the total change of the subject–object that is, today, global capitalism. This is a type of change that can only mean equating politics with violent regime change, and ultimately embracing dictatorial government, as Žižek now frankly avows (*IDLC* 412–19). We have seen that the ultra- political form of Žižek’s criticism of everyone else, **the theoretical Left and** the **wider politics**, is that **no one is sufficiently radical for him** – even, we will discover, Chairman Mao. We now see that **this is because Žižek’s model of politics** proper **is modelled on** a pre- critical analogy with the total transformation of a subject’s entire subjective structure, at the end of the talking cure. For what could the concrete consequences of this governing analogy be?

We have seen that **Žižek equates the individual** fantasy **with** the **collective identity of an entire people.** The social fantasy, he says, structures the regime’s ‘inherent transgressions’: at once subjects’ habitual ways of living the letter of the law, and the regime’s myths of origin and of identity. **If political action is modelled on the Lacanian cure, it must involve the complete ‘traversal’** – in Hegel’s terms, the abstract versus the determinate negation – **of** all these **lived myths**, practices and habits. Politics must involve the periodic founding of entire new subject–objects. Providing the model for this set of ideas, the fi rst Žižekian political subject was Schelling’s divided God, who gave birth to the entire Symbolic Order before the beginning of time (*IDLC* 153; *OB* 144–8).

But **can the political theorist reasonably** hope or **expect** that **subjects will simply give up on all their inherited ways**, myths and beliefs, all in one world- creating moment? And can they be legitimately asked or expected to, on the basis of a set of ideals whose legitimacy they will only retrospectively see, after they have acceded to the Great Leap Forward? And **if they do not** – for Žižek laments that today subjects are politically disengaged in unprecedented ways – **what means can the theorist and his allies use to move them to do so?**

**They don’t access the solvency deficit debate- their method allows dominant ontologies to overcode the terms of debate- the terminal impact is perpetuation of statist violence**

**Shapiro ‘97**

(Michael j., prof of pol sci @ univ of Hawaii/phd in pol sci @ northwestern 1966/former prof @ uc berkeley, nyu, & umass, violent cartographies: mapping cultures of war, univ of Minnesota press, p. 58-60)

When dealing with this use of alterity at a collective level – that is, with the primary modes of otherness with which cultures, societies, and nations police their boundaries – we must view the enmities involved in warfare more ethnographically than strategically. A comparison of tribal and state collectiveies therefore suggests itself, especially because the ontological aspects of enmity are more forthrightly expressed in the case of the former. For example, ethnographic evidence suggests that for the Huron tribes of the Great Lakes in the seventeenth century, for some of the Native American tribes of the US plains at the same tiem, and, more recently, for the Anggor of New Guinea, cosmological commitments and other dimensions of the cultural or group ontology provide the collective coherence that determines the peaceful versus militant or violent apprehension of Others. **In the case of the modern state, a complex clash of interpretive** positions, driven by interests, bureaucracies and institutional complexities, and **ideological positions, plays a major role in the selection of dangers** in general and **foes** in particular. As a result, the **ontological aims**, which are forthrightly expressed in tribal societies, **are over coded by official and bureaucratic discourses in modern states.** Nevertheless, although warfare in the modern state is legitimated on the basis of a discourse of security interests, to which a variety of security-related agencies contribute, the ontological aims can be recovered despite the dominance of policy-oriented rhetoric, very much the way they were in Clausewitz’s discourse. **The ontological interests driving hostilities go unarticulated because a policy grammar commands attention, and the rationale for violence emerges as something like** suppressing or **destroying external threats.** ]

## 2NC

Somehow the speech doc now has no cards. We said that extinction is important, nuclear war hasn’t happened yet, and they don’t have a good relationship with death

## 1NR

### Fetish

**THE CONCEPT OF FETISHISM CANNOT BE A USEFUL ANALYTIC TOOL BECAUSE IT BEGINS WITH MISRECOGNITION.**

**WINOKUR 2K4**[mark, technologies of race: special effects, fetish, film, and the 15th century, “genders”: 40]

**The early modern anthropological fetish, then, acquires a number of qualities that we think of as having been attributed to it within later psychoanalysis or Marxism.  It is associated with the primitive, the irrational, and the mysterious.   It is a mystification of another culture’s relation to the material and economic realms.  As such, it is a symbol that both mediates between and hides the true socioeconomic relationships between two cultures**.  It is not, however, a symbol without a referent: **it refers to the weltanschauung of another culture, but in an exploitatively mistaken manner.**  It is méconnaissance at the cultural level, a newly mistaken Western notion.  Because it is lost, however, **the originary African idea of the fetish suggests, not that no African or new-world presence exists apart from its representation by the West, but that the notion of the fetish is both a projection—for example, of the early modern catholic/protestant problem of iconographic representation—and the (mis-)recognition of a newly perceived culture’s new orientation toward the material.  The fetish represents** both **orientalism** and méconnaissance, two psychoanalytic notions that were always, in some unacknowledged way, related.    [6] Further, if one credits the Foucauldian-derived notion that **skin color is not an important defining category until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries**, best exemplified by Ivan Hannaford’s Race: The History of an Idea, **such constructs as the fetish were, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the dominant categories that distinguished between cultures whose differences would later be more importantly denoted by pigmentation.   Fetishism as an anthropological term denoted arbitrariness and primitivism in culture; tribal Africa was initially enslavable not** (or not simply) **because it was black but, for example, because it was not identifiably Christian and did not practice emergent capitalism.** [7] **In short, the Portuguese coinage of the word already suggests the most important property of both the psychoanalytic and Marxist fetish: it’s there and it isn’t: a different culture exists, but not as imagined by the explorer.  The properties described by Marx and Freud in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are already connoted by the word at the moment of its coinage as a proto-anthropological term.  As a corruption of something original that is immediately lost to Western culture, the feitiço signifies both presence and absence as much for the Portuguese as "fetish" does for Freud and Marx**.  Just as the vagina disappears for the fetishist in psychoanalytic theory, and just as the produced thing is displaced by the fetishism of the commodity in Marx, **the original thing described by the word feitiço is real but not available to Western discourse.** Like Walter Benjamin’s notion of the impossibility of translation, or Jacques Lacan’s notion of the real, **"fetish" refers to a culture that it can not but mistakenly describe.**

**their expository desire to reveal our fetishes to us serves a double function as a mode of repression of otherness on the behalf of the observer. You should reject this xenophobic-coping mechanism**

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12] I use Ian’s account of **the correlation between Marxian and Freudian fetishes to demonstrate the fact that the poststructuralist fetish is typically engaged with only two of the three principal sources of contemporary political praxis: with gender and class, but not (perhaps understandably) with race.  This omission reproduces the** often-remarked American feminist tendency in the 1970s and early 1980s to **struggle for gender equality in various economic and psychical disciplines, while often forgetting about the importance of race in the political dialectic**.  In response, I would like to suggest a general definition of the fetish that might encompass class, psychoanalysis, and racial dimensions, and that combines Pietz’s observations about the Portuguese discovery of the fetish with Marx and Freud. As I’ve argued, **the fetish was originally an attempt to orientalize the visible material culture of the unknowable other in such a way that the other’s culture can exist only in monstrous form.  In the same way, modern disciplines define the fetish as monstrous or pathological deformations of the visibly material.  In anthropology, Marxism, and psychoanalysis, the fetish signifies for its believer a material object whose secret belies its materiality.  To its believer, the fetish signifies potency; to the Western observer, impotenc**e.  **At a different level of signification, however, the fetish serves a fetish function for the observer as well—for the psychoanalyst as for the proto-anthropologist.  Identifying the fetish as fetish serves to repress the observer’s fear of cultural otherness.**

### Cooption

**and, the term ‘censorship’ is a moralizing freudian term which codes the function of the critic into subjectivity – by presuming that all *true* individuals reject censorship, they make exclusion of all conflicting elements inevitable. that internal link turns their offense.**

**ratner 24**

[joseph, journal of philosophy, de-moralizing freud, feb. 28, vol. xxi, no. 5, college of the city of new york, from “east egg”, pp.113-117]

This tendency to view our desires in isolation without trying to find out their comparative value is greatly reinforced by that other Freudian term, which is also heavily charged with moral significance, namely, the censor.This term, like the term "suppression," summons to the mind an unfortunate image. A censor, especially to modern people, is an external controlling force that is opposed to the true needs and best interests of the individual. A censor is to be tolerated in times of emergency, such as in war, but at all other times he is to be heartily despised and stubbornly resisted by all freedom-loving men. For he is the worst sort of a tyrant. The Freudians, **to be sure, have by this term been calling atten- tion to an important, though quite homely, psychological fact.What they** symbolize in the censor **is** that firmly knit and organized aspect of the individual which expresses **his** character and individuality and represents **most fully his most** permanent interests. The real function symbolized in the censor is **the function of the critic in the individual-similar to that of the critic in politics or in literature- the function, namely**, to maintain consistently the integrity of the individual and rigorously to exclude all sporadic conflicting elements which seek to break down the established organization.